NERAL DE GAULLE: *Rebirth of Liberal France*

FREE WORLD

Future of Europe

discussed by

NORMAN ANGELL
MAX BEER
HENRI BONNET
PIERRE COT
FELIKS GROSS
JOSEF HANC
FINN MOE
CARLO SFORZA
RUSTEM VAMBERY
J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

LOUIS DOLIVET, *Chairman*

Problems of the Pacific

by H. V. Evatt

Australian Minister for External Affairs

The Search for Principles

by Lin Yutang

After Il Duce, What?

by Gaetano Salvemini

ALSO

Ernest K. Lindley's

World Scene in Washington

PROPERTY OF THE LIBRARY OF THE
MAY 24 1943
WOMAN'S COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

JUNE, 1943
40c PER ISSUE
CANADA, 50c

. . . and now The Pulitzer Prize to



Upton Sinclair

for his great modern novel

DRAGON'S TEETH

This story of an American behind the scenes of current history, his adventures in pre-war Nazi Germany, belongs among those recent works with which Upton Sinclair has reached a new peak in his remarkable literary career. Since 1940, four novels of his have appeared, each telling of Lanny Budd and his career in the world of international intrigue —each a completely separate story. The Prize winner is the third of the group; *Wide Is the Gate*, the most recent, is an outstanding current best seller. *Each Volume $3.00*

WORLD'S END
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

DRAGON'S TEETH
WIDE IS THE GATE

H. G. Wells: "The completest and most fruitful picture of that period that has been done, or is likely to be done."

George Bernard Shaw: "When people ask me what has happened in my long lifetime I do not refer them to the newspaper files and to the authorities, but to Upton Sinclair's novels."

Lewis Browne: "Sinclair has made history more vivid and absorbing than any mere historian could ever do."

Walter Duranty: "The best reconstruction of Europe in the immediate pre-war period that I have come across."

Oswald Garrison Villard: "The narrative becomes more vivid and compelling on every page and finally swept me completely off my feet emotionally."

Lion Feuchtwanger: "He discloses more about our epoch than a thousand detailed news reports. He makes the age come alive."

Thomas Mann: ". . . strong and truthful . . . Whoever knows Nazi Germany will admit that not a word in Sinclair's book is exaggerated."

John Haynes Holmes: "He gives a picture of this age that is beyond compare for its vividness and vision, and which is destined to live indefinitely into the future as one of the giant literary spectacles of this period of human destiny."

Dorothy Canfield Fisher: "I have read it with attention and admiration, much moved by its power and sincerity. It seems to me the best book of Sinclair's I have read. The book and its characters are rich in human complexity."

THE VIKING PRESS NEW YORK

FREE WORLD

A Monthly Magazine

devoted to

Democracy and World Affairs

VOLUME V, No. 6 **JUNE, 1943**

Springboard for Action (*Drawing*) . . . . . *Felix Kraus* 484
Editorials
At the Gates of Europe 485
Changes in the Argentine 487
Rebirth of Liberal France . . . . . Charles de Gaulle 488
Problems of the Pacific . . . . . Herbert V. Evatt 490
The Search for Principles . . . . . Lin Yutang 495
Democratic and Political Concepts of Common Wealth . . Richard Acland 498
Let's Not Fear That Revolution . . . . . Ferdinand Czernin 503
Drawing . . . . . Felix Kraus 506
After Il Duce, What in Italy? . . . . . Gaetano Salvemini 507
Must the United States Garrison the World? . . . . . Stanton A. Coblentz 511
Progress of the Struggle . . . . . Norman Angell 515
Snapshots at Random: Hitler, Mussolini, Laval, Stalin . . Lucien Vogel 519
The World Scene in Washington . . . . . Ernest K. Lindley 523
Round Table No. 16: The Democratic Organization of Europe 526
Special Correspondence: Japan Changes Propaganda Tactics in China . . . 546
Training Co-operative Leaders for China . . . . . George A. Hogg 548
American Japanese—Friends or Foes? . . . . . William Tani 552
Plans for the Future 556
Underground Reporter: Europe's Secret Freedom Press . . . E. R. Yarham 561
Sound-Effect . . . . . Richard MacCann 566
Books:
The Far East . . . . . William Diebold, Jr. 567
Industrial Offensive . . . . . D. C. B. 568
Signs of the Times . . . . . Richard Pike 568
Luminous and Moving . . . . . Albert Lippman 569
Psychology and Prices . . . . . Adolf F. Sturmthal 570
German Underground . . . . . Julius Deutsch 570
Among Ourselves 574

Drawings by B. F. Dolbin, Stan Fraydas, Tibor Gergely, Robert Hale, Felix Kraus, L. M., Löw-Bodek, Victor de Pauw, Tom

---

FREE WORLD is owned and published monthly by FREE WORLD, INC., 8 West Fortieth Street, New York, N. Y. Board of Directors: Li Yu Ying, Chairman; Hugh Moore and J. Alvarez del Vayo, Vice-Chairmen; Wousaofong, Secretary-Treasurer; Louis Dolivet, Freda Kirchwey, Frederick McKee. 40 cents a copy; $4.00 a year; $7.00 two years; $9.00 three years; Canadian and foreign postage $1.00 a year additional. Volume V, Number 6, June, 1943. Copyright 1943. All rights reserved; reproduction in whole or in part prohibited without permission. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. FREE WORLD is printed in the United States of America by Charles Francis Press, Inc., New York City. Entered as second class matter September 17, 1941, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

INTERNATIONA

MIGUEL O. DE ALMEIDA	*Professor of Physiology, Institute of Manguinhos, Brazil.*
MAX ASCOLI	*Dean, Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research.*
HENRY A. ATKINSON	*General Secretary, World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches.*
PHILIP J. NOEL BAKER	*Member of British Parliament, Author.*
DOROTHY J. BELLANCA	*Vice-President, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.*
ROBERT BENDINER	*Editor and Journalist.*
EDUARD BENEŠ	*President of the Czechoslovak Republic.*
G. A. BORGESE	*Professor of Italian Literature, University of Chicago.*
CLAUDE G. BOWERS	*United States Ambassador to Chile.*
ESTHER C. BRUNAUER	*Associate in Education, American Association of University Women.*
BALDOMERO SANIN CANO	*Rector of the University of Cauca.*
GEN. LAZARO CARDENAS	*Former President of Mexico.*
F. J. VAN CAUWELAERT	*President of the Belgian Chamber of Deputies.*
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD	*Nobel Peace Prize, 1937; Co-President, International Peace Campaign.*
BEN M. CHERRINGTON	*Director, Foundation for the Advancement of Social Sciences, University of Denver.*
MME. CHIANG KAI-SHEK 蔣宋美齡	
CHU HSUEH-FAN	*President of the Chinese Association of Labor.*
JOHN B. CONDLIFFE	*Professor of Economics, University of California.*
MERCER COOK	*Professor at Atlanta University.*
PERCY E. CORBETT	*Gale Professor of Roman Law, McGill University.*
DAVID CUSHMAN COYLE	*Consulting Engineer and Economist.*
J. W. DAFOE	*President and Editor,* WINNIPEG FREE PRESS.
JONATHAN DANIELS	*Editor of* THE NEWS AND OBSERVER, *Raleigh, North Carolina.*
TARAKNATH DAS	*Author; Lecturer on Oriental History and International Relations at the College of the City of New York.*
CHARLES A. DAVILA	*Former Minister of Rumania to the United States.*
JULIUS DEUTSCH	*Former Minister of War of the Austrian Republic.*
PAULO DUARTE	*Brazilian Journalist.*
STEPHEN DUGGAN	*Director of the Institute of International Education.*
ALBERT EINSTEIN	*Member of Faculty, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.*
H. V. EVATT	*Minister for External Affairs of Australia.*
MORDECAI EZEKIEL	*Economic Adviser to the Secretary of Agriculture.*
CHARLES G. FENWICK	*Member of the Inter-American Juridical Commission.*
HON. ADELARD GODBOUT	*Prime Minister of the Province of Quebec.*
FRANK P. GRAHAM	*President of the University of North Carolina.*
HAROLD K. GUINZBURG	*Publisher.*
JOHN GUNTHER	*Writer, Foreign Correspondent, and Radio Analyst.*
MRS. J. B. HARRIMAN	*Former United States Minister to Norway.*
OLAV HINDAHL	*Minister of Labor of Norway.*
BERNARDO IBAÑEZ	*Secretary-General, Confederation of Workers of Chile.*
HON. HAROLD L. ICKES	*Secretary of the Interior.*
F. CYRIL JAMES	*Principal and Vice-Chancellor of McGill University.*
COUNT MICHEL KAROLYI	*Former Prime Minister of Hungary.*
HENRIK DE KAUFFMANN	*Minister of Denmark to the United States.*
HON. DOROTHY KENYON	*Counsellor at Law.*
PIERRE KRIER	*Minister of Labor of Luxemburg.*

Honorary Board

GUILLERMO LABARCA	*Professor, University of Santiago, Chile.*
FIORELLO H. LA GUARDIA	*Mayor of New York City.*
HENRI LAUGIER	*Former Director of the Institute of Scientific Research of France; Professor at the University of Montreal.*
FRANCISCO PEREZ LEIROS	*Vice-President, Latin-American Confederation of Workers.*
MAX LERNER	*Professor of Political Science, Williams College.*
LI YU YING 李石曾	*President of the National Chinese Academy, Peiping.*
LIN YUTANG 林語堂	*Author, Formerly Professor at University of Peiping.*
ENRIQUE S. DE LOZADA	*Professor, Williams College.*
ARCHIBALD MAC LEISH	*Librarian of Congress.*
THOMAS MANN	*Author; Nobel Prize for Literature, 1929.*
J. D. G. MEDLEY	*Vice-Chancellor, University of Melbourne, Australia.*
PIERRE MENDES FRANCE	*Deputy and former Minister of France.*
EDOUARD MONTPETIT	*Director of the School for Social, Economic and Political Science; Secretary-General of the University of Montreal.*
GUNNAR MYRDAL	*Professor of Economics, University of Stockholm.*
REINHOLD NIEBUHR	*Chairman of the Union for Democratic Action.*
FERNANDO ORTIZ	*Editor of* REVISTA BIMESTRE CUBANA *and of* ULTRA *(Havana)*
A. OSSORIO Y GALLARDO	*Former Ambassador of the Spanish Republic to Argentina.*
ISABEL DE PALENCIA	*Former Minister of the Spanish Republic to Sweden.*
RALPH BARTON PERRY	*Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University.*
STOYAN PRIBICHEVICH	*Author.*
WALTER P. REUTHER	*International Vice-President, U. A. W.*
SYNGMAN RHEE	*First President of the Provisional Government of the Korean Republic.*
WALTER P. REUTHER	*International Vice President and Director of the General Motors Department of the UAW-CIO.*
JUAN ANTONIO RIOS	*President of the Chilean Republic and a member of the Honorary Board of* Mundo Libre, *the Chilean edition of* FREE WORLD.
PAUL RIVET	*Director of the Museum of Natural Science of Paris; Professor at the University of Bogota.*
GAETANO SALVEMINI	*Lecturer, Harvard University.*
F. R. SCOTT	*Professor of Civil Law, McGill University, Montreal.*
COUNT CARLO SFORZA	*Senator; Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.*
JAMES T. SHOTWELL	*Professor, Columbia University.*
T. V. SOONG 宋子文	*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic.*
JAN STANCZYK	*Minister of Labor and of Social Welfare of Poland, Secretary-General of Polish Mine Workers.*
CLARENCE K. STREIT	*Chairman of Federal Union; Author of "Union Now."*
RAYMOND GRAM SWING	*Writer and Radio Analyst.*
ALBERTO TARCHIANI	*Former Editor,* CORRIERE DELLA SERA; *Secretary-General,* MAZZINI SOCIETY, *New York.*
DOROTHY THOMPSON	*Columnist.*
VINCENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO	*President of the Latin American Workers Federation.*
RUSTEM VAMBERY	*Former Professor of Criminology, University of Budapest.*
EDUARDO VILLASENOR	*General Director of* BANCO DE MEXICO.
LUCIEN VOGEL	*Former Publisher and Editor of* LU *and of* VU, *Paris.*
WILLIAM W. WAYMACK	*Vice-President, Editor* DES MOINES REGISTER AND TRIBUNE.
MARY E. WOOLLEY	*President Emeritus of Mount Holyoke College.*
QUINCY WRIGHT	*Professor of International Law, University of Chicago.*

"Africa is no halting place. It is not a seat but a springboard"
—WINSTON CHURCHILL

EDITORIALS

At the Gates of Europe

WHEN these lines are printed, the last armed nazi soldier in Africa will have been killed or imprisoned, or will have fled. The air of Africa, poisoned by the presence of human beasts, will have been cleared; the concentration camps, prisons, and ghettos opened; and for hundreds of thousands of men and women life will again be worth living. The Nazi will have left not only a memory of cruelty but also one of shameful cowardice. For many years to come, the local population and the Allied soldiers who participated in this campaign will not forget the picture of the nazi superman abandoning his Italian comrades-in-arms and running for his life; and the story will be handed down from generation to generation.

One feels almost savage joy in thinking that so many assassins have been made powerless to kill, for the nazi has committed so many crimes that one can no longer think of him as a soldier fulfilling his duty to his country; he can only be regarded as the willing instrument of the inhuman nazi machine.

But there are those who have fled—

We imagine some officer' mess inside "Fortress Europe." The nazi officers who have escaped the hell of North Africa are talking. At first their language is boastful; they have temporarily regained a sense of security. The bristling arms, the well-packed air fields, the still-intact machinery of the German Reich, and above all, the desire not to appear cowardly to their comrades make them talk about the "colossal stupidity" of the American and English generals who did not know how to use their superiority. But as the night advances and alcohol loosens their tongues, caution leaves them. Slowly they tell the real story of North Africa. They draw a picture of the horrors through which they have lived; they tell how defenses that were meant to last for weeks or months lasted for hours only; they relate how their commanders lost their heads and how precious matériel fell into the hands of the Allies. They are particularly concerned with the fact that so many secret weapons—the 88 mm. gun, the Messerschmitts No. So-and-So, and the most sacred of them all, the super-tank M6, have fallen into the hands of the Allies. They fear that the technical services of the Allies are already studying effective counter-devices which will weaken the defenses of Europe.

Of course, at some moment, a fanatic member of the nazi party will spring to his feet and shout: "Stop this nonsense. The Fuehrer knows what he is doing. He lures the Allies to the European Continent in order to destroy them." Whereupon all those present will probably raise their hands and give the Hitler salute. But in the eyes of those who have escaped, there will remain an expression of terror, and when other people talk to them about the decaying British plutocracy, the "Hollywood" Army of the Yanks, or the effeminate French forces, they will remember the Mareth Line, Mateur, Bizerte, Tunis, Pont du Fahs.

The Tunisian campaign contains a number of extremely valuable lessons. First of all, it has proved the superiority of the armies of the Allies over the Nazis in hand-to-hand combat. But even more important, the breakdown of the whole system of German defenses in forty-eight hours has again proved a fact that first became apparent in 1918, namely, that the German General Staff and the German soldier are splendidly trained for victorious offensives but that they are badly prepared for long defensive operations. Contrasted with the gallant Russian resistance at Stalingrad, where the Germans had an even greater superiority than the Allies had in Tunisia, the nazi breakdown illustrates this moral and military lack of stamina. Finally, Tunisia has proved that the Luftwaffe has lost its old striking power and that German production cannot keep pace with the needs of more than one active battlefield.

The time is nearing when the Allies will more than ever need the support of hundreds of millions of men and women now enslaved on the European Continent and waiting for the moment when they can aid the Allied armies with their remaining strength. This is the time for the United Nations to wage the strongest kind of political warfare; now is the time for the superiority of the democratic argument over the fascist argument to be again proved to the whole world. This is the time to oppose the vision of a democratic world order to the prospect of fascist slavery. This is the time to call for the democratic revolution in Europe against the nazi counter-revolution.

Unfortunately, on the political front the situation is not as favorable as on the military front; remnants of the old forces and the old methods which are opposing the new spirit of the United Nations still linger on. Among the disturbing signs there is one that dominates all other concerns—the Soviet-Polish suspension of diplomatic relations to which reference is made by Norman Angell and Ernest K. Lindley elsewhere in this issue. The mere fact that an Allied Government could have taken a nazi accusation as a point of departure for a diplomatic démarche indicates that some of the old fascist elements of Poland have not lost their influence in vital matters. In confidential conversations these men preach the necessity of an anti-Soviet unity and even of an eventual war against Russia. They continue in their chauvinism, anti-Semitism, in attitudes characteristically fascist. The Russians know all this as well as we do. On the other hand, the Russian decision not to appeal to the United Nations but to take unilateral action is disquieting proof of the necessity for a Supreme Council of the United Nations, on which we have so often insisted in these pages.

Had such a council existed before, and at the time of, the Polish-Russian incident, it would certainly have drawn the attention of the Polish Government to the dangers in the machinations of these fascist elements. Russia would have had a higher body to which to appeal, and the whole incident might have been avoided. But the necessity for an immediate effective organization of the United Nations is merely illustrated by this incident; the whole political problem of the world demands it. There are fascist forces—and there will be more in the near future—which, having lost the hope of maintaining themselves in power with the help of the Axis, will turn to the Allies—not in sincere repentence, regretting their past mistakes, but as insolent pretenders to power under Allied protection, and with programs similar to those set in motion by Hitler against which humanity went to war.

For the time being, this is the greatest danger threatening the cause of the Democracies, and it is against this danger that the United Nations Governments and their people need to act with the same energy and determination which the armies of all the United Nations are showing on the battlefields.

Changes in the Argentine

THE military succession of the United Nations as well as the increasing realization of what the triumph of fascism would mean for Latin America have brought about changes favorable to our cause in the Argentine Republic, the only remaining neutral country of South America. The Radical Party, one of the most important in Argentina, decided at its last convention to enter into an alliance with the socialist and other democratic elements for presidential elections which will take place in the month of September.

Realizing the strength of this new political set-up, the Government of President Ramon S. Castillo is trying to present itself to the public in a more favorable light, as evidenced by the surprising statement against totalitarianism of Dr. Ruiz Guinazu, Minister of Foreign Affairs. But it remains merely a statement, and there is no sign that the present Argentine government has decided to sever its connection with the Axis powers. Much will depend in the near future on the internal evolution of Argentina and particularly on the outcome of the elections in the federal capital of Buenos Aires and in the provinces of Entre Rios, Santa Fé, Cordoba, and San Juan.

Our correspondent in Buenos Aires reports that the alliance between the Radical and Socialist parties is still in abeyance due to divergent views on the choice of the candidates for President and Vice President. The Socialists would like to have an outstanding national figure, not a party man.

Among those considered are Saavedra Lamas, former president of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Tomas Le Breton, ex-ambassador of the Argentine to Great Britain. The Radical Party, however, insists on the candidacy of a Radical. This difficulty might be overcome if the Socialists received satisfaction through the nomination of a socialist candidate for Vice President of the Republic.

The victory of the democratic alliance next September would result in a break of relations with the Axis and the alignment of Argentina with the other Latin American countries on the side of the United Nations. But even in case of defeat, the increased democratic strength in parliament and among the people will render it more difficult for the Government to continue a policy of neutrality. With every passing day public opinion is becoming more and more passionately anti-fascist. The Argentineans are particularly worried about the effect of the neutrality policy on the future role of Argentina in international affairs, and this issue will play a predominant part in the coming campaign. The Fifth Column in South America is far from being overthrown as the President of Bolivia made clear in a recent statement. The elements are making every effort to injure the United Nations and a vigorous offensive on the part of the democratic forces in Latin America is needed to counteract their work and influence.

Rebirth of Liberal France

by

CHARLES DE GAULLE

LONDON (by cable)

THIS war which has forced upon mankind such heavy and bloody sacrifices has no meaning and can have none unless a new world is to rise from its ruins and sufferings. A free world in which liberty is no longer a word but a reality and the essence of daily life for every man and every woman—that is what the soldiers on the war fronts and the heroes of resistance in enslaved Europe are demanding with all their might. And how can one think of this revived world without that nation which has made of liberty and human dignity the time-honored object of its thoughts and the vital objective of its activities? How can one imagine it without France?

At this moment the enemy and the traitors who assist the enemy have let loose over France a flood of repression and deportation. The young Frenchmen, the workers, the intellectuals are hunted, dragged from their hearthstones, thrown into concentration camps or prisons, and taken to Germany as slaves. Hitler and his accomplices wanted at any price to extinguish their fighting spirit. Nevertheless, that spirit flames up to light their every step. The French nation is still in this war. Not a single day passes without many and powerful blows struck at the enemy and at his war machine—mutinous conscripts escape deportation, workers sabotage production, patriots are uniting in the movements of resistance. The dictators of Berlin and Vichy believed that they would procure slaves; they find only rebels. The silent

army of liberation remains in the land, awaiting the hour when the allies of France clutch the monster by the throat.

Since June, 1940, Frenchmen outside of metropolitan France have not ceased to fight to the utmost, faithful to her alliances and loyal to her ideal. Her soldiers, her sailors, and her aviators have added glory to her name from Kouffra to Bir Hakeim, from Eritrea to Fezzan, from the Russian front to the Atlantic. With the English in Cyrenaica, with the Americans in the Pacific, with the Red Army in the East, alone with their flag in the mountains and sands of Tibesti and of southern Libya, striking the enemy with all their force, they showed him and forced him to recognize the determined will of the French people. The territories which have joined Fighting France have continued to put into the common fund of this world struggle their bases, their resources, and on more than one occasion, the lifeblood of their people. Who, in considering these sacrifices, could pretend that France, in spite of everything, has not played her part in the war—and that, at a time when her soil was invaded, her finest sons imprisoned and deported, and her very name defamed by lies and treason.

For some months now, the United Nations have again gradually assumed the offensive. An important part of the Empire, held in sham neutrality by the agents of the enemy, has again come into the war. Valiant French troops, voiding the shameful armistice, add in their turn the weight of their arms to those of the legions which have been fighting for almost three years under the symbol of the Cross of Lorraine.

France identifies herself with all those who are serving her; from the depths of her prison she acclaims these stirring exploits. The night may still be long, perhaps, but the suffering and weary are now sure that dawn will come. France intends to stand erect and strong in the sun of tomorrow. Thrice invaded in the course of one lifetime, she is conscious of what she has suffered as the vanguard of freedom. She knows that her humanistic and liberal tradition holds promise for the future. She is sure to be able, as master of her destiny and within a world at peace, to rebuild her house, to set up a more equitable and more effective republic, and to translate into action the great longing for dignity and perfection which inspires her.

Those who are our allies in this war can count on France as France counts on them. If she has firmly decided not to permit the loss of any of her rights, she is no less resolved to do her duty in the international community. Because the sacrifices, the sufferings, and the heroic exploits would be in vain if the people and the countries which are now uniting their efforts for the war fail to maintain that unity in building a world that would ultimately measure up to all the potentialities of man.

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC

BY H. V. EVATT

THE two British Democracies, Australia and New Zealand, are the trustees of democratic civilization in the South Pacific. The war we are fighting there against Japan is not merely a war to regain or retain territory. It is a war to retain our civilization, and the civilization of the world.

The civilization of the Australian community is based upon a long European tradition. But while our geographical position has developed local characteristics in our social and political outlook which differentiate us from our kinsmen in Britain and our allies in the United States, it has needed the war to force upon the Australian people the full consciousness of the fact that their responsibility and their rights are primarily those of a key Pacific nation. Since the entry of Japan into the war this consciousness has been strengthened because from time to time we have been compelled to stress the vital significance of the Pacific phase of the war.

Thus, many Australians have been compelled to turn their attention to the longer term problems of the Pacific. These problems are many and infinitely complex. The mere enumeration of the numerous Pacific countries and territories suggests a range of problems, political, economic, and social, and their solution will tax our wisdom, our understanding, our tolerance, and our sincerity.

Pacific powers like Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia, China, and the Netherlands exhibit many differences in political organization, economic development, and social philosophy. Then there is Japan, an extremely powerful nation which, by the end of the war, will have been defeated in an attempt to secure Pacific domination. We have Australia and New Zealand, two smaller but strong and progressive peoples, whose civilization and culture are democratic. We have, too, a number of smaller and weaker states and territories at various levels of political and economic development. These areas are the source of many basic raw materials much sought after by the largely industrialized countries of the world.

Peace and stability in the Pacific in the post-war period can be achieved only by building a way of life in which the varied nations and peoples can live together in peace and prosperity. We can succeed in building such a way of life only if we prepare plans that take into account the legitimate aspirations of the peoples, and if we provide a basis for economic development that will provide improving standards for all the peoples of the Pacific.

The principles on which such plans can be built were suggested in the Atlantic Charter. Doubt has sometimes been expressed as to whether the so-called Atlantic Charter was applicable to the Pacific and Asiatic areas. But the better opinion is that the name Atlantic Charter which has been given to this declaration does not refer only to the Atlantic region or to powers having interests in the Atlantic. The Charter derives its name from the place where it was signed. The thirty-one nations which have subscribed to it extend around the globe and the declaration is universal in its scope and application. It follows that the future

of the regions of the Pacific are to be covered by the broad principles of the Atlantic Charter.

This does not mean that the Charter is capable of being applied mechanically to Pacific problems. To be sure, those directly concerned with the preparation of the Charter had Europe primarily in mind at the time, and this fact rather appears in certain aspects of the wording of the Charter. This, however, does not—and the fact has also been emphasized by responsible leaders in many of the United Nations—qualify the declaration set out in the Charter, which by its own original and inherent force is universal in scope and application.

Some consequences of the undertakings in subscribing to the Charter, in so far as they apply, or they can be applied, to the problems of the Pacific, may fairly be suggested. The first and outstanding principle which must be applied is that of security. It is clear that there should be established a system of general security which will be effective in these Pacific and Asiatic zones, as in all other parts of the world. Pending the establishment of such a system the aggressor must be disarmed. That aggressor is Japan, the only Pacific power which since 1931 has systematically employed its armed forces for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement.

Some further thought might be given to the organization of this system of security. The development of the present war is clear proof that the problem of security for the East cannot be separated from that in the West. Consequently the problem of organizing security in the Pacific cannot be disassociated from the problem of organizing security in other parts of the world. They reckon ill who leave the Pacific out of account. In point of fact, security must be universal or everyone will be insecure. This does not mean, however, that within a system of general world security there will not be ample scope for the development of regional arrangements both for the purpose of the preservation of that security and for the handling of ordered change within the region.

When an adequate general plan is prepared for security against aggression, the United Nations in the Pacific will have to be assured of their own security. In this respect Australia will naturally regard as of crucial importance to its own security the arc of islands lying to the north and northeast of our continent. While Australia will be anxious to build a universal international system of security and to play its part in the general and regional organization of such a system, it will, particularly before such a system is adequately established and proved to be in good working order, be vitally concerned as to who shall live in, develop, and control these areas so vital to her security from aggression.

II

No world or regional system of security, however, can be permanent unless it has an adequate basis in economic justice. This has been recognized, in propaganda at least, by Japan in spreading the notion of a "co-prosperity sphere." It has been clear to us for many years, and by this time abundantly clear to many of the inhabitants of Malaya, the Philippines, and the East Indies, that the so-called Japanese "co-prosperity sphere" only means this—that Japan is to get the prosperity while the subject peoples get a lower standard of living and the status of slaves. It is not sufficient for us to negate the attempt of Japan to impose this system on the peoples of the Pacific nor to establish machinery for international security unless we can envisage a system of improving standards of life for all Pacific peoples.

The Atlantic Charter promises to the peoples of the Pacific, as well as to the peoples of the more developed parts of the world, freedom from want. The United Nations have a duty to see that this promise is implemented. If freedom from want means anything, it means decent standards of living for all peoples and the end of any possibility of unfair exploitation of weak peoples by those who are stronger and economically more fully developed. The problem of reasonable living standards in Pacific countries is a problem which differs in character and method of solution from country to country. This does not mean, however, that the problems or their solutions can be regarded as independent of one another.

A special case of the problem of under-

developed areas is that of colonies. The history of the period following the 1914-18 war and preceding the present war makes it clear that the lust for colonial areas is a constant threat to the security of the world and will no longer be tolerated by the public opinion of enlightened peoples. Following the last war, there was an attempt to deal with this by establishing the principle of international responsibility for certain colonial areas. Accordingly, under the League of Nations a system of mandates was set up. This system had the germ of the right approach. It was not entirely successful, partly because of its limited application, partly because the undertakings given by the countries concerned were not sufficiently precise, and partly because in some cases the undertakings actually given were not carried out. There has recently been a good deal of discussion of the problem of colonial areas in the settlement following this war. This discussion can best proceed on the basic principle that those countries whose historical development has placed them in control of colonial areas are to be regarded as occupying the position of trustees. They retain general sovereignty but they also have obligations to other countries in the world and to the native populations which it is a condition of their trust that they shall carry out.

This is sound, but in analyzing the application of this trusteeship to the actual problems of colonies, the major attention has up to the present been focused upon the political aspects of development—that is, it has been emphasized that the trustee country has an obligation to educate and develop the peoples under its control along the road toward self-government. Australia feels that emphasis should also be placed upon the economic factor. In short, the principle of trusteeship also implies that the trustee power will ensure that the economic development of colonial areas is conducted in a way which is not opposed to the interests of the people of the world.

It is clear from what has been said that the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter, though admittedly very general, are capable of providing a starting point for an attack upon the economic and political problems of the Pacific in the post-war period. There will remain the crucial problem of how these principles are to be implemented. If the general principles of the Atlantic Charter are carried out by the countries adhering to it, it may become necessary for their governments to accept obligations of international character affecting matters which, in the past, have normally been regarded as matters of domestic concern only, and to accept responsibility for standards of living and for economic development in countries beyond their own borders. These are developments of major significance. For instance, it is absolutely essential for the economic and political security of the world that the major industrial countries shall maintain a high level of employment and living standards within their own borders. The governments of these countries may well be treated as having an obligation to see that these practical objectives are achieved internally, this obligation being assumed not only toward their own peoples but to the peoples of the world.

It is necessary to differentiate between the acceptance of this responsibility and the methods by which it will be achieved. It must clearly be left to the individual country to decide by what means and within what limits these objectives are achieved internally, but this does not alter the necessity of the obligation being accepted.

The acceptance and implementing of these obligations may require reconsideration of the forms of international organization. I believe, however, that a valuable illustration of the organization required is presented by the International Labor Organization. Of that organization most of the United Nations, including the United States, are still members. In accepting the membership in the International Labor Organization all the nations concerned undertook, as a matter of domestic policy, to pursue certain objectives relating to the conditions of labor. The Office set up machinery by which the progress of the nations concerned toward the achievement of these objectives could be embodied in binding conventions, and provided machinery for international consultation and international lawmaking.

What has been the success of the I.L.O.?

Briefly put, the causes lie in the universality of the objective and in the recogni-

tion of the fact that "universal peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice," as the preamble of the I.L.O. constitution declares. Article 41 of the constitution seems to me particularly significant at this time. It is founded on the conception that the injustice, hardship, and privation experienced by the working masses everywhere produce the unrest that imperils the peace and harmony of the world. It states:

> The High Contracting Parties recognizing that the well-being, physical, moral and intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance, have framed in order to further this great end, the permanent machinery provided for in Section I, and associated with that of the League of Nations.
>
> They recognize that differences of climate, habits and custom of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate attainment. But, holding as they do that labor should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply, so far as their special circumstances will permit.
>
> Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the High Contracting Parties to be of special and urgent importance:
>
> First: The guiding principle above enunciated that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.
>
> Second: The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers.
>
> Third: The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country.
>
> Fourth: The adoption of an eight-hour day or a forty-eight hour week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained.
>
> Fifth: The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours which should include Sunday wherever practicable.
>
> Sixth: The abolition of child labor and the imposition of such limitations on the labor of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.
>
> Seventh: The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.
>
> Eighth: The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labor should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.
>
> Ninth: Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.
>
> Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the High Contracting Parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations; and that if adopted by the industrial communities who are Members of the League and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of such inspection, they will confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earners of the world.

There was little missing from the stated objectives of the I.L.O. The only criticism I should like to make is that a negative attitude toward the problem of unemployment—i.e., "prevention of unemployment"—is not adequate, and that this vital problem is better approached positively, by emphasizing the need for standards of living, better housing, increased protection, and the like.

Be that as it may, the fault has been in the reluctance of governments to carry into effect these principles by ratifying the labor conventions and implementing them in their domestic legislation. For instance, the number of ratification of conventions registered in September 1, 1942, was only 871 out of 3,276 conventions which were adopted by the I.L.O. That is a percentage of only twenty-three, and a very poor average. Again there were only two ratifications of the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, six of the Minimum (Sea) Convention, four of the Protection Against Accidents (Dockers) Convention, one of the Hours of Week (Coal Mines) Convention. Other illustrations could be given. Clearly, unless the nations have the real *intention and will* to carry out international obligations, little can be expected of international organizations.

I believe that some such form of organization is capable of dealing with the type of

problems I have outlined. If, for instance, the governments of the major industrial countries undertook to maintain within their own spheres a high level of employment, an international body could be developed with power not merely to record the results of this policy in the various countries but to provide the machinery required for the supervision of the international obligations. A similar type of organization could be set up to deal with international trusteeship. The Mandates System, which succeeded so well in relation to Australia's mandate of New Guinea, might well have succeeded had there been in the League of Nations a will to enforce the mandates, e.g., in the case of Japan's mandated islands which became great military bases, contrary to the whole intent of the Charter.

The Food Conference which has been called presents an opportunity for the consideration of one of these difficult international problems. It is to be hoped that out of this discussion will emerge material and recommendations upon the basis of which governments can examine the practicability of some such form of approach.

I do not suggest that these tasks of reconstruction are easy or that the mere establishment of machinery will be sufficient. Machinery can do no more than provide the means for consultation, co-operation and possible enforcement of obligations. To be effective, machinery must be vitalized by understanding, mutual confidence, and a determination to achieve for the purposes of peace some of the objectives for which the war is being waged.

And yet the primary problem of the post-war world will be that of freedom from fear—i.e., fear of aggression—in short, the problem of security. That is the basic problem and it can be solved only if the aggressors are disarmed and kept disarmed. This may be illustrated by reference to the rate of ratification of the conventions of the International Labor Organization. There was a steady stream of ratification from the establishment of the organization up to the time when the authority of the League was gradually subverted and finally defied by the aggression of Japan first, Italy second, and finally Hitler. As aggression became successful and even popular, so the authority both of the Mandatory System and of the International Labor Organization was weakened. In short the guarantee of security against aggression is the necessary condition precedent to the attainment of such objectives as improved standards of living in all the countries of the world.

An Editorial

EQUAL TREATMENT FOR THE CHINESE

A CONGRESSIONAL committee has begun to study the question of Chinese immigration into the United States, and it is to be hoped that Congress will take immediate action to annul a discriminatory law which needlessly offends our Chinese allies and friends.

As Dr. Alfred Sze, former Chinese Ambassador in Washington and at present vice president of China Defense Supplies Corporation, said at a recent conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Chinese do not ask favors for their immigrants; they merely request equality of treatment with all other races and nations. It is understood that controls can be established either in this country or in China that will admit a limited number of Chinese immigrants. The figure will not matter either to us or to the Chinese, but the act will serve to affirm the dignity of the Chinese nation and the justice of our laws. It will be a fitting supplement to the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China which did so much to prove to the Asiatic people the sincerity of the aims enunciated by the United Nations.

The search for principles

by

LIN YUTANG

WE have strayed far into the field of nature. It is time to come home and remember that we are men. The only important philosophical question of today is, what are we, and what is man?

When Confucius heard that a stable had burnt down, he asked if any man was hurt, but "did not inquire about the horses." I am such a "humanist" that I do not care if the whole species of horses and dogs and cats and rabbits are wiped out, if man hereafter can live in peace. This may sound a little Oriental and heathenish, but there are, on the other hand, men whose minds are almost as limited in compass as mine, and who, while very much devoted to the very lovable dogs, have not yet any conception of the brotherhood of *all* men. I am sure horses think the same way, too. White horses are devoted to man, but have nothing but contempt for brown and bay horses, and the brown and bay horses have nothing but contempt for the spotted ones. Horse love, I understand, is only skin-deep. The most inconceivable barriers of pigment exist. In the same way, a bulldog will patronize a human being, but must persecute his brother, the Irish terrier, because his own tail is smooth while the other dog has a hairy tail and somewhat too much of a moustache. How the Westerners laugh at Chinese high cheekbones and almond eyes and how the Chinese laugh at the Westerners' hairy chests and arms!

But this state of things is not funny any more. We are starting out on an era of compulsory world living with all the tribalistic traits of a past epoch and the psychology of the bulldog-terrier racial prejudices. We talk lightly of world co-operation and world government without realizing the immense complexities of the new problems, not only in respect of their size, but also in respect of their nature.

Perhaps Aristotle's "Politics" is broad enough or perhaps it is not, but a modern Aristotle, his analytical mind exercised over the new problems created by a world state, would ponder very deeply and seek for certain cardinal principles. Aristotle would be what we call a "realist," but his realism would be profound, and he would not necessarily potter around with "expediencies" in ignorance of first principles. He would still classify the three possibilities of the government of the world, like those of a state, as being the rule of the one, of the few, and of the many, taking nations instead of individuals as the units. He would still postulate the good and bad forms of each: the good being monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy; the bad being tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. And he would depict how these different principles would operate, and speculate how each might degenerate and how each might evolve into, or be replaced by, another form. And he would still apply his psychology of motivation, and would maintain that "In considering how dissensions and political revolutions arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect constitutions generally. . . . The universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has already been mentioned; viz., *the desire of equality,* when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves; or again, *the desire of inequality and superiority,* when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not

more but the same or less than their inferiors; pretensions which may or may not be just."* He would find the two desires, for equality and for inequality or superiority, still operating today in respect of a World Federation and as causing all dissensions or revolutions that may consequently arise. And he would not conceive of any one form of World Government as so perfect, so good, so just that it would not undergo internal transformations from psychological causes, or even evolve from one form to another by a series of world revolutions; he would try his utmost, however, to see that the best and the most just form be adopted to ensure the greatest stability. Being a knower of human nature and its corruptibility, he would be realistic and would most probably despair of a utopian settlement. But his would be a less mechanistic mind than ours, and he would certainly not agree with Ely Culbertson's international contract bridge, or trust a mechanical elaboration of a world police force and say to himself, "There is the basis of an enduring peace." On the other hand, having read Locke by now, he would at once plunge into a discussion of the principles of coercion and consent, and the manifold reactions they evoke. In addition to forms like world tyranny (rule by one nation), world oligarchy (rule by a few rich nations) and world democracy (rule by the many nations), he would also postulate the collapse of all and a reversion to national autarchy, which in view of the present state of nationalistic psychology might most probably result.

Aristotle would, I am sure, agree with the general principle that world peace must be enforced by a world police. But he would analyze the problem further in respect of three points: what to police, who are to police, and who are to be policed and why. Such a dispassionate examination would reveal that certain things can be policed and certain things not. For instance, he would believe that only such laws and traditions as command general public approval can be enforced by the police, that police power derives from public approval and a sense of justice and not from tear-gas bombs or tommy guns, and that policing an unjust order would be the maintenance by force of a state of things due for a change. So he would be careful to point out that before we decide to police and maintain something by force, we have to make clear what that thing is—whether, for instance, the police will be constrained to defend the *status quo* against "acts of rebellion against the World Government."

Secondly, he would closely examine the area and the neighborhood to be policed. He would not try to police a peaceful neighborhood too much, but would concentrate on certain gangster sections that in the past have repeatedly upset public order, where most of the "muggings" have been going on. Only the principle of historic experience would seem to serve as safe guidance in regard to those to be policed and those selected to do the policing. And, in equity, he would be forced to the conclusion that those nations which have in the past most disturbed others, have been most aggressive, most imperialistic, ought to be the policed nations, and those that have observed the principles of good neighbors ought to be the policing nations. Thus he would probably arrive at the astounding conclusion that Eskimos, Javanese, Samoans, Chinese and Americans, Danes, Swiss, etc., ought to police the Japanese, the Germans, the English, the French, and the Italians. The Spaniards and Portuguese, though at one time bloodthirsty pirates, ought to be given liberal consideration, on parole and good behavior.

In view, however, of the desire for inequality of the "Big Powers," such a scheme is obviously unacceptable, and the best principle would probably be a sort of compromise, excluding none and based on complete equality for all nations, or it would lose its police character and have the characteristics of an agglomeration of powers. Following such a principle of common consent and common equality, the best solution would be for the World Police to "belong" to no particular nation, as no community police belongs to any socially prominent members of the community. Such a community police may now and then distribute small, private favors to the socially prominent members, such as better lighting on certain streets or shifting "no parking" signs in their favor, since they pay more

*Aristotle, *Politics*, tr. by Jowett, (Oxford) p. 148.

taxes, but this must be underhanded and the state of things must not become unbearable to the poorer members of the community or enrage the public sense of justice.

II

AND over all these questions must stand the philosophic question whether the World Government is to be preponderantly laissez faire, according to Rousseau, or preponderantly regimentalized, according to Hobbes; whether it is to be a government by *Polizei,* according to Prussian nazism, or government by self-government, according to Jeffersonian democracy and the old-roguish Chinese. There is so much trouble that could be avoided if we did not poke our noses into it. The point immediately suggests itself that the greater the area of government, and the more scattered the populations, the less can force be relied upon in government.

The Chinese, having governed their country for four thousand years without lawyers or police, and having had some experience in the matter of governing large areas, would instinctively incline toward Jeffersonian democracy. After all, a nation that believes in government by worship and song, by rituals and music, must be a little stunned by the idea of government by *Polizei.* The Chinese would probably lead the revolt against the *Polizei,* and they have certain ways of dealing with the police. They believe it is their duty to corrupt the police by sending the police sergeant a present when his wife gives birth to a baby, because he is so obliging as to stand guard at our doors. They have no idea that the sergeant is there to guard public order, since public order is already guarded by scrolls of proverbs and public laughter at transgressors—the thief has a bad mother —but they understand he is there to open limousine doors for rich men arriving at sumptuous hotels. They are not rich themselves, but they can also buy the policeman's small favors by pulling him into their house on a hot day and giving him a cup of tea. Just by human experience, they have found that no policeman in the world can resist such corruption. And the Burmese, the Javanese, the Eskimos, the Samoans, the Caucasian villagers, and the Brazilians and the Chileans would join with the Chinese and shout to the French, the English, the Germans, and the Americans: "What the hell! Why do *we* require your police? We ain't got Krupp guns or parachutists here. Why don't you police yourselves? Why don't you try to police Moscow?"

One may make a parenthetical remark here about America. America has a fair record, not a blameless but a fair record in respect of imperialism. The American is too good a democrat to be a successful imperialist. He pats the foreigners on the back, and American doughboys pull rickshaws for Hindus out of sheer fun. That is the last thing an imperialist should do. You have not got the imperialist instinct. You can't fraternize with "natives" and be their masters. The fellows whose backs you pat today will think tomorrow that they are as good as you are, and good-bye to your empire! It's rather odd, isn't it, the way human beings think? But America has developed enough power, and power is a dangerous thing. I am winking and blinking to see what she is going to do with that power.

America, having come of age, is like a research doctor who suddenly finds himself married to a socialite. "It's the war," the doctor says, trying to explain his marriage. To go on with the research or move in with his socialite wife to cure corns and misshapen nails for the rich is now the doctor's central spiritual problem — the only important problem that faces America today. For America today stands at the crossroads. Be a research doctor, I say.

DECLARATION OF AIMS AND PURPOSES OF COMMON WEALTH

1. An age in the world's history is coming to an end and a new civilization is in the making. Out of the defeat of nazism mankind can lay the foundations of a new human fellowship worthy of the sacrifices that have been made. If through ignorance or indifference we will not do it now, we will do it after some other world war. We believe it to be the determination and the eager hope of the common people of the world that it shall be done now. We postpone and even jeopardize military victory while government policy leaves it uncertain whether Britain marches with or against this hope and this determination.

2. Economic and political, as well as social and moral arguments, make it clear that in the new civilization men will discover that they can only prosper if people of all classes and nations regard themselves as members of one great society and work together for the common good of humanity instead of struggling like uncivilized barbarians for private or sectional gain.

3. The British people cannot escape their responsibilities. They have resources, both material and spiritual, which fit them to make a leading contribution to the new civilization. Common Wealth exists to ensure that they shall be permitted to make it, and make it in their own free democratic way. But if the British people are to make this contribution, Common Wealth believes that they must accept at least three fundamental facts.

4. *The time has come when principle can and must replace expediency in the making of all major decisions.* This does not mean that we either should or shall be always unanimous on all the steps that should be taken. It does mean that in considering what steps to take we must discuss our differences in terms of what is right, not in terms of what is expedient.

5. *The time has come when the practice of democracy can and must advance from a formality to a reality.* This practical and living democracy must spring from the people themselves. In one form or another all citizens must be given the opportunity of active associations in the conduct of every department of their common life. All must recognize their democratic responsibilities as they claim their democratic rights. But if we are to plan a society based on democratic responsibility we must also plan for the freedom of the individual. The personal rights of individuals must never be ignored, even by majorities purporting to act in the name of "the State."

6. *The time has come when the service of humanity can and must replace self-interest as the dominant motive in the lives of men and nations.* In the international sphere this means that the conception of individual national sovereignty has outlived its usefulness and must be abandoned. In the domestic sphere it means that the great productive resources of the country must be transferred from private to common ownership. For the essence of democracy is that the resources of the country are a common possession to be managed on behalf of all by the representatives of all for the benefit of all.

7. It is for this new civilization, based on human fellowship and incorporating these three fundamentals, that Common Wealth will strive. We can accept no narrower purpose if we are to be worthy of the hour.

DEMOCRATIC AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF COMMON WEALTH

by

Richard Acland

ONE of the most important social and political movements in England since the outbreak of the war has taken the form of Common Wealth, an independent political organization which is winning increasing support from progressive elements. After running a good second in four by-elections this year, Common Wealth gained its first parliamentary success in April in Eddisbury, a wholly rural and normally conservative constituency of Cheshire. Sir Richard Acland, one of the principal founders of the movement, has written a special article for FREE WORLD expounding its aims and purposes which were embodied in a formal declaration at the Easter conference of Common Wealth.

Sir Richard, the fifteenth Baronet Acland, has been a Liberal Member of Parliament since 1935. He has been in the forefront of the movement to reconstitute the social and economic order both in England and throughout the world. His amendment to the declaration presented at the Malvern Conference of the Anglican Church, which was overwhelmingly adopted, stated that the time had come for Christians to proclaim the need of seeking some form of society in which the stumbling block of private ownership of the great resources of a community will be removed.

I MUST insist that the first sentence of the Declaration is the key to the whole. All sorts of people in these days are saying that we have come to the end of an age in much the same tone of voice as they might say "my trousers are worn out." We say that we have come to the end of an age, *and we believe it.*

We believe that it is absolutely futile to think in terms of patching the old order, reforming it, running it more cleverly, evolving something out of it. If humanity seeks security and prosperity, release from frustration and a life of new dynamic purpose, we must make up our minds to *abandon* the old way of living and pioneer into a new civilization as different from anything which we have now as individualism was different from the preceding feudalism. It is not so much that we must set up new international machinery, or organize our domestic life differently. This, certainly, we

have to do. But far more important is to abandon the basic ideas, the basic values, and the basic motives of the old society and to accept the basic ideas and basic values and basic motives of the new. It is not the slightest use to take any or all of the purely mechanical changes which we propose and then to add onto them the ideas and the motives of the old society. If any such attempt is made the sum will not add up, because it is not suggested that the new machinery can be operated by the old minds which move in the old way. *An age in the world's history is coming to an end and a new civilization is in the making.* This means that the new machinery must be run by new minds capable of thinking in new ways. To hope for anything other would be as ridiculous as to suppose that some bevy of feudal barons could have successfully conducted some capitalist merchant venture in the year 1550.

Consciously or subconsciously we believe that the whole of humanity is yearning for this new civilization. We do not believe that they can be inspired by the slogans which aroused enthusiasm in the days when the old civilization was young and vigorous. Although enthusiasm in Britain is high today, we are convinced beyond doubt that it would leap upwards—that it would in fact be restored to the level of those "Dunkirk Days"—if only we were certain that our government had any proper conception of the new age toward which humanity is striving. But we are not. On the contrary, all the evidence before our eyes suggests that the majority of those who hold power are either straining back into the old, or thinking of the problem before us in terms of patching up what we have already got.

Look now at the three fundamental facts which we seek to emphasize.

Working on a basis of expediency, leading statesmen and economists have reached the rather surprising conclusion that the nations with a high standard of living cannot now increase their standards much further unless they simultaneously take steps to increase the standards of backward peoples even more rapidly. Good. But how are we going to handle the resulting situation? On terms of long-term loans to be repaid someday. By arguing, against our more short-sighted business men, that it is "better" for us to insert a sort of "lease lend" element into some of this long-term lending? And by conducting the whole of the argument in terms of the values of the old order? We cannot see the slightest prospect of success along these lines. Break with the old values. To hell with expediency.

Is it morally right that the Americans and the British should enjoy a standard of living so vastly higher than that of the Chinese, the Russians, the Indians, and the Nigerians unless they are earning that standard of living by doing everything in their power to raise the standards of these people? Yes or no, is it right? If it is not, then let us cut out all this business about long-term loans. Let us translate the nebulous (but temporarily useful) "lease-lend" into the plain Anglo-Saxon word *give*. Then we know where we are. Then we have a basic principle which can give to humanity a new dynamic. The advanced peoples are going to *give* the backward peoples what they need for their most rapid possible advancement. Does anyone in his senses suppose that a world can be run on those principles by the kind of minds which ran the world from 1919-1939? Of course not.

Then consider democracy. We in Britain and you in America have carved out of history the bare bones of democracy. We have the right to criticize our government, to organize against it, and, every four or five years, to vote it out if we are so minded. Now we have to put living flesh and blood on these bare bones. In relation to the development of democracy the task before us consists in greater part in mutual education and only in lesser part in the establishment of new machinery. In our own country we see the need for proportional representation. In our factories we see that the removal of the control of "the owners" opens the way for democratic and responsible participation by all operatives from apprentice to production manager. But when all these mechanical reforms have been made, success depends above all on whether our citizens can and will take a vigorous interest in and a real responsibility for the development of every aspect of our common life. But once again it depends on the people at the top. Before we can establish a complete and living democracy, can we find, in what we already have, enough

democracy to choose as our leaders men and women who believe in democracy? To believe in democracy means that you allow the people to run their own affairs, accepting the fact that they will often make obvious mistakes which a very wise dictator might have avoided, but knowing that the practice of democracy does in fact "pay a dividend" in terms of the new human values. It is one of the issues between "things seen" and "things unseen." You see the mistake that has been made because "the men" were allowed to express an opinion on how the job should be done. You do not see that on thousands of other jobs "the men" have worked more enthusiastically precisely because they were allowed to express their opinions.

I assert, regretfully, that the majority of those now occuping positions of power in my country are such men as are afraid of taking the curbs off democracy and giving it its head. They are sure that "the masses" will always make fools of themselves unless they are properly "controlled." Though they would not admit it, in the very bottom of their minds they believe that there *ought* to be a special kind of person who does the governing, and that there ought to be the general kind of person who is governed. Admittedly self-education toward full democracy is going to be an intensely difficult process. It cannot be accomplished at all by those who are frightened by the common man.

Look finally at our last point, which in effect contains two points. Let me deal with them in reverse order to that in which they appear in our statement. We see no hope whatever in the development of big business. Small enterprises with two or three, or even twenty or thirty or fifty men and women employed and working side by side with an owner who is himself the actual manager and source of driving power—such enterprises we believe can and will continue to live and flourish as at the present day. But we do not believe that in our country there is the slightest possibility of taming big business, controlling it in the public interest, or forcing it to compete with itself in the benefit of the people when it prefers to combine with itself for the benefit of the shareholders.

The moral foundations of capitalism have disappeared. In the old days the owner was (or could be represented as being) the individual saver who had stinted his own standard of living in order to provide the community with capital equipment. The individual owner was the man whose brains directed the individual factory. His ability brought him success, his inability brought failure. Today all this has gone by the board. The Federation of British Industries deplores free competition. One hundred and twenty of our biggest big-business men have published a statement on policy which offers, as the correct industrial solution, a set of self-disciplined industries coordinated by the biggest of all industrialists in the General Council of Disciplined Industry. Owners are now (and under these proposals will be even more) divorced from the problems of technical efficiency which are today exclusively managed by salaried officials. And what about saving? The whole of our big-business world is insisting that under the coming "controls," costs and wages must be so adjusted as to "allow" to industry those margins out of which "progress" can be financed. Charming phrase. But what does it mean? It means that wages must be kept below what would be necessary, and prices must be raised above what would be necessary, if we were not "financing progress." In other words, the new capital equipment of the coming community is *already derived,* not from a voluntary stint of the big shareholders, but from a compulsory reduction in the standards of living of the workers and of the general public! (If this is not a correct analysis, Mr. Editor, please show me a big shareholder living on bread and water in some garret in order to "save" the money which the Standard Oil Company needs for its next pipe line!) And in spite of all this, the existing shareholders insist that all new capital equipment must belong to them and their children, and that production must come to a standstill whenever they cannot earn dividends on it.

II

THE men who enjoy the big-money game may and will struggle to resist all these conclusions as long as they possibly can.

Humanity will know no peace until it accepts the fact that *capitalism is finished.* This is not something special, divorced from the conception of democracy. It is part of it, as our declaration shows. To put it yet more strongly, anyone who talks in terms of free competition in our country is talking about something which (if it ever existed) came to an end fifty to eighty years ago. The proper name for what we have now is not free competition but economic feudalism. It is impossible that economic feudalism and political democracy can long exist side by side. Either political democracy must go on to establish economic democracy, or industrial feudalism will suck the lifeblood out of political democracy.

Lastly we insist, along with many other men and women, that the conception of national sovereignty has outlived its usefulness. But once again, are there some people who use this phrase without understanding its meaning? I know a great many Britons who will verbally agree that Hungarian and Rumanian and Italian sovereignties have outlived their usefulness. But how many Britons really understand that British sovereignty has outlived its usefulness? How many Britons realize that if the British Colonial Empire is to stand high in the history of the twenty-first century we must exchange the motto "What we have we hold" for the motto "What we have we pool"? And how many of those who would applaud that sentence really understand its meaning? One very small part of its meaning would be that if the Nigerians (for example) require any technical or administrative assistance from any white man, the chances of an individual Dutchman taking part in the technical administrative service must be made precisely equal to the chances of an individual Briton.

We shall, of course, co-operate with, as we already welcome, all those who share our views on international affairs, even when they do not accept our views on the internal government of individual countries. We shall work with them to try to establish international organizations for surveying the resources of the world, for coordinating world transport, for combating world disease; we shall co-operate in any work which seeks to persuade the nations to behave more like an ordinary family and less like a set of scrambling gangsters.

But we shall ask those with whom we shall co-operate one important question. What are you trying to do? Are you trying to work out plans for international cooperation which will be so wonderfully and transparently reasonable that the old kind of minds will welcome them, will adopt them, and will then operate them with success? If you are trying to do that, we shall of course do anything we can to help and advise you. But our most important advice is that you cannot succeed. May I be very blunt. I do not believe that the kind of minds which have dominated the British Foreign Office and the American State Department for the last twenty years (and which dominate them today) are of any more use to humanity. The job of humanity is not to go running to those men saying, "Oh please isn't *this* a good idea, isn't *that* a good idea; please wouldn't you like to accept our good idea and work it for us." Those of us who believe in collective security tried this sort of thing in this country for ten years before the war. Today we are trying to get the same kind of minds to do something creditable to save the European Jews. It does not work. In 1550, in our country, the task before humanity was to take all the reins of government out of the hands of men with the feudal mind. The task before humanity today is to take all the reins of government out of the hands of the men who have the old kind of mind.

Shall we succeed, in Common Wealth, in achieving our aims in Britain? We do not expect to succeed alone. We expect that other individuals and organizations will come in and work with us. May I end by quoting a question addressed to me at a by-election meeting last night and the answer I gave to it. "Do you suppose," asked my questioner, "that the British people will agree to this sort of thing in anything less than two or three hundred years?" "They will either agree to it at the end of this war, or they will agree to it at the end of the next world war, or at the end of the next world war but one, or at the end of the next world war but two. So take your choice."

Let's not fear *that* REVOLUTION

by

FERDINAND CZERNIN



IN this summer of 1943, the war has reached the threshold of Europe, and we are today at the point where the Allied armies may at any time invade Europe. We are well aware of the existence of strong anti-nazi forces in Europe and for some reason we are confident that the uprising of those forces will take place as soon as Allied troops set foot on European soil. However, few of us have given much thought to what kind of uprising we expect to see, and very little has been done to make sure that that uprising will take place in such a manner as will not only benefit the military operations in Europe, but will also lay the foundation for the new, sound, and democratic order of the Europe to come.

We know that Europe is a boiling cauldron of forming forces and that it is today in a state in which its future can be molded. It may seem of minor importance today which political forces we decide to encourage. We may even feel that we should encourage all the anti-nazi forces, contradictory though they may be to one another, since every single one of them is bound to make trouble for the enemy. There are many who feel that everything which gives Adolf Hitler a headache is worth encouraging; yet upon the Allied choice, the Allied decision, the Allied support or non-support, the future of Europe for generations to come will depend, and with that the future of mankind.

There is a very definite, a very real revolution brewing in Europe. What is still to be determined is the form that the revolution will take. We know that Europe is divided within itself, but we are still likely to look upon Europe as a conglomeration of countries and nationalities and to see the division of Europe running along strictly national frontier lines. But that is no longer true. The real division in Europe today runs along entirely different lines and is a purely ideological division.

There is no country in Europe today which has not got its quota of Fascists, be they rulers or moles; and there is no country in Europe which has not retained its fair share of liberty-loving democrats—in the truest and noblest sense of the word. A portion of every country's population has retained its faith in the principles of democracy, in the creed of individual freedom, and holds to the same basic political tenets that we are fighting for. Thus Europe's present division is not one between nationalities or classes, but one which runs through every nationality, through every class, and is a distinction of ideology, principles, and political faith.

The forces that go into the making of the European revolution are varied and many. One aspect of it may be a struggle for national liberation, a fight in which the colossal amount of hatred stored up in Europe explodes along nationalistic lines, a fight

which will, in the first place, turn against the Axis nations. In the natural course of events, however, that uprising, influenced by a strongly resurging and revitalized nationalism, would not stop at annihilating the oppressor nations of Europe, but would immediately turn to rebuilding a Europe in which the various blends of nationalism are once again turned loose—a Europe which would find no peace for decades to come, in which national ambition, national politics, national economics are set off one against the other. Never can the problems of Europe be solved on any nationalist basis, neither by establishing one or another nationality as the ruling *Herrenvolk,* nor by trying to balance rival sovereign nationalities on the continent of Europe.

Adolf Hitler has succeeded in making three-quarters of the population of Europe a part of the underprivileged proletariat and the European revolution may turn into a class revolution—a communist revolt. It is obvious that the social revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, would not only be unable to solve Europe's problems, but would present a very serious threat to the rest of the world.

Yet the revolution of Europe might still be turned into the ideological upheaval of men fighting, not for the greater glory of their nations, not for the dictatorship of their classes, but for the rights of individual man, the basic rights of democracy, the freedom for which and by which man lives, the principles for which the United Nations stand. It depends on us whether it does or doesn't—on our actions, on our inaction, on our mistakes, and on our initiative.

Never has a belligerent had such a host of potential allies within the enemy camp as we have today. The whole of Axis-dominated Europe is full of people whose hearts, emotions, and brains are on our side, and whose muscles and arms will be the moment we manage to give them the wherewithal with which to fight. For Europe never did have its democratic revolution. It had a series of national revolutions, and everywhere the European fight for freedom was sidetracked onto nationalist lines. The clamor for the rights of man was quickly superseded by the more boisterous clamor for the rights of nations, and ever since the spark of the French Revolution destroyed feudal absolutism, Europe has been torn asunder by ever-intensified nationalism.

The United States was lucky. The American Revolution was not forced to turn into nationalism, as in the Old World. With the elimination of British domination, the peoples of the United States were able to concentrate upon safeguarding the rights of individual man instead of defending the rights of their young nation.

II

TODAY we have, for the first time in history, the possibility of seeing a democratic revolution sweeping all over Europe. What is being fought for today is not the rights and self-determination of nations, but the rights and self-determination of individual man. It is this which makes the present war a people's war. It is this which makes the war a war for the world of the common man.

Yet there are many who are terrified by the idea of fostering a revolution. They fear the disorder it brings, its economic and political chaos, and they are afraid that by supporting or even playing with revolutionary forces, they would be undermining the very world in which they live. There are many who believe that the new Europe must be brought about without civil violence, that somehow a legal continuity must and can be established between the present regime and the liberated Europe to be.

The example of the last World War, when the German High Command released the bolshevist revolution as a military expedient, is still alive in their minds. Within a year Germany itself had become infected by the same germ. But there is the great difference that, while the German High Command supported the Russian revolution as a military expedient and had to fight it when it reached its own people, we who stand for democracy can and must foster and support a revolution which fights for the same principles which we stand for. Or have we forgotten that the principles for which we fight today, the principles of man's individual rights, the principles of democracy and man's freedom, are revolutionary principles for which generation after generation has had to fight anew in wars, in revolts, and in revolutions ever since 1776?

These principles have as yet not gained their victory and, where established, have been challenged again and again.

And what is the alternative to supporting Europe's revolution? If we don't embrace that revolution as our ally, we shall very soon find ourselves in the position of having to suppress it.

It is very tempting to rely upon the cooperation of established authority when you invade a country and take over its administration. It is very nice if you can leave the civil administration to the mayor of a town you occupy. It is a great load off your mind if the local police force will maintain law and order while you go on pursuing your war. But everywhere in Europe today the local authorities, the mayors, the police forces, even the labor organizations and charitable institutions are completely nazified—to such an extent that eliminating one or two people in key positions will not purge them.

It is obvious to all of us that one cannot rely upon the Hitlers, the Lavals, and the Mussolinis. But unless we employ the dynamics of the revolutionary forces, we shall find ourselves having to deal with the Darlans of every country we occupy. Hand-in-glove with them, the occupation armies will turn into a super-Gestapo—easily at first, successfully later, and desperately in the end—trying to hold down the dynamics of those popular forces, unifying Europe, as Adolf Hitler is doing it today, not behind them but against them.

Are we really less afraid of that than of the clean, strong, healthy, and clarifying breath of Europe's democratic revolution?

Those who are afraid of the revolution continually dangle before our eyes the ghastly spectacle of a bolshevist Europe. They seem unable to imagine that the ideals and the faith they profess to stand for—democracy—can have any future in Europe. It is either the totalitarians of the right or of the left. And faced with that alternative, they are bound to make a rightist choice.

But the danger of Europe going bolshevist will arise only if the peoples of Europe lose faith in the Allies, if the peoples of Europe are not given the opportunity of choosing democracy but solely of choosing between totalitarianism of the Right and of the Left. In that case, they are bound to make a Leftist choice.

KRAUS

after IL DUCE, *what in Italy?*

BY GAETANO SALVEMINI

WHEN the nazi-fascist military machine breaks down in Italy, the armed forces of the United Nations, among which those of Britain and America will have the last word, will not be able to occupy the whole Italian peninsula at one stroke. A crisis will be unavoidable in large sections of the country between the moment military breakdown begins to set in and the time when the armed forces of the Atlantic powers will have firmly established their control over the whole peninsula. During that period of crisis in the occupied sections, the men who have run the machine of the fascist administration—a machine shattered and discredited by defeat but not yet demolished—will find themselves face to face with the men of the underground, anti-fascist groups who will come out into the open. These underground groups fall under two headings: believers in democratic institutions and Communists.

Confronted with such a situation, what are the leaders of the armies of occupation going to do?

Certainly, they will not land in Italy with the purpose of setting up Soviet republics there. As long as they are there, they will prevent the Communists from carrying out *coups de main* against the other political groups. Besides making Communist *coups de main* impossible, what ought they to do? Should they bolster up a more or less disguised fascist regime, or should they allow the Italians to work out their own salvation in their own way? What are to be the aims of America not only in Italy, but in all countries west of Russia? Is the blood of American youth to be shed for the ideals of Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson, or for those of the British Tories, the Bishop of Brooklyn, and Father Coughlin?

Let us assume that our Government intends to remain true to American traditions and ideals. In this case all the fascist higher-ups, and those among the lower ranks who have shown particular fanaticism, will be interned on penal islands for the duration pending the decision of the post-fascist regular Italian Government. All fascist organizations, starting with the secret police and the General Staffs of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will be disbanded and their headquarters closed. Fascist uniforms, badges, and flags will be forbidden. Fascist legislation limiting personal and political rights will be repealed. The Italians will be left free to reorganize their press, their associations, their political parties.

The occupying authorities should not support the democratic groups by granting food to the people who join them, or withholding it if they prove recalcitrant, or by any other similar unfair tactics. Their support to the democratic groups would necessarily arise from all those military measures they would be bound to take on their own account to protect themselves from communist uprisings or fascist acts of treachery. This would not be direct and positive, but indirect and negative support. Its aim would not be to grant predominance to the democratic groups. Yet the resulting conditions may be of great help to these groups if they know how to utilize them.

Then, within six months, let us say, municipal elections by universal suffrage would be called. Three months later, elections for provincial councils would be held. At the end of the year, a national Constituent Assembly would be elected. When a

regular government is established by the Constituent Assembly, the peace treaty would be signed, and the armed occupation would come to an end.

Britain and America, by demolishing the fascist military structure, preventing communist *coups de main,* and granting the Italians a cooling off period during which they can freely organize themselves, will enable them to choose their own form of government according to their own wits. Britain and America will earn respect and gratitude by their fair dealing and humanitarian action.

II

IF such conditions materialized, what would the Italians do?

Most American correspondents who were in Italy in 1940 and 1941—S. R. Davis of the *Christian Science Monitor,* J. T. Whitaker of the *Chicago Daily News,* H. L. Matthews of the *New York Times,* the Packards of the United Press, R. C. Massock of the Associated Press—agree that "the royal family is as bankrupt politically as Mussolini," that "the House of Savoy has lost greatly in prestige," that "important middle and upper middle-class groups are now bitterly attacking Victor Emanuel," that "the King has lost the respect and probably earned the contempt of his people," that "both Americans and English vastly overestimate the personal standing and influence of the royal family in Italy," that "the royal family is now definitely committed to Fascism and must continue to support the Duce," that "the Crown is in contempt among many Italians," that "the Court has identified itself so closely with the German alliance that it is idle to try to wean them away from Germany." From these statements we may draw the inference that the majority of the politically-minded Italians would dispense with royalty and establish a democratic republic.

The republican tradition never died out in Italy. Mazzini and Garibaldi, two of the foremost heroes of the Italian *Risorgimento,* were republicans. There was a moment at the end of 1848 and the beginning of 1849 when it seemed as if Italy were destined to become united under a republican flag. Under a republican flag Rome and Venice fought the French and Austrians in 1849. Most of the men who were prime ministers and cabinet ministers in Italy from 1876 to 1891 were converted republicans who had accepted the House of Savoy as a useful medium for creating national unity and establishing free institutions, but not as representative of a traditional legitimacy. A republican party continued to exist in Italy even under monarchial institutions, and was always represented in Parliament. The Socialist party put more emphasis on social rather than constitutional questions, but was republican in principle. The Christian Democrats also never held any brief for the House of Savoy. Millions of Italians have spent some time in North and South America, in France, in Switzerland. The notion of a republic is not strange to them. The secretary of what was once the powerful Catholic Populist party in Italy, Reverend Luigi Sturzo, now living as an exile in this country, has aptly pointed out, in *Foreign Affairs,* April 1943, that as the armies of the United Nations move forward in the occupation of Italy, the first task of the generals will be to set up managers in the occupied cities, and obviously these new local authorities will not derive their power from the King, for he will be on the other side. As long as the King remains with the Axis, he will be the representative of an enemy power. When the Allies reach Rome, either the King will flee together with Mussolini and his Nazis, or he will remain in Rome and give himself up, or he will order the cessation of hostilities and ask for an armistice while his armies continue the struggle alongside the Germans. If he flees, the King will still be an enemy. In the other cases he will become a prisoner or a Quisling with no actual authority, while Hitler will supplant him in the provinces under his control until he too is expelled. "These various hypotheses help to demonstrate that the problem of monarchy was inevitably posed on the day the King signed the declaration of war and thereby assumed responsibility for what was to happen as a result of that act."

Republics have never arisen from the endeavors of republicans, but always from the stupidity and cowardice of Kings.

To be sure, nobody, unless he is a fool, can be positive and definite about the shape

of things to come when the present earthquake is over. Had one lived in England in 1831, would he have been able to know what England would be in 1834? Would he have been able to say in 1898, under Salisbury, what England would be under Lloyd George, or rather would he not have asked: "Who is this Lloyd George?" Are we in a position to forecast who will be the President of the United States in 1945? Are we in a position to forecast what England will be in 1945? How can one describe today what the French Fourth Republic will be tomorrow?

The mood of the Italian population is in a permanent state of flux. Last summer most of them were dejected, desperate, in something like a "political coma." Only stubborn minorities were ready to come forward at the first opportunity. The Russian military successes changed the picture. A man who visited the whole of Italy last fall, came out with the news that the Italians were 98 per cent against Mussolini and 75 per cent for Russia. This does not mean that they had "gone Bolshie." It only means that they saw a ray of hope coming from Russia. If nobody else helps them out, they will receive Russian armies as their liberators; but if Britain and America rescue them from their present misery, they will take hold of both their land and their souls. Thus to a very large extent, the behavior of the Italian "masses" will be conditioned by the ups and downs and ultimate outcome of military operations. Thus, if I were asked to make a bet about future developments in Italy, I should not do so, if for no other reason than the fact that future events depend to a very large extent on what the British Foreign Office and the American State Department intend to do.

III

WHAT the Italians or other European peoples west of Russia will do when the nazi-fascist regime collapses, should be their own business, and not that of Britons and Americans. It is high time people in Britain and America stopped speculating on what the Italians will do and teaching them what they ought to do. They should rather begin to concentrate on what Britain and America ought to do if they intend to remain true to those democratic principles of which they claim to be the custodians. If the Italians do not know how to take advantage of the opportunity offered them by the armies of occupation, we should be sorry for them, but we should always be able to say: "We did our best; our record is clean."

On one point alone the Italians are to be told—and as a matter of fact they are being told—that they will not be allowed to do what they please. They will not be allowed to start a fresh war. They will be disarmed and will be kept disarmed. When they have been deprived of their Navy, their Air Force, their tanks and their artillery, and thus have been made incapable of starting another war, they can do anything they want with their domestic affairs.

Unfortunately, everything we witness points to the fact that the British Foreign Office and the American State Department have little use in international politics for the principles of Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson. There is danger they may follow unwittingly policies in Italy as well as in all other countries of Europe that ultimately will be used by the fascist elements for their own advantage. There is great danger that should reactionary ideas prevail, our armed forces in Italy, while preventing communist *coups de main,* will join hands against the democratic groups with the Fascists who suddenly profess pro-Allied sentiments. This will help the Fascists to remain in control of the press, the associations, the assemblies, the trade-unions, and local and central governments. Italian democrats who come to the fore from the underground will have to swallow a by-product of the fascist dictatorship, and if they do not do the swallowing with sufficiently good grace, they will be dispatched to jail or to the next world altogether, waving flags emblazoned with President Roosevelt's famous "four freedoms everywhere in the world."

The most suitable advisers for such a work of "reconstruction" are at our disposal. They are the fascist generals who were made prisoners by the British in North Africa and whom Mr. Churchill has lent to President Roosevelt for the duration. There is among them a former Minister of War in Mussolini's Cabinet. They have shown little skill outside Italy when it was a matter of killing armed foreign soldiers, but they gained

great experience in equipping fascist bands that specialized in murdering unarmed fellow countrymen. It seems that the lend-lease system provides for the export of goods from America to England and the export of fascist politicians, dethroned kings, and discredited generals from England to America.

IV

A MOST insidious and dangerous influence leads the American State Department astray: that of the Catholic Higher Clergy in America.

I say the Catholic Higher Clergy and not "the Catholic Church." The Catholic Church consists of the Upper Clergy, the Lower Clergy and the laity. The Lower Clergy and the laity are not responsible for the instructions they receive from above. When they carry them out (which is not always the case), they are obeying orders—and they would obey even if they were instructed to take precisely the opposite course. Thus, the real responsibility is with the upper ranks of the hierarchy. The Vatican is the central organ of this world-wide hierarchy and its orders are obeyed with absolute discipline by the Catholic episcopate. The Vatican claims that it is concerned only with spiritual and moral issues. The fact is, however, that it is dragged into politics by its desire to play a political role in all countries. Thus even if the Vatican's aims are spiritual and moral, its policies are temporal and political. When we speak of the Vatican as a factor in the present international situation, we are not concerned with its religious aims and purposes, but with its political activities. Such activities are not matters of religious dogma, and we are entitled to discuss them just as we are entitled to discuss those of the Roosevelt Administration.

Now, the Vatican has tied itself up in Italy with the fascist regime in the same way that it tied itself up with the Franco regime in Spain and the Pétain regime in France, though in France the resistance of the lower clergy has forced Pius XII to abstain from such open co-operation with Pétain as he practiced when nazi victory seemed at hand. Having bound himself to the fascist regime in Italy, Pius XII is forced to realize that its collapse will bring about the abolition of those privileges which his predecessor, Pius XI, obtained for the Holy See and the Catholic clergy through the so-called Lateran treaties of February, 1929. Many bishops, archbishops, and cardinals in Italy who have become notorious for their servile connivance with the fascist dictatorship will have to face hard times when it collapses. One of the most serious difficulties which will confront the post-war democratic government in Italy will be that of preventing a violent reaction against that section of the Catholic clergy that has committed itself too blatantly to fascist policies. This is why Pius XII is doing his utmost to save from shipwreck what can be saved of the fascist regime.

Here enter the American episcopate and those political organizations which follow the lead of the episcopate. The Catholics can tip the scale of American elections, especially in the State of New York, whose electoral vote may determine the Presidential election. Through the influence of the American State Department, the Catholic hierarchy in America is making use of its electoral strength in the United States to rescue the fascist regime in Italy from disaster.

I am afraid that our State Department, pending the Presidential election of 1944, will be unable to break away from its present mistaken policies. Yet the destinies of the world today are in the hands of American citizens and, in turn, the fate of American democracy depends on the right or wrong solution of post-war world problems.

Let us hope and pray that the moral integrity and the common sense of the American people will perform the miracle of putting the door on the right hinges before the time comes to elect a new President. Let us hope and pray that our leaders will change their minds before it is too late. But each of us has to do his part. Each one of us now, and not in 1944, ought frankly to tell President Roosevelt that we have trusted him for many years and that we should like to go on trusting him for many more years, but that he cannot sit on both the Vatican stool and the liberal stool. If the President does not make his choice in our behalf, we will be forced to make our own choice against him.

MUST *the United States Garrison the* WORLD?

BY STANTON A. COBLENTZ

AMONG the innumerable predictions being broadcast by prophets of the post-war world, one recurrent assertion is more threatening than a bomb. This is a forecast which, voiced by well-intentioned and patriotic men, bespeaks an unconscious defeatism that would admit in advance the failure of all hopes of a better world order and condemn us to a perpetuation of the very chaos responsible for the present tragedy.

This particular prophecy—which, if justified, must be held to be one of the blackest utterances ever issuing from human lips—not only rang forth from numerous sources both before and after Pearl Harbor, but is so deceptively simple it can be expressed in one short sentence. For example, William Philip Simms, writing in the New York *World-Telegram* for August 25, 1941, declared: "Win, lose or draw, the United States, after the war, will have to go armed to the teeth if it wishes peace—or wishes even to survive." To the same effect is a statement that appeared in *Newsweek* for November 18, 1940: "The outstanding feature of the Army's expansion program is its apparent rejection of the idea that it is building for an emergency. Instead, all efforts are aimed toward permanently increasing the nation's military plant."

Similarly, Brigadier General J. M. Palmer declared before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in 1940: "I think that after provision is made for the emergency, the policy of training should continue for young men." The plea of the American Legion (uttered shortly before we entered the war) that "universal military training be made a permanent policy of the Government," reflects the same line of reasoning. A drastic attempt at action in this direction is represented by the bill, introduced early in 1943 into the California State Legislature, providing for compulsory military training for high school boys of fourteen and over. And still another straw in the wind is this statement by Quincy Howe in *Harper's Magazine:* "The war has brought compulsory military service here to stay. Even if the war ends tomorrow, the task of garrisoning all the bases and fronts to which our troops have been sent will require a large standing Army. . . . We shall also require a seven-ocean—not a two-ocean—Navy. And to prevent another war like this from breaking out, we shall have to train all our young people to bear arms."

It is needless to marshal further examples, although dozens could be cited. All proceed on the same basis of loose thinking, inviting our fleets to dominate the seas and our

armies to command land areas greater than any nation in all history has been able to control. Just what does all this imply? Is there not something infinitely discouraging, and also infinitely dangerous, in this evidence of a formidable movement to make the United States a leading, or *the* leading, post-war military power—a military power based on conscripted manhood? And if we should drift into a bristling post-war militarism, wherein we stand with swords unbared against all rivals, will not one of the reasons be the weakening and misleading effects of statements and appeals such as those of the American Legionnaires, General Palmer, and others of their kind? Is it not, in fact, safe to conclude that none of these commentators and propagandists has ever paused to pursue the implications of their remarks, or to view them in the light of certain well-known historical facts? For just what will it mean if compulsory military service in the United States should outlast the war, and if Americans should continue to garrison the world?

It will mean that, for the second time this century, we have failed to learn the lesson of a global war and to comprehend the great truths of internationalism; that we have not departed from the old national ambitions or abandoned the outworn doctrine that a mere faction, however strong, can permanently keep the peace against a numerous and determined enemy.

Before considering briefly the overwhelming historical arguments against the position taken by our various commentators, let us note several obvious facts about the post-war world. We should remember that it will be extremely hazardous, just as it always has been, to rely upon the perpetual idealism or good faith of any one nation; and that to assume that our country will behave reasonably or honorably simply because it is *our* country is to be guilty of a childishness on a par with the Nazis' supposition that "bloodpure" Germans can do no wrong. The truth is that *all* countries at times behave dishonorably, since all are ruled by men; and all countries, if entrusted with too much power, are tempted to overuse or abuse it. With all deference to the past performance of the United States—whose record in the Philippines and elsewhere has been in accord with a democratic tradition not shared by European colonizers, but whose collaboration with Fascists in North Africa leaves ominously much to be desired—we must acknowledge that there are grave dangers in such an assumption.

First, since militarists the world over are creatures of pretty much the same stripe, army and navy leaders would not readily relinquish an authority sanctified by peacetime usage but would do whatever they could to consolidate and extend it. Secondly, since politicians are a thrusting and aggressive species and one cannot say what demagogue, what Huey Long or Father Coughlin, what fascist-minded whip-wielder may eventually gain power through democratic processes, there is no assurance that a world-wide American military control would be employed for ends altogether nobler than those of Hitler and Hirohito. Thirdly, unless the post-war revolution is so thoroughgoing that monopolistic capitalism is hurled once for all from the saddle, the pressure of powerful self-seeking individuals and of economic blocs would make impossible a world-wide American administration of an unpolluted nature. And, finally—and, in some respects, most important of all— the hatreds this war is engendering are certain to instill an obliqueness of vision if not of conscience in every one of the warring peoples. Not in a year nor in a score of years shall we be capable of an unbiased view toward the Japanese; and our animosities, whatever their justification, will be stumbling blocks in the way of world leadership on our part.

But because bitterness does not characterize our side alone, the post-war world will be as far beyond control by any one nation as the moon is beyond a moth. Even the most adroitly managed organization or League of Nations will find here one of the most knotty problems in all history; but there is at least a hope that such a League, if provided with an effective police force to which all national military corps would be rigorously subordinated, would be able successfully to patrol the world, preventing an undue concentration of military strength in any region and thus averting the outbreak of war. But there is no hope at all that such an end would be attained by a system giving to one of the combatants in the present war the right and duty to maintain order over a

large portion of the earth. Even if our population and resources were sufficient—and they are not, since we control materially less than 10 per cent of the world's area and people—how except by an unremitting iron hand could we cope with the resentments in vast, densely populated enemy districts? And even if disarmament were imposed by force, as it was on Germany after the last war, would our vigilance not relax after a time, as it did in the case of Germany? Would the preparations against us not grow in secret, fed by our very military suppression? It is not forever possible for any nation to sit on the lid of a steaming kettle; the time must come when the pressure above is diminished or that beneath is increased and an explosion occurs.

For this reason, the prediction of permanent compulsory military training in order that our fleets may ride all seas and our armies garrison the world is to my mind a forecast that we shall win the war only to lose the peace; and that our present sacrifices are but paving the road for even more terrible sacrifices a generation hence.

II

THIS conclusion is reinforced by some outstanding facts of recent history and, in particular, by the record of a century and a half of compulsory military service. It is well known that compulsory service, except for a few minor earlier examples, had its birth in the modern world in 1793, when, in order to recruit a French Revolutionary Army of 164,000 men, the French National Convention adopted Dubois-Crancé's recommendation. But this was merely the first step in a gigantic movement whose effects are visible all about us today. The institution of conscription, having made possible the Napoleonic wars, spread like fire; it was adopted by Prussia in 1808 and by other European nations soon afterwards; and in 1873 it became the law of the land in Japan, that devoted imitator of European methods. Yet there are several features of the whole colossal development which, self-evident as they should be, have been frequently overlooked; and unless these features are noted and allowed their proper emphasis, there is no possibility of estimating the ramifications of the proposed post-war draft.

Conscription, particularly at the beginning, was embraced by certain nations, not as a matter of inexorable necessity, but as an instrument of political power, and became the means by which the leaders reinforced their strength and by which the nation asserted or prepared to assert a predatory supremacy. This was notably the case with Napoleonic France; it seems to have been the case with Japan, although there conscripted armies may have been deemed necessary to hold off Western aggressiveness. But once the measure had been adopted willingly by certain great powers, their neighbors had to adopt it also, even though unwillingly. For the basis of the modern world has been competition, and above all competition by physical might. England was forced to wartime conscription; and in 1940, for the first time in its history, America adopted peacetime conscription in the face of an acute international threat. Yet we in this country, at least at the outset, regarded compulsory service as little less than a measure of desperation. We recognized, reluctantly, that our hands were tied and that we had no choice if we wished to survive as free men. But we deplored the institution even while espousing it, and there are few of us who, if safety permitted, would not vote to end the draft forever.

This state of mind is not unique. It has prevailed in England, among most of the small countries of Europe, and wherever the great majority of men would rather greet their neighbors with handclasps than bullets. But this attitude has not predominated in world affairs, partly because certain force-bent cliques in a few powerful nations have insisted on compulsory training, and partly because fear of approaching peril has not permitted the masses of men to follow their inclinations. Conscription is one of the manifestations of a world-wide evil—the means whereby the martial and predatory minorities have universally enforced their will and their methods upon a well-disposed and peaceful majority.

If this were the full indictment to be levelled against conscription, it would be sufficient to brand it as one of the black maladies of civilization and to convince us of the iniquity of any world order wherein it is retained. But this is not the worst of the indictment. Without conscription, modern

warfare could not have taken on its all-devouring, "total" aspects. Without conscription, the armies of Napoleon could not have overrun most of Europe; Prussia could not have risen to power in the nineteenth century, defeating Denmark, Austria, and France and laying the foundations for the First World War; the cataclysm of 1914-18 could not have slain from ten to thirteen million soldiers, wounded another twenty million, and inflicted its inestimable damage to property and to the lives of civilians.

Without conscription, moreover, war would lose much of its self-perpetuating quality. For the existence of enormous armies is both a peril and a protection, and there is a question whether it is often not more of a peril than of a protection. An army can be used quite as easily for attack as for defense; and the generals and admirals and military authorities, whose business it is to make war, will not take kindly to a perpetual reign of that benign amity that affords them no opportunity to exert their talents. Therefore, the mere presence of a great army involves the danger that—even if economic pressure groups do not propel a nation toward warfare—the military faction will absorb or usurp enough power to push the country across the red borderline. We have before us the examples of Germany, Italy, and Japan, where military cliques gained the ascendancy and availed themselves of the deadly fruits of universal service. And although we flatter ourselves that what occurred there cannot recur here, are the underlying motive forces of men in Europe and Asia different from our own? Will similar circumstances, opportunities, and temptations not produce similar results?

All of which brings me back to the contention, "The war has brought compulsory military service here to stay." For we must realize the implications of this assumption, if we are to work to prove it false. There is something more than dangerous, there is something pernicious, in the belief that compulsory service after the war can be a guaranty of peace, that it can, in fact, guaranty anything but our own eventual defeat. Our only hope lies in quite another direction—in concerted efforts toward the establishment of a post-war amalgamation or federation of nations, whose military establishment will be employed, as already suggested, to make all countries secure. Too long we have been experimenting with the "anarchy of nations," with the "balance of power" theory, with the idea of unlimited national sovereignty for vast military powers. We see the results in the second world-wide upheaval within a generation. The time grows short—it was never more urgent that we seek new ways and methods, if we are not again to observe great nations doing solitary tightrope dances over an abyss.

For can we afford to wait until a third world eruption, by terminating modern civilization or the human race itself, has provided the ultimate refutation of those who see a panacea in the extension of the very means that have done so much to bring us to our present dire pass?

Progress of the Struggle

by NORMAN ANGELL

STALIN'S declaration, early in the month, that he desired, after the war, to see a strong and independent Poland caused the barometer of Polish-Russian relations to rise sharply from its disastrous fall following, first, the execution by the Soviets of the Polish-Jewish Socialists, Ehrlich and Alter, then the suspension of diplomatic relations, then reports (since denied) of the establishment of a separate Polish Government under the Soviets.

But after the rise following Stalin's letter, the barometer registered another sharp drop on the publication of the accusations made by Andrey Y. Vishinsky, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, to the effect that representatives of the Polish Embassy in Russia, and officers of the Polish Army had been guilty of espionage on behalf of the Nazis. This did not seem to accord with the intent of Stalin's letter. It is not surprising that foreign observers in London remarked that every time Moscow makes one gesture toward harmony, it seems to be followed up with two or three toward anarchy. The New York *Times* London correspondent adds that Vishinsky's statement has made "people wonder whether Russia wants to co-operate with the United Nations or is so distrustful of her Allies that she thinks it necessary to keep them guessing about her political attitude until the last military blow of the war has been struck."

The Russo-Polish relations do not stand alone as an indication of cracks in Allied solidarity. The incidents just noted followed disturbing speculations as to the future of the Baltic states; the exposure of an equivocal situation in Jugoslavia where one party had received support from the Soviets and another from the exiled Jugoslav Government in Britain. These complexities had for some time been accompanied by an extremely vocal agitation in Britain for a Second Front on the Continent of Europe. Neither the bombings in western Europe nor the campaign in Africa were accepted as constituting such a front by those who maintained the agitation. But that agitation for much greater aid to Russia synchronized with another agitation on this side of the Atlantic for much greater aid to China, and for regarding Japan, not Germany, as enemy No. 1, and for giving military priority to the Far Eastern, not the European theater of operations. While Second Fronters in England were violently attacking the Churchill Government for not aiding Russia sufficiently, a well-organized agitation in the United States was attacking Roosevelt for not aiding China sufficiently. Those most vocal in each of these conflicting and mutually exclusive agitations freely alleged that political prejudice or preference was dominating military policy; and both agitations were obviously influenced by political considerations, considerations, that is, of domestic politics. The Tunisian successes and the keen speculation as to where the next blow will fall upon the Axis has allayed these agitations for the moment. But they will recur.

These episodes raise once more in acute form the whole question of terms upon which the U.S.S.R. can live at peace and in fruitful co-operation with governments of the West. For although Moscow itself has, since the elimination of Trotsky, abandoned the policy of world revolution, we have not yet arrived at any clear terms of co-operation between a Socialist Russia, which refuses the right of legal opposition within its borders, and Western States, still largely capitalist in character and most of them founded on the principle of free discussion, parliamentary opposition, free contacts with each other, and a political ideology which the Soviets would describe as "bourgeois."

For the Communist of the strict party line, as indeed for some others of the Left,

the answer to this question of how governments of such very divergent moral and economic foundations can live together and co-operate is simple enough: The governments of the West must adopt the principles and ideology of the Soviets, embrace not merely socialism (the exigencies of war have in any case compelled all nations in lesser or greater degree to adopt large slices of socialism) but embrace also the principles of the proletarian dictatorship: Single party government, denial of the right of organized opposition to the government, and similar measures which have marked government in Russia since the Revolution of 1917. An ardent apologist of the Soviet form explained the other day that the world could not live half slave and half free—the Americans and the British being the slaves and the people of Soviet Russia being the free.

The whole sense of public feeling in the United States and in Britain will, of course, reject any such basis of co-operation between the two orders of society. The West is not going to become communist in the Soviet sense, and if "the Social Revolution" to that end were attempted in the midst of war, the result would be a conflict from which the only beneficiary would be Hitler. It is not likely to happen that way. But what may easily happen, and indeed is happening in some measure, is the increase of frictions which certainly add to the difficulties of waging a war by thirty different nations and which, if they increase, will certainly make a stable peace impossible. An unstable peace would not help Russia and the development of a free socialism therein; it would give to fascist Germany a chance to come back.

In politics as in the other occupations of life, there is a time to do things and a time to refrain from doing them. Very clamorous elements of the Left in Britain insist that now is the time to "blast the foundations of the old society," to put an end to the electoral truce, bring about an election, dynamite the Churchill Government, replace Churchill by a "true man of the people chosen from the revolutionary elements"—and much more entertainment of a like character. The assault upon the Government comes mainly from the Left. In America, on the other hand, the assault comes mainly from the Right—as reflected in the last Congressional elections, the behavior of Congress since then, the constant rejection of Administration bills—an assault aided by confusions and divisions within the labor world, the maneuvers of John L. Lewis, the criticisms of the State Department, the taxation confusion, the specter of inflation. If as we approach the end of the war, power and public opinion in America has drifted greatly to the Right, and in Britain greatly to the Left, it does not bode well for close Anglo-American co-operation in dealing either with Russia, or her neighbors to the west, with Poland, Germany and France.

II

THE strains and stresses within the Grand Alliance seem, on the surface at least, to be much greater than were the strains to which the alliance of 1914-17 was subjected, strains which caused it to fall apart almost immediately the war was over.

A good part of this whole difficulty arises from the failure even yet, despite the Niagara of discussion and comment, to face honestly the ultimate purpose of the war. We have been yielding in this, as we yielded in the last war, to the very human temptation to adopt and proclaim slogans only half true, or subject to misinterpretation. The last war was proclaimed, in America, as one "to make the world safe for democracy." This was true. But the phrase was commonly taken as meaning a war for democracy, which was not true, obviously, since our allies of that time included Czarist Russia, Japan, Italy (to mention no others). Victory for them would not necessarily be victory for democracy. We later paid dearly for this not very honest over-simplification. Such a slogan tended to hide, disguise, and falsify the nature of the forces which led to the war and right policies for preventing its repetition. The nations which entered that war, like the nations which entered this against Germany and Japan, did so in order to survive as nations free of alien domination—free to be democratic if they want to be; free to be non-democratic if they feel, as the Soviets have felt, that for the purpose of carrying through economic

changes, it is worth while to sacrifice democracy for a time. Because, however, the word "democracy" is appealing and emotion-laden, this over-simplification and falsification were deemed to be legitimate.

Some similar dishonesty still seems to mark the slogans of this war and is not making any easier the discovery of a common ground upon which a Russia that denies democracy in the Western sense can co-operate with Western nations. The right to maintain political opposition to the government, free discussion, and a free press exempt from government control are among the most highly prized of all the rights of American and English-speaking democracies. Soviet Russia gives to certain other things a much higher place in her scale of values. It would be entirely honest, and it might be the beginning of stable and workable relationship with the Soviets, if we were frankly to say to Russia: "Not only do we not question your right to work out your own destiny in your own way, but we are prepared, as the basis of our future as well as of our present association, to help you defend that right by furnishing you military aid whenever it should be challenged by your neighbors. In return, we ask you to respect our right to work out our principles in our way and to furnish us help in defending them against external challenge."

That, of course, is what the circumstances of the war have for the time being imposed in practice. We are fighting a war the real purpose of which is not, at the first stage, democracy, but the right of each to survival, the right to life as a state. That is, after all, the most fundamental political right. If states do not possess it, no other can be of much value. Russia is discovering that her right to communism can only be upheld by aid of noncommunist states.

One can enlarge on that obvious truth —that communist Russia can only survive thanks to the help of capitalist neighbors —by saying that those capitalist neighbors would never have been in a position to give the help by which Russia survives if, during the last few years, the Communists within the Western states had had their way; or, for that matter, if they had it now. Less than two years ago, Russia's friends, the Communists of the West, were insisting that this was a war between two imperialisms and that "the people" had no concern in it except to make its prosecution as difficult as possible. If the direction of policy in Britain had been in the hands of the Communists, or their colleagues of the extreme Left, Hitler would have been allowed without interference to carry through his conquest of Poland and to go on from Poland to the other states of Europe until everything west of the Vistula was in Hitler's hands. We are not here in the region of speculation or opinion but of quite simple undeniable fact, hardly yet two years old. The Communists in the United States, as in other countries, were bitterly opposed to the war against Hitler —until Hitler invaded Russia. Until that took place, aid in the prosecution of the war was merely, by the communist interpretation, aid given to the imperialists of the world; a victory for Britain was a victory for imperialist oppression, to be prevented at all costs. And if the Communists in the United States had been as powerful as they were, say in France, and had possessed seventy members in Congress and had been able to block all aid to Britain, Britain might well have followed France in the path of surrender and Hitler's power to crush Russia enormously increased. The wisdom of certain sections of the Left today in Britain may, in the light of past events be questioned. Does anyone really believe that a revolution within Britain at this moment, and the liquidation of Churchill, would add to the effectiveness of the British military effort?

All this folly stems from one confusion of which, alas, Communists are not the only victims—the confusion, namely, that there can be no common interest in a community outside the interest of bringing about the "Social Revolution." The folly is due to the refusal to recognize the simple fact that, over and above any conflict of class and economics, exists the common interest of all to remain alive; the "interest" not to be killed, an interest as applicable to nations and states as entities as to individuals within a nation. This is the supreme right and the supreme common interest which we ought to clarify and to emphasize and to make the basis of co-operation between socialist and nonsocialist

states, just as, within the state, it is made the basis of co-operation between socialist and nonsocialist parties.

We know that peace within a state does not depend upon its rival parties—New Deal, Anti-New Deal, Labor, Conservative—all agreeing and becoming one party. The working out of progress demands the maintenance of such differences, the making of adjustments thrashed out by discussion and mutual concession. But we also know that if that debate and those adjustments are to go on peaceably, neither side must impose its program or its platform on the other by violence. That would mean civil war, and the end of that conception of democracy which has been described as "government by discussion and by reason." Yet even noncommunist writers challenge this obvious truth. Mr. H. N. Brailsford once wrote a book which he entitled "Property or Peace," the theme of which broadly was that the nations could never have peace until they had abolished property, or at least capitalism. This is certainly not true of national communities, and need not be true of the international community. The other day, Mr. John Chamberlain, who ought to have known better, indicated that collective security, common action, that is, against violence, the common defense of the victim of violence, was impossible as between nations which were not agreed on such questions as the right to property. One can only remark that very considerable "common action" by the armies of Russia on one side and the armies of the United States and Britain on the other has been going on for some time, a fact which seems to indicate the existence of a considerable common interest. If only the principle upon which we now act had been accepted a little earlier, the fighting might not have been necessary.

Broadly, the difference between the communist or communistic conception of peace and the collective security conception is this: The former says, "The basis of peace must be agreement on the right form of economic society"; the collective security conception is, "The basis of peace must be the common interest of all of us not to be destroyed, and the right to remain alive, as a person or as a nation." If we remain alive, we can go on with the argument about property. If we don't, we can't.

It is the only principle which can work. Churchill, the Tory, rallied to his support something like 90 per cent of the British people, millions of whom were anti-Tory, simply because Churchill stood for the survival of the nation, made up of Socialists and anti-Socialists alike. Communists themselves have rallied to the support of De Gaulle, though De Gaulle is no Socialist. In Britain and France alike a unity has been found under the leadership of men of the Right for the reason that the men of the Right happen to have embodied a political principle which puts the interest of national survival first. Without such survival the Socialist cannot do his job.

On that principle of common defense of the right to national life, the right of security against destruction, we may find a firm and strong foundation for continued co-operation with Russia. We shall not find it on the basis of any demand that the West become like Russia, or that Russia become like the West.

International Editorial Board

Sir Norman Angell
H. Fernandez Artucio
George Backer
Henri Bonnet
Pierre Cot
Louis Dolivet
Freda Kirchwey
Louis Lipsky
Chih Meng
Walter Millis
Edgar A. Mowrer
Anatol Muhlstein
Milos Safranek
Johan J. Smertenko
Michael Straight
J. Alvarez Del Vayo
Basil Vlavianos
Lucien Vogel
Robert J. Watt
Wousaofong

Snapshots at Random

HITLER • MUSSOLINI • LAVAL

AND THEIR ENEMY

STALIN

by

Lucien Vogel

WHILE I was publishing Vu *in Paris, I used to travel with my group of specialists, journalists, photographers, and economists to the places where history was in the making. After our return to Paris, we brought out special numbers of* Vu *pertaining to each of these countries.*

We were reporters. We looked and listened. We did not judge—we watched.

The snapshot memos which I took for my personal album tell a more poignant story now, after things have begun to happen, than at the time when they were taken. I pass them on to you without comment.

TIME:
February, 1931

EPOCH:
The Weimar Republic on the decline

LOCALE:
Berlin

HITLER, Chancellor of the Reich, takes his five o'clock milk and cake in the lobby of the Hotel Kaiserhof, not far from the Prussian Ministry, the Chancellory, the State Department, and the Palace of President Hindenburg.

The group and I have decided that the theme for this special number of *Vu* will either have to be, "The Pre-Nazi Germany" or "The Pre-Communist Germany." The people here are still busy flipping coins.

Every day each of us interviews the bosses and underlings of the different camps—the Black Catholics, the Pink Social Democrats, the Green Herren Club, the White German Nationals, the Yellow Stahlhelm, and these Reds with the Swastika. I have assigned the Junkers of the Herren Club and the young adventure lovers, the believers in Hitler, to myself.

Every afternoon in the lobby of the Kaiserhof, I meet the only member of the Hitler gang I've known for years. We had dealings with his father, the Munich art publisher, Hanfstaengl. His son, Putzi, has married an American and has become a man of the world. For this, or other reasons, he is in charge of foreign relations for the Hitler gang. Our conversations about my interview with the Fuehrer advance slowly. I'm not being trusted. My trip to Russia has aroused suspicious interest, not only in France.

A little incident has nearly spoiled everything from the beginning. The one feminine member of our staff wants a glimpse of Hitler. I take her to tea in the Kaiserhof. But Hitler gets a glimpse of her first. Red with rage, he dispatches Hanfstaengl to our table. The lady is Armenian. It seems the

high nazi chief is not yet quite perfect in the detection of race by nose.

At that time it was considered fun to see Hitler in person; not only him, but the others too – Goering, Hess, Himmler, and Roehm. They sit at a corner table, their backs to the wall. That is a safety measure. The first line of other tables around them are either empty or occupied by hefty young men who insist on looking unconcerned, as if they are unconscious of the bulge in their hip pockets.

Finally Hanfstaengl arranges my interview with Hitler. Philippe Soupault, the ex-surrealist, and I take the elevator to the third floor. There, the Nazi Socialists have their headquarters during the election. And there I am supposed to give my name and arrange matters for the following day. Hitler is in the same elevator with us. Of course, I stare. But he does not see me. He looks right through me. I'm air to him. That means he knows who I am. And I commit a grave mistake for a journalist—I let my face show what I think.

I think of yesterday. There had been a celebration in the Sportspalast. Style—half Communist and half Roman Empire. A crowd of ten thousand deliriously applauded this little man, who behaved like a deranged demon. Next to me, a little grey-haired woman reminded me in looks—but not in manners—of my good old Aunt Amélie from the provinces. The little old woman was in plain hysterics, mystically possessed by the magician. There were more women like her—hundreds, no, thousands. And these grotesque effects from such a meager cause.

He's next to me now. He looks fattish—flabby—small fry. I cannot help it. I feel how the corners of my mouth tremble. I'm grinning, and Hitler sees it. His empty gaze focuses. His eyes catch mine. One million volts of hatred pass through me—prick and cut and tear me to pieces. No, this man is not small fry.

The interview cannot be arranged. They do not give any reasons.

Ever since, whenever I meet Philippe Soupault, he says, "And we could have killed him easily." And I answer with unfailing regularity, "But we did not think it necessary."

Neither did others.

HENRY DE JOUVENEL, French Ambassador to Rome, has convinced me. We shall publish a number on fascist Italy. My group and I, after having done the more important cities of Italy, have arrived in Rome.

TIME: *June, 1932*
THEME: *Dictatorship*
LOCALE: *Rome*

I have seen Mussolini twice; once at his office in the Palazzo Venezia, and then at the Villa Torlonia. We had been horseback riding all morning. You can't talk politics on horseback—at least I can't.

I have been granted another interview—the last. I may bring my collaborators to the Palazzo. They will be allowed to ask him questions—one each, for the subject they are covering. We didn't get any guarantee that our questions would be answered. Some were not. For instance, when I wanted to know about the fascist Constitution. "When you had worked out your project with D'Annunzio, you had decided on a Republican Constitution, hadn't you? Why did you abandon this idea?"—I didn't get any answer.

Il Duce is sitting at his desk. I am standing at his side, watching my collaborators enter. It's a bit funny for me because from the moment they pass through the doorway into the enormous hall, I see on their faces the same sudden shyness which I'd felt my-

self a few days ago when I had to glide over the highly polished tiles up to the enormous desk.

The introductions start. When I introduce my female collaborator, Il Duce's eyes stare in fascination. He does not say a word. It's really embarrassing. The lady is rather pleasingly plump. Il Duce resembles a cattle trader judging the curves of a cow. It seems that the lady meets with all the requirements of Il Duce's taste in women. The silence is awkward. Finally, the eyes of the leader permit me to continue the introductions. My collaborator, Edmond Welhoff, apparently thinks that one of us should flatter Il Duce, and as no one else does, he takes it upon himself. Bowing from the waist, he says, "Your Excellency, last year in London at the International Press Conference, I had the great honor and the pleasure of meeting your son-in-law, Count Ciano."

Mussolini's reply is icy: "You have met a man of no importance."

The ninth of June, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, Il Duce named Ciano, who had been Propaganda Chief, Minister of Foreign Affairs. I wasn't surprised. Too much has been said on the subject of the wonderful ability of a dictator to put the best man in the best place.

TIME: *May, 1935*

OCCASION: *The conclusion of the French Soviet Pact*

LOCALE: *Moscow*

I'M the only foreign journalist invited. The conference is held in Molotov's private office, a large hall in the Kremlin. Joseph Stalin, Viacheslav M. Molotov, President of the Council of the People's Commissars, Maxim Litvinov, then the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (now Ambassador at Washington). Pierre Laval, Alexis Leger, the General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry in Paris, and Charles Alphand, Ambassador to Moscow, are here for the French.

(Today Leger, as a political émigré, is a member of the Library of Congress in Washington. Two years ago, Charles Alphand's son, Hervé, added a nice little item to his family history. He was Financial Attaché to the Vichy Government in Washington until he became what he is now, a member of the Fighting French in London. In his resignation letter to Pétain, he wrote: "Our family has served the kings of France, the Empire, and the Third Republic, but never has a member of my family served the enemy.")

I watch Stalin and Laval. They sit on identical armchairs. They strike me as resembling each other in a peculiar way: the son of the butcher in the Auvergne mountains and the son of the shoemaker in the Caucasus. Both are heavy. Stalin, taller and more powerful. Both hold their hands folded in their laps. At the first glance the hands look alike, but gradually the difference becomes apparent. They are capable hands—hands of placid men, silent men, common men. But Stalin's hands have never forgotten the tools they handled in their youth. They are hard and callous. Laval's hands are soft, slightly swollen. They have never known anything but how to handle money—and keep as much as possible while doing so.

The man who seems to be the more oriental is Laval, not Stalin. Some ethnologists say that the Auvergnats are descended from Tartar tribes, who came to stay in the Central Massif of Gaul.

Because they resemble each other, I continue to compare these two men. Both listen more than they talk; both show the mountaineer's heritage—patience and a gift for dissimulation. Then, one after another, the differences become clear, emerging slowly

during the conference. I feel as I do in my darkroom while developing photographs. On the feeble features around the fat-lipped mouth appear the greed and the low standard of morals of this shyster from the Auvergne. Laval is sure that everything can be bought, especially an opponent. The other, too, is biding his time. But he is waiting for another kind of fight. He would destroy the enemy, not bribe him. Stalin would die on the barricade. Laval would sell it.

The Soviet newsreel men enter and prepare their paraphernalia. Surrounded by lamps and cameras, the people look ridiculously as if attending a marriage ceremony where everybody tries to look natural, relaxed, and friendly. Laval seems preoccupied, busy—thinking of I don't know what. Suddenly, I guess. Of course, the "star" is thinking of the finale. He is certain of having written an important page in history, and he's equally certain of having cheated his partner. Probably he thinks this is the parallel to the famous scene painted by Gérard, "The Peace of Tilsit,"—Napoleon and the Czar Alexander.

While the cameras grind, Laval gets up and with open arms he throws himself at Stalin, who is absolutely flabbergasted. He has not foreseen anything of this kind. He would just love to put his hands in the pockets of his coat, but unfortunately he has to comply with his guest's wishes. He evades the embrace but has to shake hands. He, Comrade Stalin, father of the Socialist Soviet Republics, the boogie-man of international capitalism, and Pierre Laval, the Socialist of the by-gone war who, since, has continually been a traitor to his former comrades and voters in order to become the champion of the French bourgoisie, the most violently reactionary bourgeoisie in the world.

When we go out, I say to Alexis Leger, "I bet you a ruble this final scene is going to be cut out." It was.

Next day, the French Delegation had to go to Warsaw for Pilsudsky's funeral. Before leaving, we attend a gala performance in the Moscow Opera House. Pierre Laval sits in the Imperial Box. At the sound of the Marseillaise, the audience stands up. Half-hidden in another box, Stalin looks highly amused by the fact that his people honor the song of the revolution, together with the representative of French capitalism.

During intermission in the big foyer, Laval talks over the radio to the people of France. He reveals the success of his mission. While he grins at me sideways, as if to say, "Did you see how I put one over on Stalin?" he pronounces the famous phrase, "M. Stalin authorizes me to say that he understands the urge of France to increase her armaments to the level of her necessities."

It was the Caucasian mountaineer who has put one over on the Auvergnat. One day this phrase will permit the formation of the Popular Front in France, which had been impossible as long as the French Communists had refused to vote for armaments. Stalin made Laval say the very words which prepared Laval's downfall the following year.

The World Scene in Washington

By ERNEST K. LINDLEY

THE unpretentiousness with which the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture was organized was, of course, calculated. The United Nations and associated nations (those which have broken diplomatic relations with the Axis but not declared war) were invited to send experts. The experts are expected to agree, in essence, on two propositions: (1) The world's population has never been well enough fed, and (2) it could be better fed by the worldwide application of modern methods of agriculture and by economic measures enabling the areas which can produce food surpluses to dispose of them at fair prices to the people who need them. It would be difficult to choose two propositions on which experts, regardless of nationality, would have less difficulty in agreeing. And they should have little more difficulty in agreeing on many of the practical measures needed to produce and distribute more and better food.

Such a gathering of specialists, called upon to subscribe to largely self-evident truths and lacking the power to commit their respective governments, may appear to be distantly removed from genuine active collaboration among the United Nations. But it has far-reaching potentialities. Food is the first requirement of freedom from want. Even in the normally better-fed areas of the world it is fraught with more meaning now than it has been in perhaps several centuries. Even the American housewife, with her ration books, is learning that an abundant supply of food cannot be taken for granted. A great majority of the world's productive workers are still tillers of the soil. Many of these do not raise enough to feed their own families well, while others, able to raise large surplusses, have had periodic or chronic difficulties in disposing of them for a fair return.

Thus a conference on food and agriculture may have first-rate propaganda value in sketching a picture of what the world-wide reorganization of agriculture could mean in terms of everyday living both to the consumer of food and to its producer. But such a reorganization must presuppose a world in which peace is reasonably assured, so that nations will not struggle for self-sufficiency in food by subsidizing high-cost agriculture at home and will, instead, depend on the lower-cost producers wherever they may be found or develop. Thus the Conference at Hot Springs, Virginia, has fundamental political implications. These will become clearer if, in accordance with expectation, the Conference sets up, or proposes, a standing committee or a United Nations board on food and agriculture to carry forward its work.

The Roosevelt Administration hopes that the Conference at Hot Springs will be only the first of a series of United Nations gatherings held during the coming year to consider specific problems. Its purpose is to begin the practice of collaboration in the simplest form by surveying common ground. This should put the emphasis upon the constructive benefits to be obtained from further collaboration. Each survey should illuminate the necessity or desirability of a world-wide system of collective security. Each, it is hoped, will lead to the creation of a piece of United Nations machinery.

Putting aside all other considerations, this selective functional approach to the organization of the United Nations is probably the best way to enlist the support of American public opinion. To begin with a proposed formal political organization would provoke violent debate. As in the controversy over the League of Nations, argument as to detail would obscure and possibly overwhelm the argument as to purpose. Any proposal to "join" an international organization must encounter this opposition to details as well as a mass of inertia. The act of joining is a positive step, a departure; to

many in the United States it will seem venturesome. But if the plans of the present United States Government prevail, there will already be in existence, when the war ends, a great deal of United Nations machinery. We shall already be part of it; indeed, we shall have had an important role in setting it up. Withdrawal would be the abrupt, venturesome policy. The completion or hitching together of this machinery could come about naturally, almost as the need and occasion arose.

Explanations for Failure

THE British-American Conference on Refugees at Bermuda was of another order. It was convened in response to appeals, especially from Jewish groups, primarily the Zionist Jews. Bermuda was chosen, not to impede press coverage, but to insulate the conferees from the published advertisements, petitions, pageants, and mass meetings which would have attended a conference in London, Washington, Ottawa. The American and British Movements had agreed that they would not approve any measure which would seriously interfere with the successful prosecution of the war. In his note to Lord Halifax, announcing the decision to hold the Conference, Secretary Hull had emphasized that the only promise of sure and general relief for refugees and the captive peoples lay in victory. This was reiterated by the American and British delegates in their published statements at the outset of the Conference.

Among the hard facts, as they were seen in official Washington, were these: American public opinion will not accept modification of the immigration laws to admit more refugees. This was demonstrated as recently as January by a unanimous vote of the House Ways and Means Committee. British public opinion holds similarly that the United Kingdom has absorbed its share of refugees. The large size of the present refugee population in Britain was emphasized by Richard Law, chairman of the British delegation, in his opening statement. Establishing refugees in colonial Africa, the Caribbean area, or Alaska would require shipping. Shipping is the most precious article in the United Nations arsenal. For every ton of it that can be built or found, the military strategists have a dozen urgent uses.

These considerations effectively narrowed the list of prospective havens for refugees to Palestine, the Near East, and North Africa. A decision to try to settle large additional numbers of Jews in territory peopled chiefly by Moslems, it was felt, would have been successfully exploited by the Axis. The Berlin radio has been hammering the theme that the United Nations are waging the war under Jewish direction to establish Jewish domination of the Moslem Near and Middle East.

All of these objections, of varying weight, assumed, however, that the refugees in question could have been brought out of Europe. Agitation for the conference was fed by a report that Rumania would release 70,000 Jews. This report is still widely accepted as a fact. But official sources state that diligent inquiry failed to develop the slightest evidence that Rumania would release these Jews. They suspect that the report was a bit of devious nazi propaganda and that if any of the Jews were released it would be only in return for exorbitant transit and exit fees—in short, the well-known ransom racket. If the United Nations objected, the Axis would then charge them with lack of sympathy for, or prejudice against, the Jews.

Against this unfavorable background, it was not surprising that the Conference at Bermuda could see no practical way of bringing special relief to any of the captive peoples without interfering with the successful prosecution of the war and that they concluded that "there is no immediate prospect of escape." As I write, their recommendations for affording aid to refugees outside nazi-controlled territory have not been published, but they are understood to include: (1) Establishment of temporary havens in North Africa for refugees now held in Spanish, Portuguese, and Iranian assembly camps, and (2) enlargement and strengthening of the representation on the Evian Conference committee.

Buffers or Boundaries?

THE Russian-Polish split was even more disturbing than official quarters publicly admitted. Behind the scenes, criticism of

the Poles and the Russians was voiced in about equal amounts: of the Poles, for aggravating a cluster of sores by a succession of clumsy diplomatic probings; and of the Russians, for highhanded action taken without consultation with their principal allies. Washington esteems General Sikorski highly and credits him with sincere efforts to establish Polish-Russian relations on a sound and friendly basis. But it feels that he has yielded unwisely at times to advisers who either believe mistakenly that Poland can play the balance-of-power or buffer game in the post-war world or are too sharply afflicted by grievances to exercise the patient and delicate judgment which the creation of sound Polish-Russian relations requires. But this critical appraisal of the diplomacy of the Polish Government-in-exile in no way softened the disappointment in the conduct of the Soviet Government.

The United States Government has not recognized as valid any of the Russian territorial acquisitions of 1939 and 1941. But neither has it supported the claims of the Poles, or of any other government, to the restoration of the boundaries of 1939. Its view has been, rather, that these questions had best be postponed. The defeat and disarmament of Germany, followed by the organization of a system of collective security would, it is held, diminish the importance of strategic frontiers. Any thought of the erection of series of buffer states around the Russian border is certainly alien to the intentions of the present American Government, which assumes that Russia's neighbors will have to live on friendly terms with her. But there is a vast difference between a fringe of friendly but independent states and a row of puppet governments.

Stalin's May Day order, his reiteration of Russia's desire to see an independent Poland, and various other indications of growing confidence in his British and American allies—such as a somewhat freer exchange of military information—were all welcomed as favorable signs.

It is generally held in Washington that the Soviet Government is tough and, within its lights, practical. But it is also believed in some quarters that it is a victim of its own suspiciousness, self-insulation, and poor information about affairs and opinions in many parts of the world. The President has shown that he is ready and eager to go more than halfway in attempting to level the barriers to full-fledged co-operation between Russia and the British-American combination. But the Russians should understand that his friendly gestures are prompted by strength, not by weakness.

The Need for Publicity

THE echoes from Vice-President Wallace's expedition to Latin America, like those from President Roosevelt's visit with President Camacho, have been altogether favorable. Mr. Wallace found most of his hosts poorly informed on one major point: why they were not getting from the United States the goods which they had expected. The principal reason is, of course, the shortage of shipping. The colossal dimensions of the ocean supply problem are poorly understood by citizens of the United States, largely owing to the secrecy with which the British Admiralty and the United States Navy have surrounded this most important phase of the entire war. It is small wonder that the difficulties are not envisioned in Latin America, not to mention Russia and the Pacific United Nations. Many civilian officials and high officers in the United States Navy agree with the almost unanimous verdict of other branches of the Government that one of the most tangible contributions that could be made to a full understanding of the problems of fighting the war among the United Nations and Associated Nations would be fuller publicity concerning the war on the high seas.

Democratic Organization of Europe

ROUND TABLE

No. 16

THE maintenance of peace and freedom in the entire world depends to a greater extent on the fate of Europe than on any other single factor. Thus the future of Europe constitutes one of the most pressing questions, not only to its own inhabitants, but to all who are interested in the shape of things to come. Moreover, this question does not solely concern the future; it is of immediate importance in the prosecution of this war. For an understanding of the forces and factors which constitute the Europe of today and will make up the Europe of tomorrow is necessary to carry on that effective political warfare that can be of utmost help and value in securing a quick victory over the Axis powers.

It is, therefore, with particular pleasure that the Editors of FREE WORLD *are able to present this discussion by some of the outstanding democratic leaders and thinkers of Europe. With Louis Dolivet presiding, the following participated in this Round Table: Sir Norman Angell, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933; Max Beer, author and former official of the League of Nations; Henri Bonnet, director of the International Organization for Intellectual Co-operation; Pierre Cot, former Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs of France and Minister of Air, Commerce, and Industry in various French cabinets; Feliks Gross, secretary-general of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board; Josef Hanc, Czechoslovakian Consul in New York City and member of the faculty, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Finn Moe, former editor of the "Arbeider Bladet," director of the Norwegian Broadcasting Service; Count Carlo Sforza, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy; Rustem Vambery, dean emeritus, Royal University of Budapest, former editor of the monthly "Our Century," and now chairman, Committee for a New Democratic Hungary.*

LOUIS DOLIVET—I think we all agree that democracy in Europe is an indispensable condition of peace. But first of all, we must consider in this Round Table the question which is most asked in non-European countries. What are the political aspirations of Europe? Are they democratic? Are they conservative? Are they nationalistic? What are the attitudes, especially those which stem from the last war? And what are the tendencies of the underground movements in Europe? Are they purely nationalistic? Conservative? Reactionary? Or are they democratic movements?

JOSEF HANC—I think one important thing would be to know exactly what ideologies

are developing in Europe under the impact of nazism, because we have a certain amount of information from the underground movements in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and we know that there is one definite tendency which is a revival of nationalism. I might also add it is a kind of restitution of national freedom in all those countries, if I interpret it correctly.

DOLIVET—Would you define this nationalism, Mr. Hanc?

HANC—It is a kind of self-protective, defensive nationalism, which has nothing to do with the aggressive type of gangster nationalism.

FELIKS GROSS—It is a reaction against Hitler.

HANC—These people want to be free nationally, irrespective of political lines. There are cases of local resistance in which a Communist leads a group of people consisting of—well, there are even priests among those people who are led by him. And vice versa, you find a Catholic priest or some other priest, who leads farmers, peasants, business men, and so on. Social stratification has been obscured by this idea of nationalism, which is very natural.

GROSS—Communist propaganda today is taking a nationalistic line. It is quite clear when you hear the radio broadcasts from Moscow that it is taking the patriotic line. Similarly in Yugoslavia; they are trying to combine national slogans with social ones. For that matter, no movement is free from national elements.

DOLIVET—Mr. Gross, can't there also be a revolutionary element in the resistance against oppression?

GROSS—That is quite true, but it is essential not to underestimate national sentiments and aspirations in the future reconstruction of Europe.

FINN MOE—So far as I know the situation in Norway, it is mainly on the national basis that people are united, and they are united to such an extent that former political differences play no role. For instance, the question in Norway today is, "Are you a Norwegian?" They don't say, "Are you anti-nazi?"

DOLIVET—They ask whether you are against the Germans.

MOE—Against the Germans, yes. That is typical for the people and for the Underground. No distinction is made between Germans and Nazis. In a serious discussion, yes; but generally people talk only about Germans.

DOLIVET—Mr. Moe, I know there is one difference, however. I should say that the democratic revolution in Norway has taken place. Norway had an effective democracy before the war so that there was no need for a revolutionary movement. Other countries, however, had reactionary regimes which even before the war were combatted by an important part of the population. This constitutes the difference between the Underground movement in these countries and in Norway. On the one hand, you have national revolutionary tendencies, whereas on the other, you have a nation that is confident its democracy will be re-established after victory.

ESSENTIAL FINDINGS

1. Nationalism in Europe no longer is permeated with the old feeling of chauvinism.
2. The people of Europe are agreed in their opposition to fascism and in their determination to establish a system of collective security.
3. Appeasement of fascist elements in the countries of Europe would be opposed by the masses and may bring about civil war.
4. The economic system has undergone a radical change which under nazi domination will be characterized by greater socialization of all basic industries.

MOE—Yes, that is the difference. And naturally the reaction of the people is that dictatorship represents national oppression, whereas democracy stands for national independence. What they had before is precisely what they are dreaming about now—the reign of law, liberty, and freedom.

HENRI BONNET—I think we should distinguish very clearly between two expressions of the national spirit. Obviously, all over Europe there is a very strong desire for national independence. It is to throw off German domination and oppression that people in every country are undergoing suffering and risking their lives. But longing for independence is not necessarily equivalent to nationalism—the nationalism which is a state of mind hostile to foreign countries. The need for independence is probably coupled with a real desire for greater unity among the peoples of Europe because unity will mean future security against war. This guarantee will rest upon a real measure of homogeneity of government; and this homogeneity will in turn inevitably depend upon strong and progressive democracy.

J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO—I am inclined to view every problem from its political aspect. And so I approach this problem from the angle of the struggle against fascism. Of course national feeling and love for one's own country is extremely old. Wherever an invading army offends the patriotic instincts of the people with its presence, one can assume a strong patriotic reaction. Nevertheless, fascism has introduced a new element into the fight for freedom. Take the case of Spain. The people of Spain were fighting for national independence. They hated the Germans and Italians as invaders of their country. But they hated them especially as the bearers of the nazi-fascist ideology. We saw in fascism our chief enemy. We were convinced that it would plunge the entire world into the greatest war that mankind had known, and our fight against the aggressors was not simply a fight by Spanish patriots but a fight by Spanish anti-fascists. It is important to keep this in mind because the presence of fascism introduced a new element into even the problem of national defense.

Certainly, I should agree that for any country occupied by the Nazis, and for every man and woman in that country, the most pressing need, the most urgent task, is to get rid of the Nazis, whatever may come later. They are not only invaders; they are not only aggressors; they are a blight. But people begin to worry about what will happen after the Nazis are driven out. They reject the idea of having to endure such great and bitter suffering in fighting against the Nazis only to have a new kind of Holy Alliance established at the peace table, for this would rob them of their hope for real democracy and freedom. They will die to get rid of Hitler, but they don't want to live under any kind of semi-fascist or reactionary regime that, while not as horrible as Hitler, would be a thousand miles from the kind of peace President Roosevelt and other leaders of the United Nations have promised the peoples of the world.

DOLIVET—Mr. Gross, before the war you were fighting reactionary tendencies in Poland. How do you see the situation?

GROSS—I want to come back to a point raised by Mr. Bonnet. I refer to a kind of revival of national feeling, but within a strongly democratic and international framework. I should like to explain. On the first of May the underground Polish labor organization stuck posters up throughout the city of Warsaw on behalf of European union, a European federation. For the first time somebody was ready to sacrifice his life in propagandizing for European federation. You will find statements about the European union and about the European federation in every program issued by the liberal intellectual, the peasant and the laboring man in underground Poland. In both Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Polish-Czechoslovakian agreement won enthusiastic approval.

RUSTEM VAMBERY—May I return to Del Vayo's remarks? We have to start by realizing that the idea of nationalism is a moot point in political science; that, of course, every nation occupied by a foreign power reacts in some way against this occupation, but its reaction doesn't necessarily take the form of nationalism. After all, what is nazism but nationalism run mad? Now is nationalism a good antidote? I don't think so. The question is, however, whether all of the European nations have yet arrived

at the other, the sublimated idea of nationalism—nationalism as the consciousness of a certain culture. Great Britain, France, Norway, all of the really civilized countries, hold this concept. Unfortunately, in the southeastern part of Europe there are a good many nations having only a vague idea of nationalism. It is more emotional than rational with them. So it was, for instance—

DOLIVET—This is a very important point because the policies of the United Nations will very often be determined by the appearance of such emotional demonstrations. How would you express it?

VAMBERY—I'll give you an example. Wasn't it emotionalism when the Magyars in 1919, after they had gone down to defeat with the Central Powers, proclaimed their aspiration for the restoration of St. Stephen's realm? No people with any kind of common sense would have thought that, as a reward for having joined the Germans and the Austrians, they would receive all their pre-war territory that, in any case, they could rule only with Austrian and German support.

DOLIVET—Was it the people?

VAMBERY—No, it was not the people. It never is the people. It is always the ruling caste. There never was a democracy in this part of the world, I mean in Hungary. When did we have democracy? Perhaps under Horthy!

DOLIVET—Two points are now clear. Our friends from Czechoslovakia and Poland and Norway view the opposition to nazism as a national reaction against foreign aggression and occupation, a nationalism, as Dr. Gross indicated, within a democratic and international-minded framework, a nationalism which in certain cases, as Mr. Del Vayo pointed out, is overshadowed by an ideological opposition to the doctrine of fascism. And now Mr. Vambery has brought up the point of the undemocratic nations of Europe in which the fight against the Axis is also a struggle against the ruling classes that have used every means, including alliances with the Axis, to keep themselves in power.

The important question that arises now is what is the temper of the masses in Europe? This must be answered because at present some of the policies of the United Nations seem inclined to favor the reactionary rather than the progressive elements in Europe.

VAMBERY—I hope you are more aware than the State Department that there is a slight difference in the nations of southeastern Europe. You have there, for instance, 7,000,000 Czechs, a perfectly homogeneous nation thanks to the battle of the White Mountains in which the Czech nobility was almost entirely wiped out. But, on the other hand, you have nations like the Rumanian where you had a ruling caste, the Boyars, who are still firmly entrenched in their economic position despite agrarian reform. And you have the Magyars, of course, who with the help of the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns have maintained a feudal regime since the Battle of Mohács in 1526.

DOLIVET—Have the people of those countries definitely shown a desire for democracy? If they are given a chance to express their will freely, will they do so in favor of democracy?

VAMBERY—They have had no chance yet. How can you expect any effort when there is no means for the expression of public opinion? Hungary never had a really free press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, either before or after the World War. May I tell you an amusing incident? In 1926 we organized a branch of the Fabian Society in Hungary. In accordance with the law I asked the Home Secretary to approve our constitution and by-laws. Nothing happened. So I asked Philip Snowden, at that time Chancellor of the Exchequer and member of the board of the Fabian Society in England, to help us. The British Minister in Budapest went to see the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary told him, "Well, I'm sorry but we don't know what Fabianism is; we have consulted the Minister of Education." A few weeks later when we again asked for an answer, the Home Secretary said the Minister of Education didn't know what Fabianism was, so he had sent a query to the Faculty of Law "and they are studying the question now." They are still studying the question! We never got an answer.

How can you expect the people to participate in the struggle for democracy in such a country?

DOLIVET—So, practically, we have Europe divided into two parts. There is the part made up of countries in which democratic revolutions have succeeded and a democratic form of government has been established; and then we have another part of Europe where only a modicum of freedom has existed and where the ruling classes are still entrenched in power. The problem of the United Nations—and this is where I should like Sir Norman to intervene—is to find out proper means for helping this process of democratization in the interest of international co-operation, because I understand, from everything that has been said here, that without democracy throughout Europe there can be no peaceful co-operation anywhere in Europe.

NORMAN ANGELL—Like everybody else who has been interested in the prevention of war, for forty years I have regarded nationalism as the curse of mankind.

VAMBERY—That is what it is.

ANGELL—I am inclined to think that in the next ten or twenty years we may be praying that nationalism will survive. Here we are, talking about international co-operation. But how can you have international co-operation between nations when there are no nations? And how can you organize Europe against aggression, or against anything else, unless you have some sort of grouping, even if it is only for administrative division? If you had complete chaos in Europe today and you had to set up—

DOLIVET—You *have* complete chaos.

ANGELL—and you had to set up some sort of a European government, what would be the first thing you would do? I suggest that the first thing you would do would be to divide Europe into nations as the most convenient administrative way of getting at an expression of the popular will. You have to do something similar in all democracies. If democracy is to work, you cannot have 130,000,000 individuals, or 45,000,000 individuals, meeting in a conference, each expressing an individual point of view. It is perfectly impossible. The whole thing would be chaos. You must represent the people through groups, or nations, or parties. We cannot talk at all if we have to talk simply as individuals.

In democracy we have learned to create parties and we have a Republican party or a Democratic party or a Conservative, Tory, Labor, or Liberal party, and they stand for certain views. When you have those parties, you can then begin to talk about the representation of the common will, which is democracy. But if you don't have some grouping, you can't talk at all. Democracy can't exist. Government can't exist. That is quite obvious. Now if we are going to organize Europe against domination by minorities, whether those minorities be ruling classes, agrarian groups, hereditary aristocracies, the Nazi party, or anything else, you must have groupings. They will either be the national or political parties, which are difficult to organize and which have a tendency to infinite fragmentation. In Germany you had how many parties at one time? A hundred?

MAX BEER—Fifteen.

ANGELL—Enough always to give the domination to the minority and not to the majority. If we are going to organize Europe at all—and this is my point—if we are to organize Europe for democracy against aggression or against the Nazis or for any purpose whatever, it must express its wills by groups; the natural groups are the nations.

DOLIVET—I think you must have a purpose, too.

Henri Bonnet

ANGELL—You must have a purpose, yes, but purposes are infinite. There are as many purposes as there are individuals. The easy thing, the natural thing to do at this stage is to take the nations as the bases of the indispensable grouping. Up to a degree, the more you have got a national expression as representing a group, the easier your work of a European and world organization will be. If your national group overrides other divisions, that may be more convenient for the first stage of your organization. If you haven't some such grouping, you are bound to get domination always by minorities. I would say this about nationalism, which I have cursed all my life: It is an expression, up to a certain point, of a very vital thing in human association; it is a sort of instinctive feeling that we are members, one of another, that we make a corporate body. Without that sense you can't get democracy. But neither the nations nor any other corporate body can be independent. The claim for independence is an anti-social claim. And half the time, the de Valeras, when they are talking about independence, really mean equality of right, which is a very different thing. If everybody is going to be independent, you are never going to have cooperation. You must be subject to the rules of the road or you can't use the road at all. Everybody would bump into everybody else.

MAX BEER—If I may revert to the discussion of the trends in Europe, I should like to say that I do not believe these tendencies will necessarily be nationalist and communist. More likely they will be direct reactions to what Hitler and the Fascists have tried to force upon Europe. Hitler wages war against the national and individual rights of all peoples. The reaction to this is a strong patriotic and democratic feeling all over Europe. This patriotism is not nationalism; it is not a glorification of one's own nation but a tremendous passion for national freedom and independence.

This state of mind is due to the fact that the resistance of the oppressed nations to nazi domination has not been the act of a few inspired leaders but the collective effort of the peoples themselves. Even in Yugoslavia where, as we know, resistance has been partly crystallized around a national

Norman Angell

hero, the popular passion for independence is stronger and more inspiring than worship of that hero. There is another splendid illustration in France. When General de Gaulle began his magnificent fight against German domination and the Vichy regime, some people—and I believe that includes the General himself—thought that they could counter the Hitler-Pétain dictatorship by a strong, nationalistic, independent French leader. But very soon General de Gaulle, despite his Rightist affiliations, felt that his country's interests called for an unequivocally democratic attitude. And today the Chief of the Fighting French has become the expression of the French underground movement—that is, of the majority of the French people. He acts as a democratic and not as a totalitarian leader. This is one of the most important lessons of the war.

Now the question is how, immediately after this war, the peoples can express their will in regard to their participation in the reconstruction of Europe, their representation in some international organization of the world, and—this is important—their participation at the Peace Conference. From what I have just pointed out it appears that

we shall have to deal with national collectivities and not with national leaders, or only with such leaders as are closely bound to the people. We may also assume that there will not be any strong political parties in the liberated countries. The only way, under these conditions, to assure the expression of the national will is to provide immediately for elections or plebiscites. You can, of course, rely on the exiled governments and the national councils which have been built up around these governments to undertake the immediate steps at the end of the war. But I think the first thing to do is to organize free elections based, in the case of the democratic peoples, on the rights they had before the nazi invasion—in France, for instance, on the legislation of the Third Republic and in Germany on the laws of the Weimar Republic. As to the peoples who never enjoyed real democratic constitutions, I think the United Nations would have to enforce a type of elections which correspond to the democratic procedures in the more advanced small European countries such as Norway and Belgium.

DOLIVET—Do you agree, Mr. Gross?

GROSS—I think Mr. Beer is right on the whole. There is a very strong longing for personal liberty. (I was recently in Poland for eighteen months and I had the same feeling.) It is a longing for very elementary human rights. The first thing is not to have the police, the gendarmery, and everything else on every step, but positively to have full freedom. Coming to the point raised by Sir Norman Angell and by Mr. Beer concerning international representation, I think the form of the representation should be stipulated by the United Nations. They have the mandate.

DOLIVET—A European constitution?

GROSS—Yes, and the people in Europe, after the cessation of hostilities, should have the right to elect deputies to this parliament.

ANGELL—I am interested in your distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism implies *patrie*. When we talk of elections, plebiscites, and so on, we are implying in these suggestions, are we, nations about as they exist now?

VAMBERY—Yes.

ANGELL—Because it is rather important, in your plebiscites or in your representation, whether in Czechoslovakia you conclude to have one nation or two or three. I think we shall probably need some agreed basis as to what is Europe, what are the nations, what is Poland? Are the Polish deputies going to be chosen in certain cases under the Soviets or under the original Polish Government?

II

PIERRE COT—I should like to return briefly to certain views voiced at the beginning of this discussion, and make three observations. First, I believe that one of the greatest obstacles to the democratic organization of Europe, presupposing a German defeat, will be the fulmination of nationalism. Like Dr. Beer I know the difference between nationalism and patriotism. But nationalism, like capitalism, seems to me to contain within it the most dangerous germs of fascism. If we have a nationalist Europe, we shall have neither durable peace nor democracy. Fortunately, I am less pessimistic than most of the speakers who have preceded me. I can envisage this development of nationalism in Europe counterbalanced by other feelings.

This leads me to my second observation—the fact that in all the countries under the Hitler dictatorship, including Germany itself, a current of internationalism has risen. All countries realize that to avoid war we must not depend on the force of national arms; we must organize collective security. In this way, the instinct for national security directs the peoples, and will more and more continue to direct them, toward international and European solutions. I hope that this current will supplant nationalism; in any event, it will restrain it.

My third observation is connected with the existence of a third current—anti-fascistic and anti-capitalistic. The war will accelerate the tempo of proletarianization. The European masses, at least in Eastern Europe, are growing increasingly aware of the fact that they were generally betrayed by their respective bourgeoisies. At the moment the feeling is not so strong as nationalism, especially in the occupied countries. But with the end of the war, it will develop much more rapidly than nationalism. Why, you ask? For the simple reason that the

problems which will arise with the end of the war will be primarily of an economic and social nature. They will take precedence over problems of national frontiers and national vanities.

Now we come to the real point of the discussion, which concerns the re-establishment in Europe of conditions requisite for the functioning of democracy, or rather the establishment of new conditions permitting the creation of a new democracy, for we all know that we cannot return to the past without danger. These new conditions are bound up, first of all, with economic and social problems. I believe, in effect, that the framework of social structure is economic, and the superstructure political. To organize a democratic Europe, then, requires the organization of an economic framework which will make a politically democratic superstructure possible. Without it, we cannot have real democracy.

DOLIVET—Which problem must be solved first?

COT—The essential problem, from the political point of view, is to allow the liberated peoples to govern themselves. We must not, under any conditions, permit the governments-in-exile, or the military leaders, to establish provisional dictatorships on the pretext of maintaining or re-establishing order, for we know how these provisional dictatorships hold on. It will, therefore, be the duty of the United Nations to guarantee electoral deliberations everywhere, giving the peoples themselves the chance to express their thoughts and their wishes. It will be necessary to arrange these elections as soon as possible; in this case there are more advantages than inconveniences in moving swiftly.

But what should the practical procedure be? I believe we must begin with the smallest of territorial units, the community. Under the control of the United Nations—which have the right and the duty to organize this control—let us begin to organize local governments everywhere. These local governments will clear Europe of fascism. Combining, they will quickly form provincial, national, and finally the supernational governments we need.

This, in my opinion, is the general outline for the most efficacious re-establishment of free institutions in Europe. I repeat that it is a general outline, to be adapted to the special circumstances of each country. But it should have the following bases: (1) Elections to be held as soon as possible; (2) Immediate organization of elected "local governments"; (3) Control and, if necessary, action on the part of the United Nations to prevent the organization of provisional dictatorships. If this general procedure had been followed in North Africa, many difficulties would have been avoided.

DOLIVET—When will the governments-in-exile give up their power?

COT—The role of the governments-in-exile is to symbolize and represent their countries during the war. It is an important role. But, in my opinion, it will be unjust and dangerous to entrust them with even the provisional administration of the liberated countries. As time goes on, these governments represent the peoples enslaved by Hitler less and less. We may rest assured that the future leaders of Europe will be found, not outside the occupied countries, but within them.

Take France as an example. General de

Pierre Cot *J. Alvarez del Va*

Gaulle is an admirable symbol of French resistance. But his National Committee will have neither the competence nor the capacity to govern France provisionally. We shall not be doing De Gaulle a favor to impose the task on him. The case of France, moreover, is exceedingly simple: a constitutional law of 1872 provides that provisional government be exercised by Conseils Généraux, which are comprised of local elected assemblies, and that general elections must be organized within the shortest possible span of time, at most a month. De Gaulle, who has promised to abide by the laws of the Republic, will certainly respect this one. I repeat, if you want a democratic Europe, let the people speak at once. They alone have the right to speak, and no one can direct them.

BONNET—I should like to answer some of the things which have been said by some of the participants just now. I agree that at the beginning there may be a certain amount of anarchy in Europe and that central authorities will have to be put in power by the people. I should not go as far, however, as my friend Cot goes and try in a few weeks or months to cover centuries of history and to rebuild the national unity, starting from the municipality.

COT—I did not say that. I said that for European representation, even on the national scale, it is better to start with local elections.

BONNET—I agree that it will be extremely important to have local authorities re-established in the villages, in the towns, in the provinces, but I think that we should not envisage that one will have, everywhere, to start from scratch. Let us take the example of France. The legality of the Third Republic should be automatically re-established, and that will mean that a certain number of local assemblies will again exist. In other parts of Europe with all sorts of differences of which you have already spoken, you would also see local authorities, having their roots in the legal past of the nation, re-established. In many cases, leaders of the resistance will be included in such assemblies. Everywhere collaborationists will be eliminated. Anyway, it is very likely that in all the liberated countries emergency authorities will arise. At the same time I think that the people of many European countries, especially the democratic ones, will re-establish a central and national government on the first day. The governments will be insurrectional and provisional governments. But, if properly constituted, they will, in agreement sometimes with national governments-in-exile, obtain the necessary amount of support from the temporary local assemblies.

Now another word. There will probably be federations in Europe, and, I think, much larger units than in the past. The trend toward creating confederations, as shown by some governments-in-exile in London, is probably rather small in comparison with what will be the trend of their peoples tomorrow. But the governments-in-exile are quite right in not having gone farther because more drastic measures toward creation of federal governments will need popular approval. It is through the process of regional reorganization that we shall move toward a reorganization of Europe.

HANC—I should not take an exaggerated or a too-pessimistic view of this post-war chaos in Europe. Naturally, when the Nazis have gone, what appears today as a patriotic unity of the Allies will dissolve more or less into sectional divisions. I do expect there will be less tendency in Europe toward a multiplicity of parties, especially in those countries where parties had been built up on an economic basis. Why? Because there will be a great leveling of property, a dissolution of the social strata. I believe that next to nationalism, a self-protective kind of patriotism, the strongest ideology is a tendency toward socialism or social democracy, whatever you call it. When we come to the idea of national, homogeneous groups, I am not so very much afraid that they will whirl in chaos. After all, the French know who they are, and where they are, and their place. The Poles know where they are. The main thing is that we do something to make it easier for Europe to translate these very natural national units into connecting links between the individual and the generality of mankind—nothing more and nothing less. Strong leadership and action will be necessary, and we can give that leadership from outside, from the United Nations, to direct that nationalism along constructive channels.

DEL VAYO—I should like to be very out-

spoken on the subject of the rebuilding of Europe, in my very best English, that up to now the greatest part of the political anarchy and chaos in the European situation has been introduced by the United Nations themselves. It has been the United Nations which, by their lack of a co-ordinated democratic policy, by flirting with the Fascists in North Africa, by supporting Franco in Spain, by trying to pick up any archduke in exile, have confused the peoples of Europe and weakened the men and women in underground movements in occupied countries. From the point of view of the democratic rebuilding of Europe, the greatest anarchist is an appeaser, and the man most likely to bring chaos into the European situation is any one among the reactionaries of the United Nations who believes that, after all that has happened, it will be possible to bring back Europe to the situation of 1939.

Apart from this, of course, there will be a good deal of violence, unavoidable violence, in Europe after the war, especially if we are right in our conception that this is a war against fascism. In every country which has undergone a social upheaval, and not merely in such a situation as will follow this war, there has been a good deal or a certain amount of violence. I don't think that should frighten us. I think that with a clear democratic policy laid down by the United Nations now, the problem is not insurmountable. The dangerous thing would be if we were to emerge from the war with no firm attitude toward the conduct of the peace.

I agree with Pierre Cot. The governments-in-exile must be limited in function. Now they must serve to carry on the political establishment; with victory they will return to their countries as provisional authorities to organize the elections as speedily as possible.

COT—I should like to state my ideas precisely. I recognize the importance of the governments-in-exile. But these governments must be instruments of democracy, or we shall have to defy them. Their primary duty is to organize free elections everywhere. If the governments-in-exile represent the will of their countries, they have nothing to fear from such elections. If, on the other hand, they do not represent this will, they have no right to wield any power.

In my opinion, they ought to function under the control of the United Nations. Even the governments-in-exile of Norway and Holland, which are certainly in the best juridical position, should submit to this control. The United Nations, operating in unison, should compel these governments-in-exile to respect the will of their peoples by organizing, without delay, elections in all the regions that are freed. If we do not concede this, let us stop talking about democracy.

DOLIVET—Will you express a preference as to which of the United Nations should be most directly interested in European affairs?

COT—All the United Nations ought to participate in this control, because they are all concerned with seeing the European peoples free to make their decisions. The "Big Four"—Russia, America, England, and China—should participate in the control, which will allow the organization of elections. If Russia abstains from this control, all those in Europe who have confidence in her, and their number is increasing, may get the impression that the Anglo-Saxon countries want to sponsor conservative governments. On the other hand, the participation of England and America will serve as a guarantee of impartiality for those who are friends of these great countries.

ANGELL—A closed organization of the United Nations as such.

COT—As such; I should like to see the responsibility for the re-establishment of political independence all over Europe taken by the United Nations as such.

ANGELL—You would make the United Nations a corporate body?

COT—Yes, a trusteeship for the restoration of European political independence.

BONNET—I only want to tell you that the formula of the four big powers will not work for Europe.

VAMBERY—Certainly not. It didn't work after the first World War.

MOE—I don't understand Mr. Cot's point. While those local elections are taking place, who would have authority in national matters?

COT—We must begin with realities. When the war is over, the countries now occupied

by the nazi armies will be taken over by Allied troops. I want the governments of the Allied Nations—that is, the governments-in-exile and the "big four"—to be jointly charged with the re-establishment of the rights and liberties of the people and the organization of immediate elections. This procedure will offer more of a guarantee to the people than that of simply handing back power to the governments-in-exile. I am interested in the people, not in the governments.

If I consider it imperative to re-establish local powers first, it is for purely technical reasons. We must begin at the bottom and not at the top. Within a fortnight, one could organize these elected local governments. The local governments will serve as the basis of the new European democracy. Only by beginning with them can you reconstruct provincial, then national, governments, and create a European federation.

MOE—I think that is the biggest mistake you can make. We started off by stating that the fight today is on a national basis, in order to achieve national freedom, or—to express it popularly—to get rid of the Germans. I very much fear the consequences if you merely substitute representatives of the United Nations for the Nazis.

Rustem Vambery

COT—I am speaking only from a technical point of view and you are not speaking from a technical point of view.

III

VAMBERY—Both Mr. del Vayo and Mr. Cot took it for granted that the United Nations will be united after this war. I am not so sure of that.

COT—It seems to me the only way to prevent the danger which was pointed out by Mr. Vambery, which is a great danger, is to give the responsibilities and the control to an organization of the United Nations. We were putting the cart before the horse. The first task of the United Nations is to organize this control and this responsibility.

ANGELL—As to meeting this danger of the man on horseback arising with a small army behind him, within the united front, it is a real danger and it may be the most difficult situation which the United Nations will have to meet, because there you will face a misguided patriotism. Your man on horseback will get hold of slogans which will have great emotional appeal. The technique of control, it seems to me, will be this: The United Nations will have developed something in the way of a machinery for controlling, directing, managing transport, food, ammunition, planes, tanks. As peace approaches, that control should not slip out of their hands. If they retain that control, they will be able to render any local military chief attempting to challenge the authority of the United Nations impotent. He won't have material to fight with.

DEL VAYO—I do not disagree with Dr. Vambery. I agree with him entirely, 100 per cent, about the possible disintegration of the United Nations. I should like to see whether we can agree on this, or at least whether we can state this clearly. We have been calling for a United Nations council whose chief purpose will be to secure the democratic conduct of the war and to prepare for a real peace.

DOLIVET—I think, gentlemen, we agree that the United Nations must assume control and responsibility temporarily to establish representative government in Europe. There are some divergences about where this should start, from the top or from the bottom.

ANGELL—Broadly, on the basis of the legitimate governments which existed before the war. I am thinking, for instance, of France. The United Nations should assume that the government and constitution of the Third Republic are broadly what should be the bases of the provisional government of France.

DOLIVET—But the situation is more complicated when you come to Franco Spain or to Hungary or to many other—

DEL VAYO—Spain has a constitutional government.

DOLIVET—Of course. I think the members of the Round Table agree that the United Nations cannot permit the establishment of military and political regimes which prevent the expression of the will of the people. But there is no general statement which can sum up the position of the United Nations regarding the social and economic tendencies in Europe. Here it is necessary to take into account a great disparity in the countries which make up the United Nations. Even before some of these countries were occupied by the Nazis, their economic system had begun to disintegrate; now these systems have been completely destroyed.

GROSS—This indicates how important it is to avoid generalization because the situation is different in every country. If we take Poland as an example, we see that the idea that the ruling classes will again assume power will have to be modified. For the ruling classes in Poland have been practically destroyed—not the ruling classes alone but the intellectuals as well. Moreover, the great majority of the underground organizations in Poland are now sincerely democratic.

It is necessary to bear in mind that, whatever one may think of the Polish government-in-exile—or the Czechoslovakian or Norwegian government-in-exile—the hopes of the people of these countries are bound up in them. Finally, you know that there are actual underground governments—some better, some worse in every country. These are performing a great many governmental functions.

DOLIVET—But they are not dominated by the governments-in-exile.

GROSS—They are in very close touch with them and acknowledge them.

DOLIVET—This is very significant.

GROSS—Undoubtedly in those countries where there is no strong underground government, some other means will have to be found to establish authority when the Nazis are driven out. But in Poland a complete administration can be organized the moment hostilities cease.

On the economic side, too, the situation is completely changed. Many titles to property have changed hands. Heavy industries have been taken over by the Hermann Goeringwerke. Industry on the whole has been socialized according to the German fashion. The large estates have so-called trustees appointed by the Germans who control everything, and in many cases the landed estates have been given to nazi officers in the same way the knights of medieval times received gifts of landed properties. For instance, near Cracow a certain Count Pototsky owned a very beautiful estate where before the war he entertained German visitors among whom is the present German governor of Poland. Now Governor Frank simply confiscated Pototsky's castle and his lands, executed the Count and is himself the owner of the property.

DOLIVET—Serves him right. May I ask a question? In the event the future Polish government seeks to restore property by cancelling all the changes effected by the Germans, would it not create a conflict between the people and the government?

GROSS—There is a decree of the Polish government-in-exile cancelling all transactions under German occupation. It has caused much discussion among the Poles. It will affect, however, only a few cases where property taken by the Germans from the Poles was turned over to other Poles. In the main, the Germans have taken everything for themselves. I read an advertisement in a recent Lodz paper where the new German owner states, "I have a factory and 200 Jews," and goes on to say that he is ready to use his new property and slaves for any kind of business. Naturally, at the end of the war this situation will not continue. Not only the ownership of property but the employment of people will be under the supervision of the new government or of the United Nations.

DOLIVET—Do you see the end of private enterprise?

GROSS—Not in all respects. Not in the case of small enterprises, the textile industry or the food industry. But we have new industries—the whole Hermann Goeringwerke, in Poland, for example. There are new factories in Poland, shifted from Germany. We shall not give them back. They will be taken over by Polish authorities. The whole Czechoslovakian industry, as I understand it, was taken over by the Hermann Goeringwerke. He took over the chief bank, and the bank controlled the factories.

HANC—Automatically he got all the factories.

DOLIVET—What is the situation now in Czechoslovakia?

HANC—The government in London issued an order invalidating all transactions made under the rule of the nazis. This is vital because we have to demonstrate to the people of Germany after this war that the changes forced on the occupied nations are invalid. But I don't want to say there will be a restitution of all properties.

ANGELL—Some are quite new properties. There is no one to give them back to.

HANC—But there are violent changes.

ANGELL—But we speak of restoration to private ownership. If you take these new properties created by the Germans away from the Germans, there is no private owner to give them back to and consequently you must find some substitute for private ownership.

HANC—There will be changes in ownership but they must be changes made by the people themselves through the constitutional apparatus they have created.

GROSS—I should like to add something concerning the landed estates. There is no party which will not support proposals made by the Polish socialist and peasant movement before this war. It is quite clear to all that land reform is a necessity for Poland. It is one of the elements basic to confederation, because it is impossible to confederate two countries, one of which has big landed estates whereas the land of the other is owned by small farmers or peasants.

DOLIVET—Before we go further I should like to call attention to the fact that there seems to be agreement in the view that before the war there were socialist tendencies

Max Beer

in Europe making for a transformation of the existing economic system. We should see to it that the United Nations, as representative of popular government, do not interfere with those social trends.

COT—This seems inadequate to me. We must go further and state that a socialist economy is the prerequisite of a democratic government. This may not have been true when capitalism was subject to free competition—there is much to say even on this point—but it holds entirely true for the present state of capitalism. There is a contradiction both in principle and in fact between monopoly capitalism and political democracy. When the war is over, we shall have no other choice than between fascism and socialism. It will be impossible to reconstruct economic life, especially in Europe, without adopting the principle of planned economy. Economic planning will thrust itself upon us. For when you have a planned economy, you either end in corporatism, which is to say fascism, or in socialism. Economic planning plus capitalism equals fascism. Economic planning plus socialism equals democracy. It is to this that I was referring several minutes ago, when I said that we must construct the

most appropriate economic framework to assure the development of democracy.

DOLIVET—Is there an agreement on this view of Mr. Cot?

ANGELL—I should emphasize the caveat introduced by our friend from Poland. The importance of the political instrument is primary. Can we produce a political instrument which will make a free socialism possible?

MOE—I shouldn't go as far as that. I think we can recommend a planned international economy which has as its consequence a certain planning in the different national economies also, but I think it is very dangerous to generalize for all the nations. We talked at the beginning of this discussion about nationalism and the fact that some nations have to a certain extent achieved democracy. I think we should not indulge too much in wishful thinking.

In Norway today there isn't very much political discussion because they are afraid that will create cleavages, and they are not interested in that. What we are interested in now is a united national front. On the other hand, there certainly are certain tendencies in the direction of more planning. But I wonder if it is not true in Norway today—and I should suppose in other occupied countries also—that freedom is not just an abstract conception. Freedom means something very real: getting rid of the Gestapo—that is, getting rid of the representatives of the state, of the government which looks into everything you do, which demands that you get an authorization in order to buy a pair of shoes, an authorization in order to sell a pair of shoes, and so on. That is freedom for them and, frankly, I wonder if that does not create a tendency in the direction of private enterprise. In this longing for freedom in the occupied countries there is also a very strong tendency to individualism. Let us allow—

COT—There is a contradiction to reality—

MOE—That can be coupled with a desire for socialism.

COT—There is no contradiction, of course. I see your point. You are plainly preoccupied with the war effort.

BEER—I should like to make a very clear distinction between the political and the economic problem in Europe. I am not afraid of anarchy or of fascism, and not of dangerous political struggles in the European nations. I believe that the violence of which some of these gentlemen spoke and which we may, of course, expect after the war will turn against the Germans, against the traitors and the collaborationists, and that this struggle against the enemies of the people will contribute to national and political unity in each nation, and to the establishment of national and democratic authorities. The political ideology will be, I am sure, under these circumstances absolutely anti-fascist and anti-totalitarian. No people will accept any power which does not come from the people. There are fears now that that will lead to bolshevism. I don't share those fears, because I believe we still have a state of mind in Europe such as existed at the beginning of the French Revolution and not such as we saw during the Russian Bolshevist Revolution.

The people will be eager to have three things: order, justice, and freedom—and especially freedom to speak, to speak openly, to speak where and when they like.

As to the economic problem, I am afraid that here we shall face anarchy, a terrible anarchy. If we are entitled to say that the European nations will create their own political ideology without help and without the leadership of the greater United Nations, I am sure, on the other hand, that they will not master, that they cannot master, the economic situation without the assistance of the United Nations; that they will need the help of the United States of America especially. I want to ask how we can, under these circumstances, formulate a doctrine now about a future socialistic economy in Europe? I agree with Mr. Cot that the feeling in Europe after the fascist experiences may be in favor of a kind of socialistic economy but—

COT—I didn't say that.

BEER—But can we foretell that there will be a socialistic tendency in the United States of America? I don't think there will, and I don't feel, under these circumstances—knowing that the economic reconstruction of Europe can only be undertaken in collaboration with American economic forces and with the leadership of America—the necessity of stressing a socialistic economic doctrine today.

VAMBERY—I very much disagree. Some years ago President Beneš, in the International Congress of Philosophy in Prague, said the problem of our day is how to reconcile the inevitable collective trend in economics with personal liberty. The problem is not a new one. Socialism has ever been and will ever be an ideal. It is obvious that after this war, people will be less interested in discussing their political problems than in creating an economic life in which they can live and prosper. It is unquestionable that the problem is not the same all over Europe. It is entirely different for the agrarian countries and different for the industrial countries. But considering the controlled economy of the war, it is impossible not to arrive at socialism, unless you want to arrive at nazism.

COT—This is my point. I do not say that the feeling tends toward socialism. We must not be merely opportunistic. It is our duty and responsibility to make clear, even before the United States of America (that do not realize it at all), that the choice after the war is not between a kind of more-or-less reactionary liberalism and socialism, but only between fascism and socialism. This is our responsibility, because if the United States of America does not realize it, it will try to build a mild, liberal-reactionary Europe, and in that case we shall again have fascism.

DOLIVET—When you say socialism, you don't mean an established system.

COT—Obviously not. We shall involve ourselves too deeply if we have to define what should be the economic organization of Europe in relation to its political organization. What I must emphasize is the absolute impossibility of returning to a liberal economy. One may either regret it or be glad of it, but the period of economic liberalism is gone, together with slavery, mercantilism, and handicrafts. If we try to lead Europe back to capitalism, with or without the control of the United States, we shall again see the European economy end in monopolies and corporatism, that is to say, in fascism. The one alternative to fascism, in the present moment of history, is socialism. Only socialism can provide a new foundation for democracy.

BONNET—I think we must distinguish between the political and economic fields. In the political field, I am sure that the people of Europe will find means very soon to express their will. The only point for the United Nations will be, of course, not to allow a new "march on Rome" or on any other capital. But it is unthinkable that they could help fascism, any kind of fascism, to come into power. Practical measures, however, should be defined and adopted in advance which would guarantee that popular sovereignty will immediately be restored.

In the economic and financial field negotiations are going on now, and are very advanced, among some of the United Nations governments for establishing before the war is over the machinery which will allow stabilized currencies to exist in every country. That will mean a certain curtailing of national sovereignty. You cannot have stabilized currencies if you leave to every country the sovereign power to manipulate its currency as it did in the interval between the two wars.

You should not imagine, either, that even the most conservative people in the world can think of maintaining in the future private monopolies and cartels as they existed before. You will have more international regulation, whether you like it or not, and much more planned economy in the future than in the past, at least in the field of raw materials. Will that mean that the same economic and social regimes will be established in every country and in every continent? I do not think so. It may be that in many countries of devastated Europe, regimes will exist which will establish much more regulation, much more socialism, if you will, than in other parts of the world—perhaps, for instance, in the Americas. Organized collaboration between such regimes would be impossible only if some of them were fascist, and that because the supernationalistic regimes are committed to conquest, economic conquest first, and then political conquest. But there may be a fair degree of collaboration between democratic regimes, even if some of them are more socialistic than others.

DOLIVET—I should like to make this point clear. Mr. Moe was afraid there might be a conflict between planned regulation and the aspirations toward individual freedom. I don't think there is such a danger. I think that individual freedom, so far as it con-

cerns the exercise of normal aspirations to freedom, will probably be more effectively guaranteed under an economically just system than under another.

MOE—I agree with you entirely. I can make my position quite clear. You see, it almost depends on the fact that we haven't defined what we mean by socialism. But for me socialism is collectivism.

COT—Of course socialism is based on collectivism. But I do not believe that private enterprise is incompatible with socialism. Take Marx, Lenin, or even the "Communist Manifesto." What is incompatible with socialism is using private enterprise as a way to exploit the workers. I completely agree with Dolivet. Socialism is a better way way than monopoly capitalism to guarantee individual freedom and human dignity. Under present economic circumstances, socialism is the only way to replace democracy for the few by democracy for the majority. We must say this, because the time has come to say it, even if in so doing we create difficulties for ourselves and make ourselves unpopular in this country.

MOE—What I want to say is that the occupied countries certainly also realize the fact that there must be an internationally planned economy and that consequently we must also have, to a certain degree, a national planned economy, at least so far as relations with foreign countries, with the outside world, are concerned. But on the other hand, I am afraid that the experience during fascism has created a feeling that people would not like too much interference in their private lives or in their business from the government. They have had enough of that. These are two contradictory tendencies. And, at least from what I have learned about socialism, it seems to me that when you use the word socialism, you go too far.

COT—For instance, let me take a factory. Do you believe that the workers would really not agree on the necessity of control by the state and on a management where they have a kind of democratic control? This is socialism.

MOE—Certainly a control by the state, but for that I should find another word.

COT—If we suppress fascism and monopoly capitalism, we shall have no revolution. If we do not, we shall prepare for war and revolution in the near future.

ANGELL—There is the difficulty of defining socialism or fascism. We have had a developing socialism in England for thirty years. We did not call it that and it has developed rapidly because it was not called that. We have had developed social services, nearly all of them introduced by the Tories. One of the last speeches I heard Herbert Morrison make in the House was that when he had undertaken to combine all the transport services of London into one public corporation, he was opposed by the Tories. Morrison got up with a list of similar measures introduced by the conservative parties in the last forty years, the transfer of telephones, for instance, from private property to the state, and so on. He concluded his speech thus: "Really, the Honorable Members opposite must not think that they are the only party which can introduce a little socialism into Great Britain."

The ordinary Englishman will accept a great deal of socialism, if it is not called such. If it is, he will say, "Socialism as in Russia? With an O. G. P. U.? With the suppression of political opposition? With no freely criticizing press? No, thank you!"

There is no watertight division between a socialist state and a "private enterprise state." There is development on the whole toward managed economy. Whether or not the development is to go on peacefully—and it can never be finished on some wonderful Monday morning—inaugurating the complete socialist state depends upon whether we solve the political problem.

DEL VAYO—I find it most refreshing and encouraging to hear from Sir Norman Angell that the Tories in England want the introduction of socialism! I have a more recent impression, that is of two weeks ago, when they were strongly opposed to the Beveridge report in Parliament.

ANGELL—They accepted every item in that report except one!

DEL VAYO—They opposed it.

ANGELL—Read Morrison's final speech.

DEL VAYO—I received today a bunch of press clippings, airmail, with all the commentaries, even from the *Times*. I think the Tories give the impression of not liking the Beveridge Plan very much, to put it mildly.

Feliks Gross *Josef Hanc*

I should like, for my part, to say this very briefly: I think that practically everybody agrees on one point. Nearly all the authorities who have been talking about reconstruction in Europe agree that it is impossible without a planned economy. But planned economy in which direction? Planned economy to install once again the privileges of the past or planned economy in a socialistic direction? I think it must be in a socialistic direction. I think it is going to be a planned economy in a socialistic direction, whether or not we like the word, socialism.

ANGELL—But it is a question of definition. You can't define it.

DEL VAYO—After the war the peoples of Europe will think and they will act and they will long for that planned economy to move in a socialist direction. The situation will be difficult in one country and not in another, according to the degree of economic and social revolution experienced before the war. In countries which have already had advanced social legislation the situation will be quite different from that in the backward countries of Europe. Some steps will be taken, perhaps, if the word, socialism, scares too many people, to establish a kind of New Deal. But I don't think we can escape the outlook in Europe for a planned economy directed toward socialism. That does not imply socialist regimes all over Europe, but a very strong tendency toward socialism—not necessarily from the point of view of ideological preference but from the point of view of economic factors combined with political factors which can evolve into socialist concepts.

COT—But we cannot be satisfied with such control. You saw several minutes ago how the Tories introduced a certain kind of socialism into England; still we cannot consider present-day England a socialist country. England is still a great capitalist country. We must also say that the kind of control exercised there is inadequate. The question now is not to establish controls over certain capitalist excesses. We have passed beyond that. We must now determine whether we are capable of achieving a complete transformation of the present-day economic order.

Let us look at reality. Let us not restrict ourselves to the consideration of capitalism in its manifest and obvious functions. Let us consider the curve of its development, and we shall see where it leads. Through the accumulation of economic power, through the expansion of industrial combinations and hierarchies, it leads toward corporatism, and the natural consequence of corporatism, on the political plane, is fascism. We can emerge from the war profitably by replacing an economic regime which naturally moves toward fascism with a regime which naturally moves toward democracy. But if we do not take advantage of this opportunity, we shall be wiser to stop calling ourselves democrats, for it is altogether illusory to believe that the same causes do not produce the same effects: from capitalism allied with nationalism there will once more emerge, in Europe, imperialism, fascism, and war.

HANC—We move too much in terms of established doctrines here. We should take much more interest in what goes on in Europe, try to gauge the social forces which are, as I said before, obscured by this temporary phenomenon of resistance to nazism. We have spoken of the right of freedom of speech, and so forth, but I think there is one more vital right that is rising in importance there: the right to work in political freedom and safety. The first thing all

these enslaved millions of Europe will ask for is to go back and to work in freedom.

The impact of Russia on the countries in the Danubian Basin will be tremendous in the sense of strengthening their social consciousness. I shouldn't care so much whether it is socialism or any other "ism." It will be something perhaps entirely new. People will want to work, to have the right to work according to the old virtues. And in addition, there will be a great amount of co-operative feeling.

Now don't forget, gentlemen, that we have developed in Western Europe, in the Scandinavian countries, a very powerful economic and social force, co-operativism. In every country we have that. In the last twenty years there were thousands of co-operatives with ever-growing membership. In our country, almost one-third of consumers' goods were supplied through co-operative societies.

ANGELL—Just as great a proportion in Great Britain. The biggest big business in Britain is the co-operative societies.

HANC—These organizations are there. The Nazis did not destroy them. They are using them for their own purposes, but there are certain traditional organizations which will not be dissolved after this war.

IV

ANGELL—If we have to make a definition of our purpose, shouldn't it take some such form as this? Our purpose is to create conditions in Europe which will permit the acceleration of those social tendencies that make for general welfare, and for their security, particularly the security of life.

COT—It seems to me that we should rest on the fact that we must create conditions which will prevent the return under new names of fascism. Monopoly capitalism leads to fascism; you cannot avoid fascism without destroying its causes.

DOLIVET—Would you agree on combining both as a summary of our discussion?

ANGELL—Yes, but I am emphasizing first of all the political task. I come back to Mr. Gross's point. When we talk of these economic tasks, we should remember that we can do them only if we have political instruments. We had in Europe a certain progress toward socialism in all its varying forms. But it was interrupted by the breakdown of Europe's political structure. Unless we get a better political structure, none of these economic proposals will be any good.

MOE—I agree entirely with Sir Norman in what he has said. I think we should really make a difference between what we in a free country, having access to all newspapers, magazines, and books, consider as necessary for Europe's future and what the people in Europe today consider as necessary. And there I warn you not to go too far. I think Norway is one of the occupied countries we have the best contact with. But it is impossible for me to say today, especially so far as economic questions are concerned, what the opinion in Norway is. And I think that is the case with most of the occupied countries.

As Sir Norman has said, you can notice two tendencies. In a political sense there is a very noticeable trend toward democracy, and so far as economy is concerned, in the direction of more social welfare for the people. But I am not sure that that is a socialist trend.

COT—That is not the problem. The problem is to know what we consider a necessary condition to avoid fascism. Of course, we don't know what Europe thinks. We in this country have a strong tendency to impose fascism on Europe and we know that in Europe they realize that the Russians are in a good way to avoid fascism. So it is not for us to say what they think. It is for us to say what we think useful to avoid fascism.

MOE—I am really afraid that if you say we are in favor of socialism and that the trend in Europe today is in favor of socialism—

COT—I am sorry but nobody said that the trend in Europe is in favor of socialism. We do not know what is the general trend of European political thought, and, therefore, we must let the European people be entirely free. But it is our duty to say that monopoly capitalism has provided, in Europe, the best steppingstone for the fascist dictators. It is our duty to tell the United Nations governments that they will prepare for another wave of fascism if they oppose the development of socialism. The future of political democracy is bound to

the future of socialism, because fascism is bound to corporatism and corporatism is the natural outcome of capitalism.

MOE—It is very good to have this point clear.

DOLIVET—I think Mr. Beer wants to bring up one question.

BEER—It was said just now that there was a very important shifting of property in some European countries, and especially in Poland. We all know that not only was Polish property given to Germans, but all Jewish properties were confiscated by the Germans and often given to Poles, to Frenchmen, and to others. This makes a tremendous problem which we should not overlook in our discussion of the economic reconstruction of Europe. I shall not speak here of the humanitarian and political aspects of the terrible Jewish situation, because I feel that in this room there is no one who does not condemn nazi atrocities and who is not in favor of the restoration of Jewish rights and of a just international solution of the Jewish problem. But I think if we are to adopt recommendations, we ought to mention the Jewish problem as one of the most important in the reconstruction of the post-war world.

DOLIVET—I think that the establishment of democracy in Europe will contribute materially to the solution of this problem. May I present here the statement of Count Sforza, who was unable to come to this discussion?

Finn Moe

CARLO SFORZA—I am sorry not to have been able to participate in the whole discussion, but—since you are good enough to ask for my opinion—I must frankly tell you that I am more pessimistic and more optimistic than most of you. I am more pessimistic because I do not think it possible now to see the future of Europe and to suggest plans for general economic solutions. It reminds me of the main error of the French Revolution when it tried, from Paris, to make Europe happy and free according to a French pattern, while each nation had traditions, problems, and aspirations of its own. We must be modestly experimental, and not proudly Illuministic.

But I am more optimistic than some at least among you, since I firmly believe that the greater part of the European nations are now infinitely riper for new international conceptions and duties than after the first World War. Wilson went to Europe with a message which Clemenceau did not understand because no Frenchman was ripe; Lloyd George understood but was afraid to accept because England was not ripe; and Orlando approved in his heart, but only in his heart, afraid as he was of the small but noisy Italian nationalism.

Tomorrow it will be different. The Wilson of tomorrow may meet in Europe statesmen still thinking with the brains of the past (does it not happen all the time?). But the Wilson of tomorrow will be understood by all the peoples of Europe. In the Europe of tomorrow we'll remain, of course, all of us, good Italians, good Frenchmen, good Poles, etc., but the new fact is that no longer can anyone say, even to himself, merely, "I am an Italian, I am a Yugoslav, I am a Hollander." Tomorrow the nations whose leaders think only in terms of a narrow nationalistic past will lose all influence in the world. Such leaders will remind each of us of old Johnson's sardonic remark about professional "patriotism."

Concerning the economic aspects of future Europe, I am afraid I lack courage for any prophecy—socialism, capitalism, com-

munism? The result will be beyond any school; it will be the travail of decades, perhaps of generations. Let us hope and work for an economic world where an equilibrium will be found between freedom of the spirit—this supreme necessity—and economic and social justice. This is *the* problem.

For my part I deeply believe that what is mainly needed—in Italy, for example— is a wide and generous agrarian reform giving land to the peasants. This is the essential basis for safety of democratic regimes and for absolute certainty against any new attempt of fascist or plutocratic adventurers. When we speak of social problems, we think too much of capital and workers and too little of land and peasants. What I think for Italy—an essentially democratic nation, in spite of the fascist fraud—I think for other nations which may be saved from the excesses of pseudopatriotism and from the dangers of blind reaction only by wide agrarian reforms: Spain, Poland, and—more than any other country—Hungary, which has always been the victim of big landowners who boasted of being the custodians of national honor while they were mainly thinking of their estates.

Let us not forget that if grave social problems had actually been solved in Czechoslovakia, it was because of the far-seeing agrarian reforms introduced by Masaryk and Beneš.

DOLIVET—The members of this Round Table have agreed on all essential points, with one exception. First of all, there is general agreement that while in Europe nationalism is still a strong force, it is no longer chauvinism. We agree that the people of Europe have realized that the independence of each depends upon the freedom of the others. Therefore the establishment of a system of collective security seems to be absolutely feasible. Members of the Round Table also agree that the fascist ideology has split the nations into Fascists and anti-Fascists and that because of the sufferings due to fascism there is no possibility of reconciliation with those responsible for it, or with their puppets. Appeasement of the fascist forces would meet with complete opposition from the majority of the people and would bring about civil war. What the people of Europe are looking for is the total destruction of everything that even faintly resembles fascism.

Louis Dolivet

The Round Table also agrees that whereas the re-establishment of a democracy in those countries which were democratic before the war presents a relatively simple problem, the matter becomes much more complicated in Central Europe and in the Balkans where democracy was suppressed. The people of those countries must be given a chance to express their aspirations in complete freedom, and economic and political conditions must be improved to enable them to participate in the establishment of a democratic system. Regarding private enterprise, the Round Table agrees that while important modifications are going to take place in the structure of the economic system that existed before the World War, there is a sharp division on what changes will be necessary. Some members think that the choice is between socialism and fascism and that socialism is the prerequisite of a democratic government. Others think that there might be some mixed economic forms. All the members of the Round Table agree, however, that democratic aspirations exist all over Europe, and that only in giving satisfaction to these aspirations will the United Nations obtain the greatest support from the people of Europe, both in winning the war and in building a peace based on security and prosperity for all nations.

JAPAN
changes propaganda tactics
in
CHINA

JAPANESE psychological warfare in Occupied China was, until recently, a failure. Acts of terrorism, as widespread and brutal as anything Hitler and Himmler have perpetrated, sowed hatred among the Chinese and gave the lie to every Nipponese protest of "sincerity" and "friendship." Realistic Chinese in areas dominated by Japan were quick to perceive that "liberation" from "corrupt leaders" meant subjugation by cold brutality; that "Asia for the Asiatics" meant Asia for Japan; that "co-prosperity" meant naked exploitation; and that "freedom from Anglo-American imperialism" meant, in Japanese terms, a new ruthless domination beside which previous injustices paled into insignificance.

During the last six months, however, signs have been increasing that, under the stress of war, Japanese policy in Occupied China has been undergoing a potentially dangerous change. There is good reason why it should. During this period Germany's position has been worsened by the second great Russian counter-offensive, by the Allied occupation of North Africa, by the intensified Anglo-American bombings in Europe. Japan, in the same six months, has lost the initiative previously held in the South Pacific, has suffered heavy losses in planes and shipping, and now must gird for the inevitable showdown that still lies ahead of them.

Under these conditions Japan's softer policy toward Occupied China, recently alluded to by Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, is a logical development. For Japan is forced to make every effort now to consolidate her positions in China without incurring the heavy cost in men and materials of large new military campaigns. The obvious course would be an intensified effort toward political consolidation. And indeed, there has been launched during the past four or five months the most deliberate and skillful propaganda campaign that the Japanese have ever conducted in Occupied China—a campaign which has belied the dangerous assumption that the Japanese are incapable of learning from past excesses and blunders.

What are the evidences of this change in political strategy? Tojo's personal visit to the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei may have been designed primarily as a means of consolidating Japan's military and economic hold over Occupied China, but the fanfare accompanying this trip was clearly for the purpose of giving "face" to the Nanking Government. The Wang Ching-wei declaration of war against the Allied powers was apparently intended to give to the puppet regime a sense of participation in the Axis. Added "face" has also

been given to Nanking by the extension of financial aid, by the "return" to "China" of former treaty rights exercised by Vichy France, by giving to Nanking authority over former enemy property and partial control over shipping in the lower Yangtze River, and by the "rendition" to the Wang Ching-wei Government, with a great flair of publicity, of former exclusive Japanese Concessions in China.

It will be noted that these actions have played upon a whole set of grievances formerly felt in China against the Western world. They also anticipated to some extent American and British agreements with the Chungking Government for the abolition of extraterritorial rights. The publicity accompanying these actions has made much of Japan's "honesty," "sincerity," and "fidelity" to earlier promises. Along with these specific actions, the word seems to have gone out to Japanese military commanders in China that the populace must be treated with greater decorum. In a word, strenuous efforts are being made to convince the Chinese in occupied areas that Japan is now adopting a liberal, and even a generous, policy toward them. Even moving pictures, fabricated for use throughout occupied areas, show brave and generous Japanese officers working heroically for China's "freedom."

It is not to be expected that the canny people of China will be readily duped by such propaganda. Their memories of the earlier years of occupation are far too vivid. But, as has been shown in other parts of the world, such propaganda, if backed by a sense of hopelessness and by the most severe economic pressure, and if accompanied by an actual lessening in the harshness with which the subject peoples are treated, may produce a passive acceptance of the situation until new hope can be engendered. If Japan can succeed even to this extent, she can with far less cost garrison and exploit the areas now under occupation.

II

WHAT can be done by the United Nations to offset this well-conceived Japanese propaganda campaign and to keep hope burning in the hearts of the Chinese people now so completely under Japanese control?

The first and most obvious answer is a strengthening of the United Nations air strength in China. Time and again persons newly arrived from the Far East have attested to this fact. Every bombing of a Japanese objective in Occupied China accomplishes not only an important military purpose; it also proves to the Chinese in those areas the falsity of Japanese claims that resistance is hopeless. It serves as the most convincing token that a day of liberation is coming. So long as that hope is kept alive, Japan's difficulties in garrisoning outposts, in organizing puppet troops, in strengthening the Nanking Government, and in exploiting Occupied China economically, will not be easily diminished. For hope is the lifeblood of underground activities which have constantly threatened the security of outposts and the longevity of traitors.

It is also of the greatest importance that means of communication—through the radio, through grapevine channels, through leaflets from planes, and through every other available means—be kept open as far as possible. Only thus can the truth of the world situation in general, and the situation against Japan in particular, be made available to the mass of the people in Occupied China. Finally, a campaign of counter-propaganda is needed, through actions even more than through words, which will offset, and more than offset, the dangerously improved techniques of Japanese political strategy.

The degree to which political action can be psychologically effective in Occupied as well as Free China depends in large measure upon the extent to which such channels of communication can be exploited. The abolition of extraterritoriality by the U. S. and Great Britain was the first political move vis-à-vis China in a long time. It should be followed by repeal of discriminatory immigration policies, and by more outspoken denunciation of the puppet regime of Wang Ching-wei. At the same time, efforts should be made, through considered United Nations propaganda, to unmask Japanese pretenses for what they are, and to nourish, among the oppressed peoples of Occupied China, the faith and determination that they shall be free.

Training Co-operative Leaders for China

BY GEORGE A. HOGG

As with the shutting off of foreign supply routes, China was more and more thrown back upon her own industrial resources, one of her biggest problems lay in the mobilization of the vast but scattered and unorganized production of the hinterland. How was she to canalize the output from hundreds of thousands of small villages into a sizable stream of flour, cloth, shoes, blankets, soap, alcohol fuel, coal, iron, machinery, drugs, and hospital supplies for national use? How to make this production reasonably efficient and standardized, when the producers were people 80 to 90 per cent illiterate and beyond the reach of newspapers, pamphlets, movies, radios, and other means of modern propaganda?

The solution was found in a decentralized system of self-governing producer units, promoted and guided over their earlier stages by a force of trained leaders. This, for China, was not the dream of an idealist but an immediate economic and military necessity. Young organizers, technicians, accountants, transportation men, and educators, who were willing to take their place right alongside the working people and able to impart to these their own purposefulness, became an urgent need. Not only did the absence of the means of modern propaganda make it difficult for this cadre force to reach the people quickly with new ideas, but huge distances and backward communications put a physical obstacle in the way of management from above. Young men were wanted who were not afraid of traveling and working under difficulties, and who could adapt themselves to any kind of hardship. Never had it been more evident that "bureaucracy is not enough." Bureaucracy could not tramp the country roads through heat and snow. Bureaucracy could not ride a bicycle. It was even incapable of understanding what the country people said. Trailing red tape behind it from village to village and farmhouse to farmhouse, it would soon have tied itself and industry into inextricable knots. The physical obstacle of distance could only be overcome by spiritual mobilization—by stimulating a movement of production that would unite the people in voluntary association, and cut out all necessity for bureaucratic management.

Today, with about 2,400 of these co-operative producer units spread throughout eighteen provinces of Free China and nearly 100,000 people engaged in work connected with CIC (Chinese Industrial Co-operatives), this movement has become a great potential in China's ability to produce wartime and civilian essentials and a valuable basis for the establishment of a truly democratic peacetime economy.

In its work of promoting countryside industry, the CIC has constantly felt the need for more young men and women who combine both the qualities of leadership and the ability to take off their coats and work with the people. There were many co-operative depots such as that in Lushan, Honan, where the whole CIC staff took daily lessons in local dialect from the country people and afterwards maintained the very closest contact with co-op members, but

there were also other depots whose staff preferred to wait in the office until the co-op manager or chairman called on him. Theoretically, any co-op which departed from the true co-operative path and began to engage in doubtful business practices could be controlled from above by withholding or recalling of loans. But actually, when the flow of loan funds from CIC showed signs of diminishing, some units began to look elsewhere for funds. New creditors—bankers, moneylenders, business acquaintances, and merchants—imposed new and strictly un-co-operative conditions. In some cases where the CIC staff had depended too much on bureaucratic methods of control and too little on the voluntary driving force of a movement from below, co-ops drifted away and tended to become small merchants (prices were rising) rather than producers.

The need was doubly urgent, therefore, for a technical school, whose graduates would be practical, willing to serve others, and believe in the power of a movement. It was for this purpose that the Bailie School was started by Northwest CIC in Shensi—an example later to be followed by CIC in Kiangsi, Honan, and elsewhere.

In all the Bailie Schools, special emphasis was laid on technical training, in the hopes that the boys turned out would be suited to act as the "bridge" between the Western-trained engineers on the one hand and the co-op member-workers on the other. Not only are the thought processes and attitudes toward life of the co-op members often quite different from those of the trained engineers, but the dialect is different too. Even on the simplest subjects, let alone technical ones, the engineer often finds himself baffled by the elementary barrier of speech. Youths are wanted who will bring an understanding of local conditions and problems to the higher technicians, and who will bring an interpretation of broad technical policy and a spirit of technical and social progress to the member-workers.

II

THE boys for the Shuangshihpu Bailie School were picked on three chief qualifications—quick intelligence, honesty, and suitable home circumstances. The last, taking into account the factors of psychological and economic background, has been found to be extremely important. The ideal Bailie boy must be a potential worker, and harbor no secret ambition of the official type; he must have suffered hardship, and know that nothing is of value that comes easily; at the same time he should be free of economic obligations to his home which might cause him to leave CIC in search of a higher salary once his training is completed.

Since the training period is only two years, extreme care must be taken to pick boys who will be of use in various capacities at the end of that time. Boys who are too young and unformed will not be able to make the best use of their time in school, and cannot be sent out immediately into responsible positions; on the other hand, those whose character and attitude toward life has already been set by their experience of competitive society will not only fail to use their time properly but will harm the co-operative spirit of the school.

Among the thirty-five students of the Shuangshihpu Bailie School, only a very few fall short of the above qualifications. Fu-shan, who lost his mother on a ferry while evacuating from his home, and was later adopted as cook-boy in a restaurant; Chang Sheng-i, who entered the army at the age of twelve, set out with his regiment to walk to Yunnan, fell out by the way, and was taken into a weaving co-op; "Small" Chang, a sturdy boy who came to the school looking out at the world through a long crop of hair over his eyes, in the style of the Shensi village children; Ying-kwei, Kuang-tsun, and Kuang-han, who have wandered half over China since the Japanese first took their homes in Manchuria; Kao, Lo, and Wang, three strong peasant lads from Kansu; Kung, a descendant of Confucius from Shangtung, who fought in the Yangtze campaign, was captured by the Japanese, released with one other boy after seeing fifteen of his comrades executed; Ch'en Hsi-kwei, only son, who helped his mother out of a village near Nanking with the Japanese only a few minutes behind; three graduates of Indusco primary schools who showed interest in technical things and professed their desire to "eat better and learn to use our hands"—these and others are as good a foundation as anybody could wish for the school.

The complexity of background from

which the students come is for them an education in itself. Peasant and intelligentsia, slick city refugee and stolid hinterland native are learning each other's characteristics and picking up each other's dialects. Training during the first year is divided into half-time practical work and half-time groundwork and classroom studies. The second year students spend a greater part of their time in workshop and co-op. Morning classes are held in Chinese, arithmetic, accountancy, economic geography, industrial co-operation, industrial chemistry, simple engineering, truck engines, motive power, textiles and dyeing, and blueprint drawing. In the afternoons, practical work is arranged either in school—in the textiles shop, at the school printing press, or taking down and reassembling the school's truck engine—or outside, in one of the co-op units. In the past month, the boys have visited two iron mines, two coal mines, a coke-making plant, several co-operatives, besides lesser expeditions to temples and beauty spots. Students make reports to the school meeting on these activities. To train themselves in co-operation, the students have organized their own consumers' co-op and credit co-op. If these prove successful, all school supplies—food, stationery, clothes, etc.—will be managed by the students in their own co-op.

Enough funds to support the school through its first year have already been sent through the International Committee for CIC. In the second and third years it is expected that the various school-supporting projects—the coal mine, iron mine, coke and iron smelting, and machine shop—will be increasingly able to support the school itself, and will in return take first pick of the students. For the second year, the Bailie students serving in these industrial projects will return to the school at fixed intervals for refresher courses and to tell the first year students of their work. In the third year, the graduate students may be either absorbed into these projects permanently or sent out into other parts of the region as technicians, co-operative members, or federation workers in the joint supply and marketing or transportation services. Seven boys are now in status of second year students, thirty in status of first year.

Rewi Alley, writing of the training given by the Shuangshihpu Bailie school after his inspection, concluded: "They learn also something of how to keep their bodies well—the relation of bedbugs, lice, fleas, to working efficiency, and of sunlight, air, and a clean skin to better production. Simple things, these, but when grafted to a practical experience of working things, useful and necessary equipment for the man who is to be a servant to many. Capital invested in a junior technician who comes to look on the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives as his family is capital soundly invested. It is the initial investment without which any further large investment of capital would be unsafe."

III

CHOOSING the staff for the Bailie school must be done with even greater care than the choosing of students. The average educational purist will throw up his hands in horror at our school. After struggling for a week or two to fit the students of mixed ages, backgrounds, and academic standards into his preconceived pigeonholes, he will spend the last of the school's administrative fees in sending three polite telegrams of resignation.

For this reason the school has been extremely fortunate in getting the services, over its early formative period, of Andy Braid and Chou Hsueh-yu—Scot and Chinese—who were loaned to Northwest CIC by the Friends' Ambulance Unit. Neither lays any claim to being an educator. Since his graduation from Oberlin-in-China (Ming Hsien School), Chou Hsueh-yu has been acting as translator, mechanic, and general handy man with the Friends' Ambulance people. Besides being interpreter during Andy's classes, he takes the two top grades in Chinese and arithmetic on his own, coaches the handball team, looks after the boys' dormitory, and acts as Hon. Treasurer of the students' Consumers' Co-op. He has the rare knack of being efficient and getting things done without ever being impatient or bossing people about. Because he treats the boys as friends and equals, they look up to him as a friend and a leader.

Andy Braid came and conquered with his bagpipes. When the boys were getting used to these he produced a Highland fling, tap-dancing, Scottish folk songs, and American

jazz on a mouth organ. Meanwhile he was explaining cost accounting and truck engines—both major mysteries—for five hours a day, and patching up odd bodily ailments—sprains, boils, and vague aches—during his spare time. The final touch came when he heard that we wanted a man to castrate the school piglet.

"Used to keep pigs myself, in Scotland," he said. "I suppose Chinese pigs are the same. Let me do that job."

The awe of the students, many of whom came from peasant homes and had previously imagined foreigners as good for nothing but sitting in motor cars and eating with forks, knew no bounds.

"He comes to China," said one, aged thirteen, "he can't speak much Chinese. But he can castrate pigs!"

Supping off homely millet and spinach, in a little place eighty miles from the nearest steam engine, a day's journey in a truck from the nearest spring bed, and four days from ice cream, Andy may be excused if he sometimes dreams of Western industrial centralization. He may imagine factories and technical schools laid out by the mile, and workers living in skyscraper apartment houses. Indeed, he would not be anything unusual if he did.

The average progressive Chinese believes that modern technical advance in the West is leading straight to industrial concentration and that anything else is inefficient. Obviously, if this is the case, CIC is merely a wartime expedient and the Bailie School, which is training co-operative leaders for the future, is a waste of time and money. But is it the case?

In the most recently industrialized countries—Japan, Scandinavia, Australasia, Switzerland—electric power and the internal combustion engine were used to skip over concentrated industry straight into a system of decentralized units with centralized co-ordination. Electric power can be widely distributed, while motor trucks collect raw materials and deliver products either direct to the consumer or to central assembly plants. Not only is this method widely used by the newer industrial countries, but England and America have been showing similar tendencies; the trend toward decentralization has received impetus as an air raid precaution measure in wartime.

"Centralized plan, decentralized execution" is an industrial slogan not only for here and now but for the future. The Bailie boys—practical, strong, and with a fixed desire to create a society worth serving—have their place in the scheme of things, not only for the war but for the peace.



AMERICAN JAPANESE...

Friends or Foes?

BY WILLIAM TANI

MILITARY police fingered triggers on tommy guns as the mob edged closer. Profane oaths colored the night air. From out of the crowd, rocks and lighted cigarette butts flew at the khaki-clad line. As if in defiance of the armed force facing them, the mob broke out singing lustily in a strange tongue. It was the Japanese Navy March. Suddenly a grey Plymouth coupé, driverless, careened toward the line of guards. The young lieutenant leaped into action. Bullets from his sub-machine gun cut the car down, puncturing a front tire, swerving it into the side of the police barrack around which the mob had gathered. Bystanders grew hysterical. More shots were heard. The mob fled, leaving two men dead, nine wounded. The "Battle of Manzanar," California, was over.

On December 6, 1942, almost a year to the day after Pearl Harbor, a bitter, deadly conflict between two groups within the Japanese population of America spilled over into violence and bloodshed. Had the military police summoned to quell the riot been American soldiers of Japanese ancestry, the "Battle of Manzanar" would have been no less dramatic. And it would have been more symbolic of the ideological chasm that divides the generation of youth, born, reared, and educated as American citizens, from the Japan-bred young men and that pits one against the other in an irreconcilable clash.

At war's outbreak, there were approxi-

mately 130,000 Japanese in continental United States. Six months after Pearl Harbor, 110,000 of these were evacuated from coastal areas of California, Oregon, and Washington and placed behind barbed wires in government camps further inland. Another 3,000, all aliens, were interned by the F.B.I. and shipped to detention camps. Mass evacuation of "all persons of Japanese lineage" was motivated largely by fear of espionage and sabotage in case of invasion. It was charged that "we can't tell the loyal from the disloyal," so "it's better to be safe than sorry."

Almost immediately upon confinement of évacuées, the loyal and the disloyal were at each other's throats. The Stars and Stripes and the Rising Sun tangled in deadly earnest on the wind-swept desert floor of the once-fertile Owens Valley. The two flags became rallying points as the casual outsider commented to himself, "The Japs in the concentration camp are fighting again."

At the height of the mob demonstration on December 6, one of the "pro-Japan" ringleaders, shouting to his followers through the window of his jail cell, shrieked in Japanese: "Tear down that flag!"

As several followers moved toward the objective, they were confronted by a small band of fifteen young men, arms locked, standing firmly in a ring around the flagpole's base. In the right hand of each was an ugly rock, on the face of each, grim determination. The would-be flag despoilers hesitated. These Japanese Boy Scouts of America had scored the most spectacular victory of the afternoon. The Stars and Stripes remained on the flag pole.

Throughout the summer months of 1942, the two factions, one American, the other Japanese—both of the same Japanese ancestry—had singled each other out, sighted their targets, aimed their torpedos, and set the stage for the riot which flared into the headlines of the nation on Sunday, December 6. In a very real sense these factions are merely the home front counterparts of young men fighting on the Pacific battlefronts. Americans of Japanese ancestry are serving with General MacArthur in New Guinea, Australia. Among United States prisoners of war held by the enemy are young Americans of Japanese ancestry. The *Pacific Citizen,* a weekly newspaper published in Salt Lake City, has reported that the first prisoner of war from the Imperial Army of Japan was captured at Hawaii by an American soldier of Japanese parentage—during the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor.

Enlisted men of the United States Army, whose parents were born in Japan, are now in training at Camp Savage, Minnesota, and Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for combat duty overseas. In other words, American Japanese are today matching blows with Japan Japanese in the war in the Pacific. They did no less at Manzanar, in the confinement of a barbed-wire camp where friend and foe were treated alike by a government that seemed for a while not to understand.

First of the ten government War Relocation Centers, Manzanar has been, and remains, a pet guinea pig. What happens there is a pretty accurate indication of problems bound to arise within a few months at the other nine centers. From the outset, Manzanar and its 10,000 inhabitants have constituted the "No. 1 Problem Child" for the War Relocation Authority, government agency charged with administration of the camps and solution of a knotty wartime home-front problem.

There have been no other riots of similar scale in any of the other centers. There have been beatings, sizable non-violent demonstrations, attempted murders, threats of violence, intimidations, active propaganda in the ceaseless war between two ways of life. But Manzanar's record, confirmed nine times over by the other centers, merely proved what some government authorities have known from the beginning: the large majority of American-born young men and women of Japanese ancestry are American, not only by birth and training, but by conviction and choice. American, not only in their love for their native land, but in their attachment to its democratic ideals. In the dark and dismal months of '42, when their internment on the basis of their race had deprived them of their freedom and destroyed incentives for maintaining their loyalty, these young men and women refused to abandon hope.

"America is our home; we shall never lose faith, whatever the sacrifice," their more outspoken individuals said.

Thus, less than two months after the "Battle of Manzanar," the War Department reopened army enlistment to loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry. The War Relocation Authority shifted emphasis toward resettlement. Interned individuals who could pass a rigid F.B.I. check were released and returned to the mainstream of American life. Today, pressures of tension in the relocation centers are being reduced. The principal combatants who might otherwise be stalking each other within the camps are taking their leaves. On the one hand, they are enlisting under the Stars and Stripes or departing on relocation into the Middle West to await reinstatement in the draft—as Americans. On the other hand, they are going into internment as civilian prisoners of war—as the Jap enemy.

II

MANZANAR produced the first sign of the bitter enmity between "pro-American" and "pro-Japan" residents of Japanese blood.

In July, 1942, the draft status of Japanese in relocation centers was officially 4-C. They were no longer being taken into the army; they were frozen literally as aliens with whom they had been indiscriminately interned. Hurt by this, and determined to see it corrected, 218 young men at Manzanar signed a petition to the President asking for a combat unit for "loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry." The petition also urged a Second Front. Some of its adherents stressed bombing Tokyo.

Opposing sentiment flared into action within Manzanar. The petition was condemned by openly "pro-Japan" ringleaders. They made a powerful appeal merely by pointing to the armed sentries, barbed wires, watchtowers: "Don't be fooled by these professions of the white man. We're all Japanese. This is a race war. You're a traitor to your race if you still think you can ever become an American. America is a white man's country. Look how they treated all of you." For the most part, this point of view found expression in the Japanese tongue. An effort was made to convince the mass of confused persons "in the middle" that Japan would win the war, that they must not listen to "the misguided young men who think they are Americans."

These assertions met with challenging action by the "pro-American" advocates who, admitting handicaps in attempting to out-talk the opposition, decided to out-do it. They contributed blood to the Red Cross blood bank at the center hospital; they boomed war bond drives; they recruited workers for the camouflage net factory, engaged in the output of nets for the Army; they enlisted as Japanese language instructors for both Army and Navy, they pressed for emphasis on "faith in God and Country" in the center church services; they encouraged the attitude of patience and faith in America against the heavy weight of arguments from the opposition.

The clash between the two factions reached tense proportions several months before the actual spilling of blood. An évacuée formerly employed as a domestic in a Hollywood home, discussing the appointment of his ex-employer's son as a commissioned officer in the U. S. Army, remarked with wry sarcasm: "He kinda dumb guy; no wonder American Army lose all time. This country never accept Japanese. I live here 22 years, no can become citizen. You boys citizens, is you? Make no difference, Japanese got no chance here. I know. I bet Japan win."

Two months later, the three young men

to whom he had addressed his opinion were wearing uniforms of the United States Army, volunteers for overseas duty.

No one living as an évacuée at Manzanar, or at Poston, Gila River, Heart Mountain, Jerome, or any of the other nine barbed-wire "relocations centers" for that matter, can help but feel the incessant tug-of-war, the divided loyalties which split the people wide apart. More than anything else, the anxiety neurosis of people uniformly bewildered, uncertain—and, therefore, afraid—is characteristic. The riot at Manzanar last December served to hurry along the process of segregating "pro" and "anti" factions within the camps.

Manzanar learned the hard way, through bloodshed and turmoil, the tragedy of war between those of like blood and race but of totally differing ideals, standards, ways of life. Manzanar learned for all the other nine centers that any pronounced activity within a guarded center by proponents of either American or Japanese causes makes internal administration a severe, wracking headache.

When the "pro-Americans" attempted to organize a "Citizens Federation" and held a meeting to discuss the Second Front petitions they endured sneers and jeers. The "pro-Japanese" taunted them.

"If you flag-waving superpatriots are 100 per cent Americans, walk past the barbed wire fence and see if you don't get shot."

A week later the Tokyoists held a meeting of their own, denounced the "pro-American" group, and secretly drew up a "death list."

A former San Francisco longshoreman who reproached the Tokyoists, charging them with subversive activity, was suddenly confronted one night by a dozen burly visitors who descended on his small barrack room. He was "asked" to retract his charges. "For the peace of this camp," he said solemnly, "I hereby retract them. But they are true just the same; you're all nothing but a bunch of lousy Japanese."

The visitors stalked away, apparently satisfied. A few weeks later, when this man volunteered for the U. S. Army, a gang of hoodlums surrounded his barrack to assault him. His last night at Manzanar was spent under police protection.

Agitation expressed in such incidents has undoubtedly been one of the most compelling incentives which have driven the first several hundred young men and women out of these internment camps back into the normalcy of American life. The riot of Manzanar produced a list of over seventy individuals whose lives were considered in jeopardy by their continued residence in the center. Foreign-born Japanese were among this number. The Government, clearing each individual's record, resettled them in the Midwest. They left behind them, however, thousands of equally loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry awaiting their release from internment. They left, also, not as many thousands of those who either have been actively disloyal from the outset or who have since their internment lost all hope and faith in America and have elected to with Japan.

America's Japanese population today, still largely behind barbed wires and watchtowers, is saying, on the one hand, as did a "pro-Japan" rioter at Manzanar: "I go to Texas prison camp; I sign up for repatriation to Japan. Japan going to win," knock stuffings out of white man. After war, lots of opportunities in Java, Australia, China, Philippines, Manchukuo. America white man's land; no hope for me."

And on the other hand, it is saying, as did Mike Masaoka: "I have volunteered for service in the Army of the United States. . . . As an American citizen, and particularly an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, I could do no less. . . . I know that this America of ours will win the war and that this nation will be greater than ever. I know that the injustices and sacrifices which we have been forced to undergo will be compensated for in some way, provided that we prove now our right to that compensation. . . . I want to be able, in the years to come, to know that my children, and their children after them will not be forced to suffer, as we have suffered, because I was not visionary enough, or courageous enough, to be baptized under the fire of enemy guns and to prove beyond all doubt that we who are Americans in spite of our Japanese faces are loyal to the land of our birth, even unto death. . . . I have a stake in America. I believe that it is worth fighting for."

PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

Among organizations studying the character which the post-war world must assume if a "good society" is to emerge, the three great religious bodies, Catholics, Jews and Protestants, have unique importance because of the great number of their adherents and because of their international associations. Refusing to believe that "chaos shall inherit the future," religious groups in many parts of the earth, writes Professor Liston Pope of the Yale Divinity School, "refuse to defer formulation of peace aims until such time as they may be put fully into effect. . . . It is assumed that planning for world reorganization can be more objective now than under the obfuscation and vengefulness of the public mind after victory has been won." In the fourteenth of our reports on post-war plans, we present a survey of major proposals which have been advanced by planning bodies of these religious groups. A later issue will discuss the program formulated by the Quakers.

XIV—Catholics, Protestants, and Jews

ANY analysis of the fifty or more statements about the "bases of a just and durable peace" issuing from religious circles during the past year or two, must take account of studies and recommendations made over the course of the past decades. Current declarations are a distillation from the past, with increasingly specific application to the immediate problems of post-war reorganization of the world in economic, political, social, and racial spheres.

For almost two decades, committees of the Catholic Church have studied such highly specific subjects as agriculture, tariffs, the League of Nations; and their published reports, written by specialists in the fields of economics, international relations, and history, have often been concrete. The Catholic Association for International Peace, for example, was set up as a "self-educating body." Its scholarly reports are usually published under subsidy from an individual college; they are not official pronouncements. Direct action is left to the Catholic as an individual, using non-religious channels. The voices of eminent persons—Monseigneur John A. Ryan, R. A. McGowan, Francis E. McMahon—represent large numbers of Catholics. To the statements of these individuals must be added those of the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, the Catholic Association for International Peace, the National Welfare Conference, the American Catholic Hierarchy, and similar bodies—all supplementing and interpreting Papal utterances.

The recommendations issued by the Anglican Bishops, meeting at Malvern in 1941, revealed the new readiness of the Church of England to make specific proposals for a new basis for society. The "Statement of Guiding Principles," prepared by the Committee of Direction of the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace—a committee headed by John Foster Dulles and appointed by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America—is in a direct line of descent from Malvern. Although the "Statement of Guiding Principles" has not yet been officially adopted by the Federal Council, it represents the Council's position. It was also generally endorsed by the National Study Conference, composed of delegates from a number of Protestant denominations, at its

meeting at Delaware, Ohio, on March 3-5, 1942. This pronouncement emphasizes the political action which individual "Christian citizens" must take "to translate . . . beliefs into practical realities and to create a public opinion which will insure that the United States shall play its full and essential part in the creation of a moral way of international living." It places a heavy responsibility upon the United States:

> For at least a generation we have held preponderant economic power in the world, and with it the capacity to influence decisively the shaping of world events. It should be a matter of shame and humiliation to us that actually the influences shaping the world have largely been irresponsible forces. . . . Many of the major pre-conditions of a just and durable peace require changes of national policy on the part of the United States. . . . We must be ready to subordinate immediate and particular national interests to the welfare of all. If the future is to be other than a repetition of the past, the United States must accept the responsibility for constructive action commensurate with its power and opportunity.

In order to put into effect this challenge to action, sympathetic Protestant denominations, particularly those holding membership in the Federal Council of Churches, have begun the organization of study groups throughout the country. They urge their members to work for the attainment of political goals through the media of secular as well as religious organizations.

Jewish bodies have likewise, through the work of various committees, assumed an increasing responsibility for the correction of the evils that lie at the roots of domestic and international chaos. The division of the Jewish church into Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform sects is as marked as that of the Protestant faith, and each denomination has taken independent action. Thus, no organization in the United States can presume to speak for all Protestants, all Catholics, all Jews. Nevertheless, there is substantial agreement on major questions, within not only each body but among all of them. In addition to the proposals offered by conferences and spokesmen for the three major faiths, there are religious groups which cut across dividing lines and conduct study classes, issue literature, and exert pressure for a just and durable peace, such as the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, the Church Peace Union, the Christian Conference on War and Peace, and the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

In the following summary of programs, because of the multiplicity of statements on the post-war world, specific analysis will be limited to four major documents: the Delaware Statement (representing Protestant thought); the statement adopted in December, 1942, by the American Institute of Judaism; "Seeking Peace in Time of War" (issued by the Rabbinical Assembly of America); and "America's Peace Aims" (a committee report published by the Catholic Association for International Peace). Since the latter was brought out before the United States entered the war, the report will be brought up to date by reference to later but more informal publications of the Catholic Association and to Kurt F. Reinhardt's pamphlet, "The Commonwealth of Nations and the Papacy." It must be remembered that, while these sources represent faithfully important lines of thought, none can be taken as an official church pronouncement.

Universal Moral Law

ONE conviction units all groups within all faiths and sets them off from secular organizations studying the post-war world: the profound belief that there is a supreme moral law to which all temporal law and society, nations as well as individuals, are subject. Out of this conviction stem a belief in the brotherhood of man, a call to penitence, and a repudiation of retaliatory measures. Because religious bodies assert that ultimate loyalty belongs only to God, as Professor Pope has pointed out in "Religious Proposals for World Order," they "rise above reliance on sheer power, national destiny, the sequence of events, or purely mundane values, and attest a fundamentally religious basis for social responsibility and hope." With regard to the question of punishment of war criminals, Jewish groups, who have suffered most heavily from Axis policies, draw a distinction between Axis leaders and Axis nationals. The American Institute of Judaism would "bring to justice the governments and their leaders who are responsible for bringing war, suffering, and destruction upon the world," for "retribution is neither revenge nor retaliation but a requisite condition of international morality."

Greater differences among the faiths are likely to be found in the area of secular interpretation and application of fundamental moral beliefs. While some sort of world organization is advocated by all groups, there are distinctions in detail and emphasis. No statement attempts to describe the precise structural form of the political community of nations. Its powers rather than its framework are dealt with. All groups emphatically state that economic and territorial imperialism must end, that the day of unilateral determination of national policy is over. There is no disposition to obliterate national sovereignties — Catholic opinion argues

strongly for their retention—but all agree that they must be placed under international control. The Delaware Conference not only declares that "a world of irresponsible, competing, and unrestrained national sovereignties, whether acting alone or in alliance or in coalition, is a world of international anarchy," but also insists that international machinery must be flexible: "Any attempt to freeze an order of society by inflexible treaty specifications is bound, in the long run, to jeopardize the peace of mankind. Nor must it be forgotten that refusal to assent to needed change may be as immoral as the attempt by violent means to force such change."

The American Institute of Judaism believes that an enduring peace "must be based upon the voluntary association of nations as equals within a world community, regardless of past offenses . . . a federation of nations in the interests of which the sovereignty of individual states shall be limited. To enable this federation of states to establish the reign of right among nations there shall be created a court of international justice."

Catholic groups likewise advocate an international court. "America's Peace Aims" calls for a world organization, "not only to prevent wars and the evils that cause wars; it is needed not alone to keep war out of the world; it is needed to gain the well-being of the world." Like the Jews, the Catholics point out that although "an international union should aim eventually to embrace all the nations of the world, in the beginning it would have to be confined to nations that are committed to the recogition of human rights. . . . In time the benefits to be derived from membership in such a federal union would be so great that they would prove an inducement to non-member nations to adopt the democratic way of life." Catholic thinkers want such an international government to represent not only governments in power but also major groups (labor, employers, etc.) within states.

Political and Economic Measures

THE close relation between economic and political security is recognized by the Delaware Statement of the Protestants:

> Nations are not economically self-sufficient, and the natural wealth of the world is not evenly distributed. Accordingly the possession of such natural resources should not be looked upon as an opportunity to promote national advantage or to enhance the prosperity of some at the expense of others. Rather such possession is a trust to be discharged in the general interest. This calls for more than an offer to sell to all on equal terms. . . . The solution of this problem, doubtless involving some international organization, must be accepted as a responsibility by those who possess natural resources needed by others.

Opinion is unanimous that "all nations shall have free and equal access to the raw materials, economic resources, and markets of the world; no proposals for peace that do not rest firmly upon economic grounds, that do not grapple with the problems of labor and capital and their relation to the freedom and happiness of myriads, can be either realistic or successful; the standard of living in every country . . . should provide not only proper shelter, sufficient food, and adequate clothing, but all other services now recognized as a part of civilized life, such as medical care, opportunities for culture and education and facilities for recreation."

In differing phraseology, isolationism is condemned by all faiths. Catholics point to the Catholic Church as the oldest international society, and deplore the isolationist attitudes of their co-religionists. The obligation Protestant circles feel to participate in world affairs has already been referred to. Jewish thought is equally emphatic. "International co-operation," states the American Institute of Judaism, "must be economic as well as political. Even as individuals cannot live by themselves alone and be unconcerned about other men, so no nation can plan only in terms of its own prosperity. Economic isolationism, expressing itself through tariff barriers, and other obstacles which impede the flow and exchange of food, materials, and products, at best brings only temporary gains and creates the bitterness, the friction, and the poverty which eventually lead to war. Nations, like individuals, have common responsibilities to establish economic justice for all."

In regard to international control of military power, the statement of the Delaware Conference represents the attitude of all faiths:

> We believe that military establishments should be internationally controlled and be made subject to law under the community of nations. For one or more nations to be forcibly deprived of their arms while other nations retain the right of maintaining or expanding their military establishments can only produce an uneasy peace for a limited period.

The Problem of Colonies

IN arguing that it is the duty of the international authority to assist subject peoples, colonies, and mandated territories to achieve au-

tonomy, the Protestant statement is similar to the proposals of the Catholics and Jews. Believing that that government which derives its just powers from the consent of the governed is the truest expression of the rights and dignity of man, the Delaware Conference declares that the task of colonial government is no longer one of exclusive national concern but a common responsibility of mankind. "This would, in many cases, make colonial government a task of international collaboration for the benefit of colonial peoples who would, themselves, have a voice in their government."

The Catholic document, "America's Peace Aims," projects the realization of this goal into the vague future and calls for an international control to replace that exercised by individual nations. The American Institute of Judaism asserts that "the federation of nations shall assume the obligation of assisting all subject peoples, colonies, and mandated territories to attain their independence." To the body of Jews represented by the Rabbinical Assembly, the colonial problem is not separate from the racial problem. "One of the major reasons for the debacle of the United Nations campaign thus far in the Far East has been the stubborn unwillingness in many quarters to recognize that the day of imperialism and colonial exploitations is over, never to return. The collapse of Burma, the loss of Singapore and of Hong Kong, and the surrender of the Dutch East Indies were due in no slight measure to the attitude of native populations. . . . The crisis in India today strikingly illustrates the truth enunciated by the Hebrew prophets that the moral law cannot be violated by individuals or nations without tragic consequences." The wholehearted support given to the United States by the Filipinos is cited in contrast—but "the fair name of American justice has been strained by the long-standing sins we have committed against the Negro within our own borders. . . . We demand the completion at the present time of his emancipation through the extension to the Negro of full equality of political, economic, and cultural opportunity with the white."

Civil and Economic Rights

ALL religious groups under examination here include declarations in favor of civil rights, although varying elements are introduced. To the traditional freedom of religious worship, of speech, of assembly, and of the press, all groups add the right to work at a wage adequate to support life decently. The Delaware Statement adds freedom of scientific inquiry and teaching. Catholics insist, furthermore, on the "right to religious formation and education," "to marry and to achieve the aim of married life," "right to work as the indispensable means toward the maintenance of family life," and "right to the use of material goods, in keeping with [a man's] duties and social limitations."

Neither the "Statement of Guiding Principles" nor the Christmas Eve Address of Pope Pius XII takes up the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively; the support given this right by Protestants and Catholics must be found from other statements emanating from representative organizations and individuals. The Rabbinical Assembly, in "Seeking Peace in Time of War," likewise makes no reference to management-labor relations. But the American Institute of Judaism is explicit:

> In a democratic society the workers in agriculture, industry, commerce, and the professions must possess the right to organize in order to advance their own welfare. This implies their right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to negotiate with employers the terms of contracts covering wages and salaries, hours and conditions of work, vacations and severance compensations, and the machinery through which grievances are to be adjusted. These rights of labor should be incorporated in the social legislation of every country. . . . The rights of workers imply responsibilities for the welfare of the industry in which they are engaged. The relationship of workers and employers should not be one of conflict but of co-operation. Economic democracy requires that workers participate with employers in the management of industry.

On the right to private ownership of property, the Delaware Statement is silent. Nor does the Rabbinical Assembly discuss it. Pope Pius XII conjoins "the dignity of the human person" with the "right to the use of the goods of the earth," and "to this right corresponds the fundamental obligation to grant private ownership of property, if possible, to all." The American Institute of Judaism confines its reference to the use of natural resources: "Our natural resources should be treated as the endowment of society alone, to be controlled democratically for social use."

In the list of rights, Jewish thought places special emphasis upon the right of minority groups, whether racial, cultural, or religious, to "the fullest enjoyment and fostering of their religious and cultural heritage." In the words of the American Institute of Judaism, "Difference signifies variety, and variety promotes cultural enrichment." On this point, the Rabbinical Assembly elaborates as follows: "Every nation is justified in exposing all its people to

educational influences designed to familiarize them with the history and institutions of the nation and to qualify them for intelligent and loyal participation in all activities necessary for the security, peace, and prosperity of the country as a whole."

Connected with arguments for the civil rights of minority groups is the Jewish declaration for the right of the Jews to a national home in Palestine. The Rabbinical Assembly, in particular, stresses this demand:

> "That right must be reaffirmed in terms that leave no ambiguity as to the right of all Jews who so desire to migrate to Palestine and, when they constitute a majority of the population, to establish there a Jewish commonwealth. . . . The Arabs of Palestine should then have the same option that Jews have . . . of either living in one of their own national states . . . or of enjoying full personal and group rights in the Jewish National Home in Palestine or wherever else they may choose to reside. . . . The administration of Palestine, until such time as it has a Jewish majority . . . shall be vested in a Commission of a world federation and not mandated to any national state. Eventually, the Jewish Commonwealth of Palestine should be enrolled as a member nation of the federal union.

Inter-Faith Collaboration

FOR the attainment of a "just and durable peace" all faiths are ready to collaborate with one another. In analyzing Pope Pius XII's Christmas Eve Address, 1942, Kurt Reinhardt says, "There is no doubt that the *Great Commonwealth of Nations,* the *Great World State* of the future . . . is to embrace all men of good will, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, Christians and non-Christians alike." To the Protestants of the Delaware Conference, "peace will require the co-operation of men of all nations, races, and creeds." To this end, nine of the thirteen points adopted by the Conference are "those guiding principles which . . . Christians and non-Christians can alike accept." Seeing that the mutual heritage of Christians and Jews as well as their present mortal peril must "draw Christianity and Judaism closer to each other," the American Institute of Judaism proposes "that there be convened as promptly as possible a World Council of Christianity and Judaism. . . . We look beyond the World Council of Christianity and Judaism to the formation in due time of a World Council of Religion which, with full regard for the integrity and dignity of each, shall embrace in its membership all the religions of the world."

EDITORIAL COMMENT

RELIGIOUS leaders of all faiths recognize that the fight in which we are engaged is not only a struggle against tyranny and barbarism but a battle for a better world. Upon the basis of those broad principles to which churchmen have always dedicated their efforts, they define precise and immediate goals for society. "Judaism recognizes no ultimate distinction between secular and sacred or between the field of politics and religion." The same holds true of Catholicism and Protestantism. There is an almost universal conviction that there can be no "true worship" until social, economic, political, and racial evils are corrected and religious beliefs are applied; until the abuses of nationalism are eradicated, imperialism is replaced by collaboration, and a world government is set up; until democratic forms of government are established in all parts of the earth and in all areas of human relationships; until great inequalities of wealth are evened out, social security is extended, the rights of all (redefined and broadened) are protected. Religious leaders are acutely aware that the peoples of the earth must understand the problems of world order. "The will of the people is the only solid foundation for a durable peace." And peace aims are the "goals *of* peoples" *even more than they are the* "objectives *of* governments."

It is to the credit of these leading religious bodies, and to the encouragement of mankind, that no sectarian warfare blackens their common present endeavor. Everyone must be aware that reaction can clothe itself in religious trappings and campaign to defeat reform, or that enmity within can destroy the noblest pursuit of an ideal.

Europe's Secret Freedom Press

by E. R. Yarham

AMONG the most persistent and courageous fighters for freedom in nazi-occupied Europe are the producers and distributors of the underground press.

Scattered over the Continent are no fewer than 7,000 Gestapo spies charged with the special duty of eradicating these voices of freedom, but yet they continue to appear with astonishing regularity. Under the very noses of Himmler's agents, and in defiance of the threat of death or the concentration camp, thousands of patriots of both sexes, in at least half a dozen countries, daily edit, print, and distribute these newssheets.

If one editor or printer pays the supreme penalty, another takes his place immediately. In spite of the general shortage of paper on the Continent, and the heavy punishment meted out to any who are caught supplying it to these clandestine newspapers, there always seems plenty for them. Many are amazingly up-to-date, appearing every morning carrying the B.B.C. European news bulletin of the previous night, and publishing Allied war photographs smuggled through by devious secret means, while invariably they are characterized by sardonic cartoons in which the heavy-handed and solemn Germans are mercilessly pilloried. In them Catholic, Communist, Socialist, Liberal, and Nationalist abandon their ideological differences.

Many of these publications reach the governments of the Allied Nations now functioning in England, punctually passing through channels which cannot now be revealed, and from them are gleaned stories of the active resistance against the Germans being expressed in many ways: going slow in industry and agriculture, deliberate faulty workmanship in the production of munitions, and particularly in the continent-wide campaign of sabotage among factories, and road and rail communications.

The underground press is as varied in its components as the countries in which the newspapers are published, and the editors differ in character and outlook. Some of the newssheets are little bigger than an ordinary envelope. They can be folded up into the size of a postage stamp and are then easily passed from hand to hand in street or workship. Some are pamphlets, others are newspapers; and while some are merely typed or duplicated by various means, others are printed. In some instances toy printing-sets have to be used, and often the machines have to be assembled from patiently collected parts.

Hunger for Truth

ONE of the most impressive facts about Europe's underground press is the number of publications which manage to survive, despite the severity of the repression practiced by the Germans. Poland where, perhaps, the nazi regime is evident in most blatant brutality, and where huge distances have to be covered, has about 150 papers. Norway, where again the population is thinly scattered except for two or three big ports, has over 100. There are from 40 to 50 in Belgium; and some dozens in France, where their number is rapidly growing with the reviving spirit of resistance. Their titles vary considerably, as, for example: *Truth, Liberty, Freedom, Fighting Front, The Voice of Paris, Patriot, People's Honor, The War Goes On, Red Flag, Hope, The New Order of Slavery,* and *Free Belgium*—which illustrate the tendencies of the newspapers.

So high is the prestige of some of these that the Germans have even tried resorting to the device of publishing "secret newspapers" themselves, a clumsy device quickly detected. How avid the people of the occupied countries are for truth is seen in the fact that as many as 400,000 copies of a single leaflet are printed and the circulation of more than one newspaper is over 50,000, with ten times that number of readers.

Poland, earliest of the nazi conquests and the country most mutilated by them, yet has a most thriving underground press determined to keep alive the spirit of freedom and to maintain the Polish language and the national traditions and culture. In Warsaw alone 150,000 copies of secret newspapers are circulated regularly, and five carry first-class pictures. Every one is anti-nazi, and they are financed by under-cover subscriptions from patriots thirsty for news untainted by Axis propaganda. Though possession of them is punishable by death, some print up to 12,000 copies. Their names express their purpose and object: *Poland Lives, The Road to Freedom, The Watch, Tomorrow, To Arms, Serve Poland, The Cause.* Day by day they carry the admonition: "Don't smoke; don't drink; don't go to cinemas"—the reason being that the Germans draw taxes from these.

Some of these newspapers have been in existence for three years, and as early as October, 1939, copies of small secret sheets were being stealthily passed from hand to hand. Most of these were in typescript or run off on duplicators, and it is a tribute to the courage and determination of the Poles that such wonderful progress has been made in production, for some are exceedingly well printed. Occasionally, and inevitably, the Gestapo spies overtake one of these organs of freedom, but it can be seen from the dates that as fast as one paper is closed down another takes its place, with the same name but from a different press.

A graphic story reached London a short time ago of a savage fight during the summer of 1942 between the staff of one of the underground newspapers and an SS detachment. Gestapo agents, aided by the SS detachment, surrounded a small one-storied house in a suburb of Radom, where it was suspected that a clandestine newssheet was being produced. A printing-machine had been set up in the cellar, and in one of the ground-floor rooms there was an office—ostensibly a typewriting bureau—where the editor and assistants worked.

The Germans broke in and found four people there, one a woman. There was no chance of escape; moreover, there were lists and other papers that had to be destroyed. The Poles decided to fight it out. They drove off the SS men, wounding three of them seriously. But in the end the Nazis set the house on fire and the gallant defenders perished. They were thrown into a nearby pit. Next night unknown patriots put their bodies in coffins and buried them, setting crosses above their graves. Two days later the Nazis exhumed the bodies and again dumped them into an unmarked pit.

"Father" Karel Skalda

IN Czechoslovakia the ruthless nazi censorship suppressed at least 900 periodicals including even the children's weekly, *Little Reader*. These have been replaced, as in other occupied countries, by a clandestine press. The nazi authorities issued a decree in 1941 that paper merchants who supply paper for such newspapers may be sentenced to 10 years imprisonment with loss of their business and their rights of citizenship. Yet the papers continue to appear, even though they have had to be printed occasionally on old paper bags. Sometimes the news is secreted in what at first glance seems an ordinary book, possibly one of a well-known series. The first page or two may read quite innocuously, but then the reader comes across cartoons and editorials about speeches made by the nazi governors and their Quislings. For example, the editor of a Czech newspaper said in a speech at a meeting of the Association for Collaboration with Germany: "The German officials have taken care that from the beginning the journalists should remain in touch with the political and military authorities." The appropriate cartoon to this shows a journalist writing at the point of two nazi pistols, while behind him stands an SS guard holding a pair of outstretched manacles. Names of traitors who are in nazi pay are printed.

The editors give instructions

to the readers like this: Do not accept this book from an unknown! Do not ask where it comes from! Pass it on as quickly as possible to another *reliable person!* Slogans are inserted, among them: "If you work for a German, work slowly and badly!" "Be cleverer than your enemy." "Be careful while reading." Books of this type have been circulated by the publishers of the Czech illegal newspaper, *Our Struggle,* which has been very successful. Another virile monthly, carrying eight to a dozen pages, is *To Arms.* A third is *R.C.S. (Republica Ceskoslovenska);* and another, *Inso* (International Service for National Liberation).

The most famous editor of Czech clandestine publications was Karel Skalda, managing editor of *Our Struggle,* who was martyred in the autumn of 1941. Behind the callous notice issued by the Germans after his death lies one of the most heroic stories of the war. "Daddy" or "Father" as he was affectionately known to his compatriots, may be dead, but his name and inspiration live on. Skalda was only forty-four when he fell before the nazi bullets, a hero many times decorated in the Foreign Legion, one who knew the terrible danger he was running, but who ignored it.

Several of his compatriots were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, but one managed to reach England. This is what he said of him: "Karel Skalda was the spirit of the enterprise. We used to call him 'Father.' He knew how to find collaborators, to collect articles, and to surround himself with loyal men who were able tirelessly to turn the handle of the duplicating machine day and night, to make every effort that *Our Struggle* should appear on Thursday evening and be sent out on Friday morning. Each number was printed in a different place. This meant that the duplicating machine had to be transferred from place to place. No one can imagine the difficulties of this work. Even the buying of paper was an art in itself; and when finally the paper was printed, there was a new problem: to distribute it to every corner of the country.

"All responsibility lay on the shoulders of Karel Skalda. But 'Father' was a true leader who knew how to overcome every obstacle, a man of unique courage and strength of will. At the same time he had the tender heart of a child. Though his speech was sometimes abrupt, his eyes would always smile and soothe. He helped his comrades in whatever way he could, but devoted himself above all to the main task: the maintenance of the nation's spirit by means of a regular, illegal, and rousing press. He knew that his activity took place on the crater of a volcano, and had not the least illusion regarding the possibilities that might lie in store for him. It was as if these prospects only intensified his efforts. He succeeded in arranging things so that it would not be the end of his enterprise even if he and his collaborators were caught."

Hero of the Press

As for France, every city has its own secret printing press, and the spirit animating those behind the underground newspapers is aptly summed up by a quotation from the last letter of Gabriel Peri, deputy editor of *L'Humanité,* the banned newspaper which continues to circulate under German occupation. This message from Peri, who was shot by the Nazis for his activities, runs: "Let my countrymen know that I die so that France may live. . . . In a few minutes I shall make my contribution to the coming of a radiant dawn. Adieu. Long Live France."

Every political party in the country has its secret newssheet of some kind; they differ on almost every subject under the sun, except hatred of Hitler. All are ardently defending the traditional French freedom of expression, and fearless editors have joined the movement, publishing such organs as *Le Lorrain,* the weekly organ of emigrés from Alsace-Lorraine, in unoccupied France. Then there are *Liberation,* the underground newspaper for the South; *Liberté,* a Democratic newspaper printed illegally in the unoccupied zone; *Pantagruel,* an anti-collaborationist journal published illegally in Paris; *People of France, Voice of Paris, The New Order of Slavery,* and many others. Patriotic Frenchmen have been sentenced to penal servitude for life for distributing them, but

despite these repressive measures the newspapers flourish and of late have been increasing in circulation and popularity.

Pantagruel, named after Rabelais' immortal hero, is one of the most notable of them. It is vigorously edited, and each issue has a note printed in big letters at the top of the first column which reads: "Beware! —This newspaper is not a British tract. Any reader who may find a way to make it reach Free French people in Britain will contribute to those who are giving their lives for our liberty by furnishing them with a stimulant and a precious message from home." A moving incident was reported in one of the clandestine newssheets. *Le Cépeaux*, which is being widely circulated by an underground movement known as Sons of France, working for resistance in the occupied territory. It told of the burial of six British airmen who fell in Brittany—"fallen among us who love them!" Their graves were covered with thousands of flowers. "French hearts were uplifted in homage to their gallant liberators," wrote the reporter. "Do not believe the lies and calumnies about Germanized France."

The clandestine printing installations are obliged to move almost every week to avoid discovery. The Gestapo has a special branch whose task it is to rout them out, but this only fills the underground workers with firmer determination to carry on. The *Voix de Paris* appears, for example, with such notices as these in each issue: *"Après le 32ème déménagement"* and *"Aprè le 40ème déménagement."*

Some idea of the difficulties facing those publishing the sheets can be gained from the experience of M. Paul Simon, an editor who was denounced to the Gestapo but managed to reach England. M. Simon and four friends, including a woman, formed a group of resistance soon after the Germans entered Paris. They first printed slogans and then brought out a clandestine sheet, a monthly publication called *Valmy*, named for the French victory over the Germans in the revolutionary wars.

The earliest issues consisted of a single quarto sheet, and M. Simon printed them in his own home, using a toy rubber printing set. It took six weeks to produce the first issue of fifty copies because only four lines could be printed at a time. The issue came out in January, 1941, but it was widely copied by people who had better means of reproduction. Circulation rose to several thousands; by May, it was being stencilled, and a special July number for *le quatorze* on blue paper with red and white stripes was turned out in a printing office. It consisted of four pages, and articles and news items were supplied by a band of organized informers.

This is how the paper was distributed. Each of the five original members formed a group, and these people in turn formed their own group, thus establishing the beginnings of a vast underground chain, in which the leaders were mostly unknown to each other. At the time *Valmy* was appearing there were from fifteen to twenty similar sheets, which proves how widespread is the thirst for news. By the autumn of 1941, repressive measures had reached such a pitch that it was terribly dangerous to publish them. One editor was shot, and when M. Simon lost his printer, the daughter of the new printer declared she would denounce him unless the sheets were withdrawn. M. Simon and his colleagues were prepared to go back and print with their first primitive machines, but the woman did report him, and he received a visit from the police the day before the December number was due to appear. He staved off arrest long enough to get out the paper and escape.

The Fake Press

TO counteract the underground press the nazis have begun to issue bogus "secret" newspapers. One is called *The Norman Worker*, supposed to be printed in an underground office in Rouen; a second is *The Workers' Life*. They are cleverly produced and contain all the features of the genuine newspapers, such as the instructions, "Read and afterward pass around." *The Workers' Life* is described as "the anonymous organ of the Free Front fighting for definite victory and the liberty of social truth." But inside are condemnation of England in the vilest terms and blatant nazi propaganda. General de Gaulle is described as "a traitor" and "a crook" who has "sold France to Churchill," and now wants to sell her "a second time to Stalin." Germany, naturally, is painted in glowing terms—a "paradise" of the working-class, the "only country on earth" where work in the factories is "a real pleasure and a joy," the only country where the workers "are free, remarkably well-fed, well-paid and well-looked after."

And Still They Come Out

IN the Netherlands and Belgium there are over forty secret newspapers, and although dozens of printing plants have been seized, they continue to appear. A Belgian printer named Heymans was caught and executed in Brussels, but there are plenty of other patriots ready to undertake the work. The secret press organizers are never held up for lack of facilities. Perhaps the most famous among the publications is *La Libre Belgique,* and in accordance with a tradition which dates back to this paper's namesake during the last war, this and its contemporaries fill the space which should contain the name and address of the publisher and printer with fantastic particulars carefully devised to irritate the Germans. In the last war the Belgian patriot Jourdain headed the group which produced *La Libre Belgique,* and it fought effectively for the defeat of the invaders. Again at the present time, the paper is doing the same thing, and its sublime and successful insolence annoys the Nazis beyond measure. Under the title the editorial and distribution address is given as 1, Place du Trone, Brussels, which is the headquarters of the *Oberfeld Kommandantur,* the Commander-in-Chief of the Nazi Army of Occupation. Just below, the name and address of the "responsible editor" is given: "Peter Pan, Jardin d'Egmont, Brussels." This is one of the most beautiful parks in Belgium. To cap everything, "complimentary" copies are always punctually delivered to the chief German officials.

Denmark has no newspaper, but several newssheets. Norway, however, has well over a hundred secret newssheets, although many organizations have been broken up and long sentences of imprisonment passed on those caught assisting the movement. In some cases the death penalty has even been inflicted, this murderous method of attempting to suppress them being introduced at the end of last year after the prison sentences seemed to have done nothing toward lessening the circulation of the sheets.

And they still come out, because the system of dispersal of publication has worked very successfully against the Germans. Norwegian patriots who still have a radio set listen in to the B.B.C. broadcasts. These are given at dictation speed and are recorded by the listeners. They then duplicate the reports by some means or other and distribute them to trustworthy people. Each person is then expected to duplicate it and pass it on to others. By this means the Gestapo is never able to get at all the people taking part in the distribution of these clandestine newssheets.

Finally, despite the strictest surveillance and many arrests, several militant anti-nazi sheets retain a wide circulation in Germany itself, particularly in the Ruhr and the Rhineland. Two are *Freedom* and *The Ruhr Echo,* issued by the German Communist party, and they have been circulating for many years. *Socialist Action* and *The Searchlight* also have a wide following. There is even an anti-war sheet, *Messenger of Peace.* And Goebbels' infamous mouthpiece, *Angriff* (Attack) is countered in the subterranean press by *Gegen Angriff* (Counter Attack).

Report from Italy

With the improvement of the military situation of the Allies the dissatisfaction of the people of Italy with the fascist regime is coming out more and more into the open. Hostility toward nazi control of their country is almost openly demonstrated by the population. The different movements of resistance are realizing that the time has come for them to assert their existence more directly and to make their political programs known.

A very interesting movement is represented by the Partito d'Azione (Action party) which has manifested its activities simultaneously in Milan, Turin, Florence, Rome, and Sardinia. The party is composed of young liberals (the word being used in Italy in the British sense), of republicans, of democrats, and of the old groups of the Giutizia e Liberta. The party publishes a secret newspaper called *Italia Libera* which is widely circulated and has even reached Italian troops in Savoy and Nice. The party has adopted as its program the principles stated by Count Carlo Sforza at the Montevideo Conference of August, 1942, where some 300,000 Italians acclaimed him as the leader of the democratic opposition to fascism.* The Partito d'Azione has established contacts with the Socialists and the Christian Democrats.

For its part, the Socialist party has been reorganized and has created a secret executive. Prominent Italian personalities are members of that executive and are in close contact with Sforza's friends.

A strange and rather mysterious fact is the creation in Italy of a so-called new Communist party advocating the following solution for Italy: abdication of the King, renunciation by the Prince of Piedmont of all his rights as hereditary prince, and proclamation as King of his infant son (who must be six or seven years old) under the theoretical regency of Princess Marie José. It is known throughout Italy that Princess Marie José hates her husband but is very ambitious for herself and for her son.

* For the eight points of this program see FREE WORLD, July, 1942, and for the Montevideo Conference see FREE WORLD, November, 1942.

SOUND-EFFECT

Soundless weights are pulling down
To long-drawn deadness....
Depths are slowly beckoning
For endless slumbering
In endless brocade-covered gutters
Flanked with endless kindly comforts....

Far in the distance a bugle sounds—
Far in the distance and shrilly alarming—
Crying a message—an urgent message—
Rousing the echoes and galloping, storming
Nearer and nearer, with rising intensity,
Blaring its way into decade-packed density,
Blasting a moment in deafened ears:

Awake!
Our hopes are in danger, our future's at stake!

Awake!...
And hurtling onward, at double-speed
To carry the warning to those who heed....

Behind the silence,
Hidden in the muffled folds
Of warm, well-known convenience,
Buried minds
Turn slightly, pull the covers closer,
Catch the threads again of some past fantasy,
Dream on in drugged contentment....
Easier far to let the weights pull downward
To the rest and ease of nothingness
And false security,
Where sorrow loses outline
And perception fades....

The messenger, shuddering, knows that he hears
In back of the silence, the wasted years.

RICHARD DYER MACCANN

BOOKS

The Far East

AN ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE PACIFIC AREA. Part I, POPULATION AND LAND UTILIZATION, by Karl J. Uelzer. xvv + 215 pages. $2.00; Part II, TRANSPORTATION AND TRADE, by Katrine R. C. Greene and Joseph D. Phillips. xiv + 208 pages. $2.00; Part III, INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC, by Kate L. Mitchell. xvii + 322 pages. $2.50. Institute of Pacific Relations.

FOREIGN CAPITAL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Helmut G. Callis. With an Introduction by Carl F. Remer. iv + 120 pages. Institute of Pacific Relations; $1.25

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by Jan O. M. Broek. xv + 172 pages. Institute of Pacific Relations; $2.00

TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by G. H. C. Hart. 123 *pages. Institute of Pacific Relations;* $.50

THE three volumes of "An Economic Survey of the Pacific Area" are essentially reference books that bring together the best available information on various aspects of the countries touching that ocean. No one can say how much of this data will still be useful when the time comes to fit together into a world economy areas that have been subject to such different conditions during the war, but the books are most helpful in the important task of understanding how things stood when war came to the Pacific.

The titles are self-explanatory. The first two volumes offer statistics for all countries touching the Pacific except those of Latin America; Part III deals only with the Asiatic countries south of the USSR, Australia, New Zealand, and adds India which is not covered by the other volumes. Miss Mitchell's book differs from the others also in devoting more space to the interpretation of events and the discussion of policy. Inevitably this means that there is more "point of view" in the book so that it becomes at once more and less than a reference work.

Mr. Callis has done an excellent job of bringing together a great deal of information on the amount, kind, use, and ownership of foreign investments in the countries of southeastern Asia. The subject is an extremely important one and by collating and criticizing the author makes three facts grow where there were but two before and in a very real sense adds to our knowledge. While the book is primarily factual, the last chapter and Professor Remer's introduction are interesting analytical and speculative essays on the forms which foreign investment must take to meet new conditions in the world. Professor Broek has written a useful, compact description of the Netherlands Indies' economy and the policy of the government of the area. Although Mr. Hart's pamphlet is illustrated to look like tourist literature, it turns out to be an interesting discussion of Dutch economic policy in the Islands, with particular emphasis on the economic position of the natives. Critical of the Government's attitude up to 1930, Mr. Hart thinks it has since moved in the right direction and, with qualifications, projects these lines as guides for the future.

One could make many comments on the material in these books. Three requirements stand out as the skeleton of the post-war economy of southeastern Asia. First, foreign capital and skill will continue to be necessary for the economic development of the area. Second, most of the countries will depend for prosperity on exports to industrial countries, largely according to the pre-war pattern. Third, increasing attention must be paid to the domestic economies of the countries and the living standards of their inhabitants. Apart from reasons of justice and political expediency, economic stability for these countries and (to a lesser degree) the rest of the world requires diversification of production and increased industrialization. All of the data and arguments in these books point to the same three conclusions.

Some of the problems that will arise are adumbrated, but the solutions are only touched on (for instance, none of the authors discusses what will happen to the Dutch East Indies and Malaya if the United States maintains its synthetic rubber production). It is good that there is some agreement on what needs to be done, and a little on how to do it. It may prove harder to agree on what the next step is because there, in the field of practical action, begins the struggle over who shall run things and how the total benefits shall be shared.

WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR.

Industrial Offensive

GERMANY'S MASTER PLAN. THE STORY OF INDUSTRIAL OFFENSIVE, by Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh. xviii + 339 pages. Duell; $2.75

MODEST in size but tremendous in importance, this book tells how Germany played on the ingenuousness of America's business leaders in developing strategic materials and how the nazi philosophy of *Herrenvolk* was thus buttressed economically for total war and world conquest. It also poses the question of cartel control, a problem grounded in the relationship between personal freedom and foreign policy. It is a book which shocks by its disclosures and baffles by its implications.

Total war requires total mobilization of industrial and scientific resources, not only during hostilities but also in the pre-war period. As a corollary, potential enemies must be weakened and handicapped. Axiomatic to Germany, this was never accepted by America, either by its industrialists or by its government. Instead, leaders in industry were guided by "business" principles—restricted use of patents, control of production, division of markets, high prices. But in Germany, cartels were developed to apply these very principes. Even before World War I, the cartel movement had gone farther there than anywhere else. The Versailles Treaty did not prevent its further development.

During the Weimar Republic, the German cartel leaders, and particularly I. G. Farbenindustrie, had a free hand to carry on their industrial offensive abroad, using patent pools and cross-licensing agreements as the bait with which to catch their competitors, actual and potential. Moreover, with the bitter experience of shortages of materials in 1914-1918 in mind, the German High Command knew better than ever which materials Germany had to develop in order to defy a blockade. With the advent of Hitler, therefore, the stage was set for the marriage of economics and military strategy which produced the master plan. In all categories of strategic materials—rubber and oil, light metals, plastics, cutting tools, optical glass, synthetic anti-malarials—Germany developed and expanded its own production while limiting, through cartel agreements, the production of these materials abroad.

Whether the architects of Germany's master plan were the Junkers, the High Command, and the industrialists, as Messrs. Borkin and Welsh claim, is open to some doubt. Even more questionable is their thesis that these groups put Hitler in control in order to galvanize the German people and consolidate them for world conquest. The doubtful validity of these points, however, should not obscure the significance of cartels when employed by unscrupulous political leaders for furthering ambitious ends. America's industrial potential for war was clearly lessened by the international agreements which certain of her business leaders made with German business. This is patently a fact of major importance for the framers of the future peace.

Shall we require, as a matter of national policy, the registration in Washington of all international cartel agreements to which American manufacturers are parties? If past experience justified such a measure, would it be compatible with our democratic system of private enterprise? What policy toward German cartelization should guide the United Nations in drafting the economic clauses of the peace treaty? Answers to these questions lie outside the scope of this book. But answers are needed. It is hoped that Washington is aware of this need.

D. C. B.

Signs of the Times

BRAZIL UNDER VARGAS, by Karl Loewenstein. xix + 381 pages. Macmillan; $2.75

THE CHILEAN POPULAR FRONT, by John Reese Stevenson. xi + 155 pages. University of Pennsylvania Press; $1.50

WE have had numerous travelogues like those of Carl Crow and John Gunther, and various general histories such as those of A. Curtis Wilgus and Dana G. Munro. They, however, cover familiar ground in familiar ways, while Karl Loewenstein and John Reese Stevenson are examining the structure of government and analyzing the movement of political life—types of studies which are still too infrequently written by North American observers of the Latin American scene. College courses in what used to be called "comparative government" paid no attention to Latin America, but sources in English are gradually becoming available, so that it will be difficult for post-war professors of political science to ignore the institutions of the other American Republics.

In his very informative volume, Professor Loewenstein has written the first full-length study of the regime of Getulio Vargas. It is well documented, and, while the legal aspects of the Government's position are clearly outlined, attention is also given to the manner in which the system actually functions. Despite certain criticisms of the lack of constitutional safeguards for the individual, the author emphasizes that the Brazilian non-party state is not a fascist state. Brazilian good humor and tolerance, plus a

strong juristic tradition, are suggested as partly responsible for inclining toward liberalism a Government which, legally at least, appears to be little inhibited by its published but as yet unpromulgated Constitution of 1937. While on the country's political life, students of public administration may regret that more space was not allotted to the remarkable developments achieved in this field under the leadership of Dr. Luiz Simoes Lopes and others. This is a serious and sympathetic study of the type recently commended by Ambassador Spruille Braden as offering a solid foundation for understanding between the Americas.

Mr. Stevenson has an interesting story to tell of the rise and fall of the Chilean Popular Front. He has done a useful job of political reporting, although his skirmish-by-skirmish account leaves one with the feeling that he has not penetrated far into the smoke of party battle. Some of the questions which arise after a perusal of this book, which reads like a good senior thesis supplemented by a summer term in Chile, include: What kinds of people are Socialists, Communists, and Radicals? What is the geographical distribution of party strength? What is the popular voting strength of the various parties? What was the role of the Confederation of Chilean Workers in the political struggle? The influence of the fact that, as distinct from France, Chile had a strong president?

A question of greater importance arises from the statement that "the masses have found that they can realize their political objectives through the ballot and need not resort to a trial by arms"; particularly when Mr. Stevenson also says that "The general conclusion about the Popular Front as an instrument of government must be this: Taking as our standard of judgment its pre-election campaign promises, the Popular Front was a failure." When he adds that it was as an instrument of political education that the Popular Front "made its most significant contributions to Chilean political evolution," one wonders whether the Chilean people have been given their due on the score of their political educability.

RICHARD PIKE.

FREE WORLD
Index

for Volume V, covering the six issues from January through June, 1943 is now available. It will serve as a reference guide to world thought on the changing conditions and vital issues of one of the most critical periods in the history of mankind.

Please remit 25 cents for each copy to FREE WORLD, 8 West 40th Street, New York City.

Luminous and Moving

THE FRANCE OF TOMORROW, by Albert Guérard. xxi + 287 pages, Harvard University Press; $3.50

IN this "Tract for the Times" Professor Guérard traces the avoidable causes of the French disaster and proposes a reorganization of Europe which would restore France to her due place and give back to the world that wise "smile of France" without which it would be immeasurably poorer. Only if Europe is reconciled with itself, says the author, can Frenchmen be reconciled with Frenchmen. After he has discussed conflicting traditions in French political life with a penetration and understanding that make their rejection the more striking, Mr. Guérard sets forth his own French tradition, exemplified by such names as Michelet, Hugo, Juarès, and Briand. The circumstances of his life have made the author a citizen of "Western democracy," and his many-faceted book reveals a personality embodying that interpenetration of cultures without which he believes there can be no salvation for the world.

Specifically, Mr. Guérard calls for a union of all Europe west of Russia, incorporating the whole Mediterranean region, and composed of some sixty geographical divisions, several in France and several in Germany. The nations would disappear as economic and administrative units to survive as cultural traditions in the minds of men. As a means of strengthening and preserving the federation the author suggests the adoption of a common secondary language, preferably a modernized Latin. Mr. Guérard is an impenitent Utopian, but he also possesses the sagacity and flare of an elder statesman. And certainly in our day of universal unsettlement the only hope for the world lies in some sort of Utopia. It is impossible here to outline in detail the author's argument, and needless to express the misgivings that may be aroused by parts of it. "Luminous, profound and moving." These terms which Mr. Guérard applies to a colleague's essay characterize his own work. It will be studied by all who are confronted with things French.

What is extraordinarily impressive is the mastery with which the author sets contemporary problems in historic perspective. Viewed from the vantage point of centuries, the religion of nationalism which has inevitably forced the peoples of Europe to immolate themselves is a recent aberration, and its correction would be no "reversal of a historic process." For the essential tradition of Europe is not nationalism but unity, a fact of immense political implications.

ALBERT LIPPMAN.

Psychology and Prices

WAR WITHOUT INFLATION, by George Katona. 207 pages. Columbia; $2.50

CAN America wage and win this war without inflation? Most economists will probably answer that this is possible, and that the decision is up to the politician. If he is farsighted and courageous, inflation can be avoided. If he is not, then the increase in consumers' purchasing power will inevitably drive prices up, and once this movement is started, it is difficult to stop. Underlying this statement, there is a silent assumption about mass psychology. Mr. Katona's book considers this assumption.

He shows that prices move by the decisions and actions of men and thus depend upon attitudes and expectations. But attitudes and expectations are subject to outside influences and can therefore be changed. Mr. Katona applies himself to a demonstration of how such changes can be used to counteract inflationary dangers. He discusses price-fixing and rationing, taxation, and saving from the point of view of the choice of psychologically effective methods to stem inflation. It is clear that once inflationary expectations exist, rush-buying is bound to bring about wholesale price increases. Mere repetition of the statement that prices will not go up, or the threat of punishment for undesirable actions, will not be enough. In a democratic community, it is necessary to make the public understand the problems of a war economy. In this frame of reference, it will then be possible to demonstrate the need for governmental action to prevent inflation.

The book is full of sound suggestions and criticisms, but I wonder to what extent scientific psychology is needed for them. Most of them, I believe, could have been found by good common sense and perhaps by referring to the great amount of European experience in rationing and price control. Many economists will be somewhat surprised by the picture of economic theory which Mr. Katona draws in his introductory pages. The velocity of money has been part of monetary theory for many decades. Most of the economic formulations to which Mr. Katona refers seem to have been taken out of textbooks written at the turn of the century or even earlier. No reference is made to the work of W. C. Mitchell and John Maurice Clark, to name only two authors in the field of psychological foundations of economics. Mr. Katona is undoubtedly on the right path, but he did not follow it far enough beyond the beaten track.

ADOLF F. STURMTHAL.

German Underground

THE SILENT WAR, by Jan B. Jansen and Stefan Weyl. 357 pages. Lippincott Co. $2.75.

Is there "another Germany" within the nazi Reich? And why has the opposition, thus far, nothing concrete to show for its efforts? What are its prospects for the future? The authors of "Silent War" have given a completely realistic picture of conditions within Germany. Far from romanticizing the underground movement, they rob it of some of its drama. Precisely for this reason, this dry, unsentimentalized book is as exciting as a novel.

The tragic mistakes made by German labor prior to 1933 are reviewed: its failure to assess the relative power of the Nazis vis-à-vis other parties and pressure groups, and its credulous reliance on formal rights. Forced underground, the workers' movement began a difficult and dangerous existence. Its early faith that labor could continue to organize legally cost the lives of many caught in the Gestapo net. But in that merciless guerrilla war they learned how to become invisible.

"The Silent War" is particularly impressive in its account of Germany during the days when the war broke over the German people and in its appraisal of their slowly manifested reaction. We know how vainly the men of the German underground warned the world against Hitler. In the summer of 1938 they said, quite rightly, "Hitler's blackout is the avenue leading to war." But in those days such men were called "war mongers."

The life of the underground worker is in terrific danger; "Sacrifice is the daily bread of the underground movement and arrest is the occupational hazard of an underground functionary." And the list of executions in Germany, published in "The Silent War," shows how often the life of the underground worker is in grave peril.

The authors of "The Silent War" are convinced that the war must inevitably bring about the downfall of nazism and they cite impressive examples to show the extent to which the German underground will have contributed to this event. The greatness of the spirit of sacrifice corresponds to the greatness of the task. The book closes with the words: "It is out of this spirit that has risen the irrepressible resistance that has cost inestimable sacrifice and will cost more. And it is this spirit that gives us a guarantee that a peaceful, democratic and free Germany will come into being in a world of free peoples."

JULIUS DEUTSCH.

The LATIN AMERICAN POLICY of the UNITED STATES

by SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS

"Of the millions of words currently printed about Latin America few reflect knowledge of the steps by which inter-American relations have been forged. Most of the books throw little light on how we got the Good-Neighbor policy, and what we got. This lack quickens our appreciation of Mr. Bemis's 470 closely packed pages. The story is all here. He has done another major job with the meticulous care which we have come to associate with his name."—*New York Times Book Review*

Illustrated with maps and diagrams $4.50

The BATTLE for BUENOS AIRES

by SAX BRADFORD

"If North America is ever to overtake the Axis in the race for friendship in Argentina, the laps lost by ignorance must be made up now and at a furious pace. Sax Bradford's book is an accelerated course in the history, geography, government, politics, people, and culture of the country, breath-taking in its urgency, persuasive in its plea for a sounder United States understanding of the land."—*Boston Globe* $2.50

MIND, MEDICINE, & MAN

by GREGORY ZILBOORG, M.D.

A new book on psychoanalysis which corrects many popular misconceptions and brilliantly demonstrates how psychiatric knowledge must affect our thinking about individual maladjustments, about crime, war, science, and religion. "A book whose enlightening tendency and capacity make it worthy of widest circulation."—*Thomas Mann* $3.50

FOUR QUARTETS *by* T. S. ELIOT

BURNT NORTON, EAST COKER, THE DRY SALVAGES, and LITTLE GIDDING, four long related poems, written in a new form described by Mr. Eliot as "quartets." They represent a distinct phase of his poetry, the product of the last seven years. $2.00

HARCOURT, BRACE & COMPANY, 383 MADISON AVE., N. Y.

"IN the United States there is a movement known as the Free World Association. Take it, make it a mass movement, bring it everywhere men and women meet together. Lose yourselves in this task! Understand that the balance of the future is now so finely drawn that your action may yet become a part of the final result."

—MICHAEL STRAIGHT in
"Make This the Last War."

•

Your duty as a citizen is to make your opinions known to the statesmen who represent you.

You can become articulate by joining

The
American Free World
Association

MRS. J. BORDEN HARRIMAN, *Chairman*
HOWARD L. BROOKS, *Executive Secretary*

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
1710 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

NEW YORK OFFICE
8 West 40th Street New York City
WIsconsin 7-9841

REGIONAL CENTERS
214 Loma Drive - - - Los Angeles, Cal.
Oliver Bldg. - - - - - Pittsburgh, Pa.
3051 Milton, S.E. - Grand Rapids, Mich.

I wish to join the American Free World Association

As a member.....$1.00 a year

As a contributing member*_____

*Fill in with any sum you desire.

All memberships of $5.00 or more entitle the contributor to a year's subscription to FREE WORLD.

AN ECONOMIC PROGRAM FOR A LIVING DEMOCRACY, by Irving H. Flamm. xv + 342 pages. Liveright, $3.00

In keeping with the subtitle of his book, "A capitalistic approach to a semi-socialist democratic society," Mr. Flamm proposes that our national economy be divided into two sectors: one operated by government departments and public corporations, the other in private hands. Although his blueprint of the proposed governmental structure is detailed and calls for many changes from our present system, the author has little to say about the administrative or economic relations of the two sectors to one another.

Mr. Flamm argues interestingly that government action should always be intended to free people to follow their natural inclinations rather than to check one group in the interests of another. Regulation, he says, is frustrating, ineffective because it is based on compromise, and leads to fascism. When private enterprise cannot function freely with good results, the government should take over the industry in question, not regulate it. Unfortunately this point is not adequately discussed, nor is there any exploration of the kinds of governmental action that would free people in this sense. The analysis of our troubles is a familiar one emphasizing waste, restrictionism, the dominance of financial motives, and the failure of the public interest to find adequate expression. To rebut possible criticisms of his proposal, Mr. Flamm catalogues the familiar arguments for socialism. Surprisingly enough, the proposal gains clarity from the author's bright idea of presenting it in the form of a corporate reorganization plan.

AN APPRAISAL OF THE PROTOCOLS OF ZION, by John S. Curtiss. vii + 117 pages. Columbia; $1.00

One of the marvels of contemporary history is that a document as obviously false as the infamous Protocols of Zion should have been so effective and injurious. From the time that Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent* first published this forgery to the time when Father Coughlin was forced to suspend his elaboration of its contents, it has been one of the chief instruments of propaganda against the Jew. Now a group of American historians sponsor the final exposé of this sinister lie with the evidence presented at the Bern Trials, which not only proves that the accusations have been false but also shows them to be ridiculous.

A Check List of Forthcoming Books on International Affairs

REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME, by Harold J. Laski. Viking. An analysis of political and social forces of today with stress on England and America. A spokesman for democracy, Mr. Laski presents the dynamics of democracy and indicates the doom which awaits if nations fail to see clearly and act courageously.

ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC, by Hawthorne Daniel. Putnam. Detailed information about the many islands of the Pacific with facts concerning location, peoples, languages, government, resources, including their strategic importance both in commerce and war.

BUT SOLDIERS WONDERED WHY, by Frank Gervasi. Doubleday. The role of Africa and South America in this global war. Not only the effect of the war on Africa and South America but an evaluation of what victory and the consequent reforms will bring to these two continents.

MOSCOW DATELINE, by Henry C. Cassidy. Houghton Mifflin. The story of Russia's production, preparedness, and resistance from February 1941 to February 1943.

THE UNKNOWN ARMY, by Nikolaus Basseches. Viking. A history of Russia in modern times with emphasis on the historical and political facts that led to the Russian Army's creation, and to its organic relation to the Soviet system, not only as a military but as a social and political power.

MY WAR WITH JAPAN, by Carroll Alcott. Holt. Information about Japan, her people, her institutions, and the havoc she has wrought throughout the Far East, by one of the top-ranking newscasters in America who has watched the development of the Japanese military machine at close range for over fifteen years.

A FIVE YEAR PEACE PLAN: A Schedule for Peace Building, by Edward J. Bying. Coward. A detailed and specific five-year democratic peace plan intended to precede the peace treaty, concerned with post-war measures of political, economic, and spiritual import. Questions considered range from the disarmament of the Axis to the free trade question, the future status of Asia, and the spiritual regeneration of the West.

BOOKS TOWARD A FREE WORLD

ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY

A Survey of Six Centuries from Chaucer to Queen Victoria

By GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN

"The scope of social history may be defined as the daily life of the inhabitants of the land in past ages: this includes the human as well as the economic relation of different classes to one another, the character of family and household life, the conditions of labor and of leisure, the attitude of man to nature, the culture of each age as it arose out of these general conditions of life, and took ever changing forms in religion, literature and music, architecture, learning and thought."—From the Author's Introduction.

628 pages. $4.50

THE TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET RUSSIA

By SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB
With an Essay on the Webbs
By GEORGE BERNARD SHAW

The celebrated authors of *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* remove the question mark from that title in this brisk, clear-sighted summary of the working of the Constitution of 1936 in terms of the political, social and economic life of the Soviets since its adoption. Included are a new translation of the Constitution by Anna Louise Strong and a unique postscript in which the Webbs emphasize its essential character as a new Declaration of the Rights of Man.

128 pages. $1.50

STRATEGY FOR DEMOCRACY

By J. DONALD KINGSLEY and DAVID W. PETEGORSKY

A vigorous examination of the economic and political realities with which we must deal if we are to build a progressive and workable world order. "The first thorough American effort to present a reconstructive view of the war and the peace that may come."—Ralph Bates.

342 pages. $3.00

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.
55 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK

Among Ourselves

To the Editors:

Amid much discussion of the possibility of a new world order after the war there remains one major problem that has received little realistic thought. I refer to the problem of minimizing the effect of the language barriers that prevent the free interchange of ideas and slow the progress of knowledge. Readers of FREE WORLD will not fail to appreciate the importance of the problem. I crave space in your columns to expose to their impartial judgment a proposal for the establishment of a world bureau for the translation of works of learning. It seems best to present it in this preliminary and tentative form without complicating details.

1. In the area of the intellectual disciplines we find today a condition analogous to that which occurs in the economic realm when the facilities of production far exceed those of distribution. The language barrier is the chief of the obstructions that prevent the free circulation of the materials of thought and knowledge.

2. In large degree the history of the advance of thought and culture has been the history of the translation of books—the flow of learned and intellectually regenerative works from language to language. But the process of selection and the work of translation have always been unsatisfactory, and in our time books are translated according to (a) the interests of some disciple of the author, (b) the interests of some limited group, (c) the prospects of commercial success.

3. Both the progress of learning and the unification of culture would be greatly promoted by a planned expansion of the translation of works of academic value. The plan should be based on (a) a systematic survey on a world scale of translation facts and requirements, (b) selection by competent judges of the works to be translated, (c) employment of competent translators and approval of their work by competent committees. Translations should include both texts that preserve historic materials of culture, and books and short studies of current importance.

4. Conferences should now be begun to prepare plans for a world bureau of translation to be set up as an essential feature of the educational policy of the post-war world authority. The main task of the bureau would be to distribute as widely as possible by translation the products of the best thought and research. It should at the outset acquire and file information on the distribution of languages, including the use of foreign languages in the various countries.

5. Arrangements for the publication of the translated texts would be entered into with university presses and other firms in the country of the receiving language group. For distribution in some countries the bureau would probably need to use a press of its own. The books produced under its direction would bear the stamp of its approval.

Conceivably the full operation of this plan might be delayed through a relatively long period of slow development from small beginnings; but at a time when projects for world organization are practical issues it is better to move as directly and promptly as possible toward its realization. There is a "too little and too late" possibility here. The speed of technological progress lends urgency to all measures that may secure and advance the higher culture and further its common diffusion. No merely national effort will meet the problem. Nor can we be content with provision for the interchange of a few works between the three or four languages of major book production. It is idle to say that the earnest student will acquire the needed language equipment for himself in order to acquaint himself with the works of learning and culture, historic and contemporary; his whole life would have to be spent in language study. Nor can we await the emergence of a universal language, desirable as that may be. With something like the zeal of the Bible societies, which have distributed the Scriptures in more than a thousand languages, we must undertake a maximum distribution of the documents of man's hoarded wisdom and of the current materials of learning.

In relation to a project of such concern for humanity as this the question of finance should not prove unduly troublesome. For the price of a battleship the bureau could be established and given years of security. It should be possible to obtain funds from governments interested in maintaining peace and from privately supported organizations for world betterment. If this project gains the favor of enough of the leading minds in the world of scholarship, and of some portion of the public, it is confidently to be expected that it will obtain the financial support necessary to its success. It is also reasonable to expect that the demand for books approved by the bureau would far exceed the normal demand for learned books, and that the financial returns would help to maintain it.

JOHN T. MCNEILL
Chicago.

[The Editors agree with Professor McNeill that the lack of reciprocal knowledge of the works of learning has been one of the chief barriers to intellectual co-operation. They invite comment on Mr. McNeill's plan and further suggestions along these lines.]

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

SIR RICHARD ACLAND, the fifteenth holder of a baronetcy created in 1644, revolted from the ideas and traditions of his class by leaving the Liberal party to found an independent political organization for "vital democracy and common ownership." He is acknowledged as one of the most advanced social thinkers in England, and under his leadership the Common Wealth Movement has made great headway since the beginning of this war. In advocating economic reform, he believes himself to be patriotic as well as progressive, summing up his philosophy in the words: "The first people who can combine political and economic democracy will assume the moral leadership of the world. It is a big job and a big challenge. We who want a new Britain have got to be big enough to get it."

SIR RICHARD is not merely an academic liberal. He recently put his political philosophy into practice by giving to the British National Trust a large part of his personal fortune and two family estates in New Guinea, after selling a portion of them to provide for the education of two sons and for death duties.

Our suggestion that FREE WORLD readers buy *SIR NORMAN ANGELL'S* new book has been taken seriously by at least one enthusiastic subscriber. He recently bought thirty copies of "Let the People Know" and distributed them among his friends and business associates—"where it will do most good." *SIR NORMAN'S* commentary on current events will continue to be published as a regular feature of FREE WORLD.

Five years ago, *COUNT FERDINAND CZERNIN* left Austria for England and a year later his, "Europe, Going, Going, Gone" was published both in London and New York. Soon afterward, he reached this country and immediately after his arrival, took out his first citizenship papers. He prefers the noble state of freedom to a title of nobility. Now he is chairman of Austrian Action, "a militant, democratic, anti-totalitarian Austrian organization established to liberate Austria and to unite all Austrians in the Western Hemisphere on behalf of a democratic solution of Austria's post-war problems." Austrian Action has vigorously opposed the formation of a battalion under the sponsorship of Otto von Hapsburg.

STANTON A. COBLENTZ, whose earlier article, *Contours of Tomorrow,* appeared in the February, 1943 issue, has done much writing in the social and political fields. Among his books, "Marching Men, the Story of War" is most closely allied to his current essay.

HERBERT V. EVATT, Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General of Australia has for years been concerned with problems of imperialism, mandated territories, and colonial policies. His book, "British Dominions and Mandatories," deals directly with this subject. He has taken an active part in Australian public affairs, for a time was member of the Legislative Assembly, and in 1926 was a delegate of the Australian Labor Movement to the World's Migration Conference in London.

It is one of the ironies of history that of all the men in the French Army who might have refused to accept the surrender to the Nazis, *CHARLES DE GAULLE* should come forth to lead the forces against collaboration. For before *GENERAL DE GAULLE* broke with Marshal Pétain on the question of continuing French participation in the war against nazism, the two men had a long, if altogether accidental, association.

When the first World War broke out, young *CHARLES DE GAULLE* was a lientenant in an infantry regiment commanded by the then Colonel Pétain. The Colonel soon became a general; and the lieutenant, wounded three times, captured by the Germans, and noted for his many attempts to escape, was cited by the general for gallantry in action. After the war *DE GAULLE* continued his military career, and in the course of time became Marshal Pétain's aide-de-camp.

This connection has been a handicap to *GENERAL DE GAULLE* in his monumental task of rallying the French people to continue their resistance to Hitler. It was held that anyone with *DE GAULLE'S* background must naturally be reactionary. But in the course of his leadership *DE GAULLE* has steadily moved toward democratic ideals and is today acknowledged by France as the leader of all the liberal and underground forces of his country. As we go to press, A Council of French Resistance, composed of delegates from nine resistance movements, six political parties, and two labor organizations, has issued a declaration demanding the formation of a provisional French government presided over by *DE GAULLE.*

As *GEORGE A. HOGG* informs us, the Indusco movement was created in China during the war as a means of carrying on the struggle against the Japanese. Its 4,500 branches form a small part of the 166,000 co-operative societies of all kinds, totaling 10,000,000 members, that constitute the Chinese co-operative movement.

MR. HOGG was born and educated in England and is an Oxford Greats graduate. He is

now 27 years old. On his return from a free lance reporting trip into China's guerrilla regions, he met Lu Kwang-Mien, Director of Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, Northwest Headquarters. Since then he has been associated with Indusco, first, as English Secretary of the Northwest Headquarters, and during the past six months, as Headmaster of the Shuángshihpu Bailie Technical School for young boys.

Under the title, *The World Scene in Washington, ERNEST K. LINDLEY* will contrbute a monthly report to our pages of important developments in international affairs, as seen from the inside in what may justly be called the capital of the United Nations. Our readers undoubtedly recognize why we congratulate ourselves on having obtained *MR. LINDLEY* for this delicate and vital task. As chief of the Washington Bureau of *Newsweek,* news analyst for the National Broadcasting Company, and American commentator for the British Broadcasting Corporation, *MR. LINDLEY* has his fingers on the pulse of the throbbing events that characterize our times. He is regarded as one of the few men who is really close to the sources of information and to the men who are making history.

ERNEST LINDLEY'S ability to look into the background of the contemporary scene and to view the immediate issues in perspective is illustrated in his books, which trace the history of the New Deal from the election of President Roosevelt to the war. In chronological sequence they are: "Franklin Delano Roosevelt—a Career in Progressive Democracy," "The Roosevelt Revolution—First Phase," and "Half Way With Roosevelt." His latest work, "A New Deal for Youth," was written in collaboration with his wife, Betty Lindley.

One of the most exciting essays ever published in FREE WORLD was *The War About the Peace* which *LIN YUTANG* contributed to the July, 1942 issue. It brought a flood of letters from educators, historians, journalists, and statesmen approving his position, and some tart replies from the authors criticized. *LIN YUTANG* has the faculty of making people sit up and take notice. His books, beginning with "Importance for Living" have been best sellers in this country. To his own countrymen he has long been known as a scholar and philosopher. *The Search for Principles* will form a chapter in his forthcoming book, "Between Tears and Laughter."

PRIVATE RICHARD D. MACCANN, at one time teaching assistant in political science at Stanford University and later a junior administrative assistant at the Office of War Information, is now in an Armored Division Headquarters, Classification Section. "We are trying to see to it, in our Section, that the Army's job of 'putting the right man in the right place' somehow gets nearer to success all the time," he writes.

GAETANO SALVEMINI, former professor of history at the University of Florence, fought the Fascists and their philosophy in Italy, and was forced to go into exile when Mussolini seized power. His book, "Under the Axe of Fascism," was one of the first studies of the moral, political, and economic ruin brought to a country by a totalitarian regime. For many years *DR. SALVEMINI* has been living in this country. He is professor of history at Harvard University and is a member of the International Honorary Board of FREE WORLD. He has been unremitting in his efforts to explain to Americans the curse of fascism and its ramifications in the international political scene.

As we were going to press, we received the following telegram from the author of *American Japanese—Friends or Foes?* "My parents-in-law still in relocation centers. Check-up within camps shows their lives would be endangered by my by-line on article at this time. Request you change my name to read *WILLIAM TANI* and defer introductory comment until subsequent date. Plan to have folks out in December." Obviously, we cannot jeopardize the author's relatives in revealing his identity by giving the facts of his life, but we promise to give our readers the fascinating experiences of this democratic Japanese who went from the White House to the concentration camp.

LUCIEN VOGEL, noted in France as editor and publisher of *Lu* and *Vu,* escaped to this country after the French armistice with Hitler, for he was marked by the Nazis as one of their first victims. He is a member of the Executive Committee of France Forever, the American branch of the Fighting French movement, and is closely associated with FREE WORLD. He is now receiving congratulations for his participation in the appearance of *Le Monde Libre.* His sketch, "Cartoons in writing," appeared in the February, 1942 issue of FREE WORLD.

E. R. YARHAM, F. R. G. S., an English journalist who is a contributor to many British and overseas newspapers and magazines, is closely in touch with the activities of the Continental Underground movement.

"Report from the Underground," the dramatic presentation of facts culled from our *Underground Reporter* which has been broadcast every Tuesday at 8:03 P.M., will hereafter be heard over WMCA at 10:03 P.M. Readers of FREE WORLD are urged to join the vast audience which has been enjoying this half-hour program.

Serving Those Who Serve Freedom - - -

Fighting men aboard naval ships and on land must have all possible protection against dread infections. Dixie Cups, used once and then destroyed, lessen the danger of passing infections from person to person. They are serving to keep the United Nations strong against the attacks of disease.

DIXIE CUPS

PRODUCT OF DIXIE-VORTEX COMPANY, EASTON, PA., CHICAGO, ILL., TORONTO, CAN.

Used 'round the world

"The night may still be long, perhaps, but the suffering and weary are now sure that dawn will come. France intends to stand erect and strong in the sun of tomorrow."

General Charles De Gaulle

chose for his message to the American people the magazine that speaks to all the world

FREE WORLD—SIX EDITIONS

AMERICAN • CHILEAN • CHINESE • FRENCH • MEXICAN • PUERTO RICAN

carry the ideas of FREE WORLD to the United Nations. The outstanding statesmen, philosophers, economists, and scientists of our time contribute to its pages.

Dear Wally:

I almost never read a magazine from cover to cover, especially if it is a rather thick one. Usually I pick out a few articles and skim most of the material.

That has been quite impossible with the FREE WORLD. No part of it can be missed. I have just finished the March issue with the same thoroughness that I gave the February one and feel a very deep enthusiasm about the publication in every respect. I am already recommending it to quite a number of other people and plan to give one or more subscriptions to friends of mine.

This note is just to thank you again for your generosity in giving me a subscription and to tell you how much I enjoy it.

Best personal wishes.

Cordially,

Joe

"No Part of It Can Be Missed"

Every day readers tell us FREE WORLD has become indispensable to them, for its timely articles and special features cover everything that happens in the international field today.

Read what the Executive Secretary of American Friends Service Committee of Northern California says in acknowledging a gift subscription.

Then think of the friends whom you can please as much by subscribing for them.

Do It NOW!